(x) In Bradford v. Farrand, 13 Mass 18, a contract had been made in Massachusetts, with a citizen of that State, by a citizen of Pennsylvania, and no express provision was made that it should be performed in Pennsylvania; it was held, that the discharge of the debtor under the Pennsylvania statute of insolvency, was no bar to an action in Massachusetts upon this contract. The court said: "It has been settled in the case of Blanchard v. Russell, that a certificate of discharge under the insolvent law of another State, is binding only upon contracts made within the State which enacts the law, or which by the terms of them are to be there performed. The debt in this case must be considered to have arisen within this State; the bargain from which it arose was made here, and it was not provided that it should be performed in Pennsylvania; although the plaintiff might have applied therefor his remedy, if he had teen fit." In Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67, a note had been made in New York, payable in New York, to citizens of New York, by citizens of Alabama The plaintiffs sued in the Circuit Court of the United States, and it was held, that insolvency of the estate, judicially declared under the statute of Alabama, is not sufficient in law to abate a suit instituted in that court, by a citizen of another State, against the representatives of a citizen of Alabama. Boyle v. Zacha rie, 6 Pet 635; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295: M'Millan v. M'Neill, 4 Wheat. 209 In Cook v Moffat, Ogden v. Saunders having been cited on the argument, and the language of Johnsont J., adverted to, Grier, J, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We do not deem it necessary, on the present occasion, either to vindicate the consistency of the propositions ruled in that case with the reasons on which it appears to have been founded, or to discuss anew the many vexed questions mooted therein, and on which the court was so much divided. It may be remarked, however, that the members of the court who were in a minority on the final decision of it, fully assented to the correctness of M'Millan v. M'Neill, which rules the present case" In Emory v. Grenongh, 3 DalL 369, the debt was "contracted between citizens of Boston. Subsequently the defendant removed to Pennsylvania, and while a citizen there took advantage of the bankrupt law of that State. Subsequent to his discharge, he returned for a temporary purpose to Boston, and was arrested by the plaintiff, on an action brought by the Circuit

Court. It was held, in that court, that the certificate was no bar. On a similar state of facts, a directly contrary opinion was adopted by the Circuit Court of Rhode Island, 3 Dall. 369. A writ of error on the Massachusetts case never reached a hearing. A valuable translation from 2 Hub. De Conflictu Leyam, p. 538, is appended to the report of this case, 3 Dall. 370 The cases of Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 196; Aguew v. Platt, 15 id. 417; Betts v. Bagley, 12 id. 572; and Osborn v. Adams, 18 id. 245, in which this matter was discussed, were followed by the recent case of Savoye v. Marsh, 10 Met. 594. In this case the facts were, that the defendants made a note payable to their own order and indorsed it to the plaintiffs before maturity. The plain-tiffs were inhabitants of New York, the defendants of Lowell, in the State of Massachusetts. The note was made in Boston. The defendants, after the making of the note, were discharged by the Massachusetts insolvent law. It was held, that this was not a bar to the action, notwithstanding the fact that the action was brought in the court of the same State which had granted the discharge; and Dewey, J., delivering the opinion of the court, laid down a doctrine which we cannot but regard as a wholesome one, as follows: "The distinction as to the forum where the party elects to institute his action, may be very material in regard to all that is mere remedy. The State courts may, in all actions instituted therein, give full force and effect to their own laws as to forms of proceeding, rights of attachment, holding to bail, imprisoning the body on execution, and the like; but a State insolvent law, operating upon the contract directly and discharging the party from all liability thereon, must, as to those to be affected by it, have the same operation in both tribunals. If it be a constitutional law, - if in its provisions it does not transcend the limits of State authority, - it must be valid in all tribunals, State or national. If otherwise, it must be held invalid and inoperative in all." A doctrine so reason-ble as this, it may be expected, will eventually prevail. And see further, as cases presenting the most interesting discussion of this subject, Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat, at the 272d page; St urges v. Crowninshield, 4 id. 122; Clay v. Smith, 3 Pet. 411. Parker, C. J., in Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 194; Norton v. Cook, 9 Conn. 314; Woodhull v. Wagner, I Baldw. 296. And see the text-book authorities cited below. Fiske v. Foster, 10 it would seem to follow *that no contract made in one State, and to be performed there, can be discharged, as to the persons of that State, by the law * of another State in which the debtor resides, (y) Thus a merchant living in Boston makes in New York a note payable there, and then becomes insolvent in Massachusetts, and is discharged by the law of that State. If, now, the New York creditor comes to Massachusetts, and there sues the insolvent in the courts of Massachusetts, the discharge would be a bar to the suit1 But he might proceed in New York under the law of New York, against the person or property of the debtor if found there, and the discharge in Massachusetts would be no bar. If, however, the note was made in Boston, and made payable there, and the New York creditor sued it in New York, after a demand and refusal in Boston, the Massachusetts discharge would now be a bar.1 If the note were made not expressly payable in any place, and were made to a New York merchant, or becomes his property in good faith for value by indorsement or delivery before the discharge, is it now available * by the New York holder? We should say it was, so far as the courts of New York were concerned, because they would regard it as a debt payable in New York, and so perhaps it would be if the debt were originally payable in Massachusetts, and had been demanded there, and then sued in another State, and there reduced to a judgment; (z) but it could not be sued in the Massachusetts courts. It has been held, that a discharge under the insolvent laws of Massachusetts, is a bar to an action on a contract between two citizens of that State, though made and to be performed in another State, (a)