(o) Hand v. Baynes,4Whart.204,214; Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 27; Brecknock Co. v. Pritchard, 6T.R. 750. But see Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 310, 321.

(p) See cases cited ante, p. * 183, note (f). In Lewis v. The Western Railroad Co. 11 Met. 509, it was held, that if A, for whom goods are transported by a railroad company, authorizes B to receive the delivery thereof, and to do all acts incident to the delivery and transportation thereof to A; and B, instead of receiving the goods at the usual place of delivery, requests the agent of the company to permit the car which contains the goods to be hauled to a near depot of another railroad company, and such agent assents thereto, and assists B in hauling the car to such depot, and B there requests and obtains leave of that company to use its machinery to remove the goods from the car, then the company that transported the goods is not answerable for the want of care or skill in the persons employed in so removing the goods from the car, nor for the want of strength in the machinery used for the removal of them, and cannot be charged with any loss that may happen in the course of such delivery to A.

(q) Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wend. 305. In this case it was held, that it is competent for a carrier to prove that the uniform usage and course of the business in which he is engaged, is to leave the goods at his usual stopping-places in the towns to which the goods are directed, without notice to the consignees; and if such usage be shown of so long continuance, uniformity, and notoriety, as to justify a jury to find that it was known to the plaintiff, the carrier will be discharged.

(r) Bristol v. R. & S. R. R. R. Co., 9 Barb. 158.

1 Jewell v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 55 N. H. 84.

If a part of the goods are lost by the act of God, or in such wise that the carrier is not liable for the loss, and he delivers the remainder of the goods, he is entitled to freight for what he delivers. (rr)

Usage, so long established, so uniform, and so well known that it must be supposed that the parties to a contract knew it, and referred to it, becomes, as it were, a part of the contract, and may modify the rights and duties of the parties in an important manner. And in determining what is a sufficient delivery of goods by a carrier, usage has frequently great influence. (s) In general, as we have said, the delivery must be to the owner or consignee, or his authorized agent. But if the goods are left at his residence or (such delivery being more appropriate) at his place of business, that is equivalent to a delivery into his personal possession, and it does not seem that any personal notice is necessary. Perhaps it may always be presumed that the owner of goods will receive information if they are left at his house; and if not, that it is his own fault, or, if the fault of others, not that of the carrier. But where a delivery by a carrier is made at an owner's house, but not in a usual way, as if the parcel were placed in a dark corner of an entrance or back room, without attracting notice or giving information to any one, this circumstance might indicate either wrongful motive or culpable negligence; and such delivery would not be a sufficient one. It is undoubtedly best, in all cases of delivery not to the person himself, to give notice to him, or to one certainly authorized to receive notice for him.

(rr) Price v. Hartshorn, 44 Barb. 655.

(s) See Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 16 Vt. 52, 18 id. 131, 83 id. 186. This is one of the strongest cases in the books upon this point. The defendants were common carriers on Lake Champlain, from Burlington to St. Albans, touching Port Kent ana Plattsbnrgh long enough to discharge and receive freight and passengers. This action was brought against them to recover for the loss of a package of bank-bills. It appeared in evidence that the package in question, which was directed to "Richard Yates, Esq., Cashier, Platts-burg, N. Y.," was delivered by the teller of the plaintiffs' bank to the captain of the defendants' boat, which ran daily from Burlington to Plattsbnrg, and thence to St. Albans; and that, when the boat arrived at Plattsburg, the captain delivered the package to one Ladd, a wharfinger, and that it was lost or stolen while in Ladd's possession. No notice was given by the captain of the boat to the consignee of the arrival of the package, nor had he any knowledge of it until after it was lost. The principal question in the case was, whether the package was sufficiently delivered to discharge the defendants from their liability as carriers. The defendants offered evidence to show, that a delivery to the wharfinger, without notice, under the circumstances of the case, was a good delivery according to their own uniform usage, and the usage of other carriers similarly situated. The case has been before the Supreme Court of Vermont three times, and that court has uniformly held, that in the absence of any special contract, a delivery to the wharfinger without notice, if warranted by the usage of the place, was sufficient, and discharged the defendants from all liability. When the case was before the court the last time, Redfield, J., in delivering the judgment, said: "If the law fixes the extent of the contract, in every instance, in the manner assumed, then, most undoubtedly, are the defendants liable in this case, unless they can show, in the manner required, some controlling usage. But if, upon examination, it shall appear that there is no rule of law applicable to the subject, and the extent of the transit is a matter resting altogether in proof, then the course of business at the place of destination, the usage or practice of the defendants, and other carriers, if any, at that port, and at that wharf, become essential and controlling ingredients in the contract itself." See Richardson v. God-dard, 23 How. 28.

Carriers by land usually deliver the goods they transport, by carrying them to the owner, or where he directs. And generally they can do this as easily as they can bring them into the town where he lives. But this is not the case with one important class of carriers by land; we mean railroads. The freight cars can go only where the rails go, and these terminate in the station-house. If the goods are to be carried further, they must be laden upon wagons or other carriages for that purpose. Moreover, it is usual for the consignor by railroad to send to the consignee notice of the consignment, and very frequently a copy of a receipt, which seems to take the place of a bill of lading, and is sometimes framed in very similar terms. And the arrival of the goods at a certain hour may usually be calculated upon with great certainty. For all these reasons, and some others, it is usual with railroads not to send the goods out of their depots. (t)