(g) Willett v. Atterton, 1 W. Bl. 35; Perkins v. Burbank, 2 Mass 81.

(h) In Spring v Gray, 5 Mason, 523.

(i) In Green v. Rivett, 2 Salk. 421.

(j ) Thus, in A'Court v. Crow, 3 Bing. 329, defendant, being arrested on a debt more than six years old, said: "I know that I owe the money, bat the bill I gave is on a threepennny receipt stamp, and I will never pay it;" this was held not such an acknowledgment as would revive the debt against a plea of the statute of limitations. And per Best, C. J., "The courts have said, acknowledgment of a debt is sufficient, without any promise to pay it, to take a case out of the statute. I cannot reconcile this doctrine, either with the words of the statute, or the language of the pleadings. The replication to the plea of non-assumpsit, infra sex annos, is that the defendaut did undertake and promise within six years. The mere acknowledgment of a debt is not a promise to pay it; a man may acknowledge a debt which he knows he is incapable of paying, and it is contrary to all sound reasoning to presume from such acknowledgment that he promises to pay it; yet without regarding the circumstance under which an acknowledgment was made, the courts, on proof of it, have presumed a promise. It has been sup-posed that the legislature only meant to protect persons who had paid their debts, but from lapse of time had lost or destroyed the proof of payment. From' the title of the act to the last section, every word of it shows that it was not passed on this narrow ground. It is, as. I nave often heard it called by great judges, an act of peace. Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them. Christianity forbids us to attempt enforcing the payment of a debt which time and misfortune have rendered the debtor unable to discharge. The legislature thought, that if a demand was not attempted to be enforced for six years, some good excuse for the non-payment might be presumed, and took away the legal power of recovering it. I think, if I were now sitting in the Exchequer Chamber, I should say that an acknowledgment of a debt, however distinct and unqualified, would not take from the party who makes it the protection of the statute of limitations. But I should not, after the cases that have been decided, be disposed to go so far in this court, without consulting the judges of the other courts." So in Ayton v. Bolt, 4 Bing. 105, where the defendant being applied to, to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, said he should be happy to pay it if he could; it was held, that the plaintiff must show the defendant's ability to pay, the court saying that the case fell within the rule laid down in A'Court v. Cross. And in Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 603, in assumpsit, brought to recover a sum of money, the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, and upon that issue was joined. At the trial, the plaintiff proved the following acknowledgment by the defendant within six years: "I cannot pay the debt, at present, but I will pay it as soon as I.can;" held, that this was not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, no proof being given of the defendant's ability to pay. And Lord Tenterden said: "There are, undoubtedly, authorities that the statute is founded on the presumption of payment, that whatever repels that presumption is an answer to the statute, and that any acknowledgment which repels that presumption is, in legal effect, a promise to pay the debt; and that though such an acknowledgment is accompanied with only a conditional promise, or even a refusal to pay, the law considers the con-dition or refusal void, and considers the acknowledgment of itself an unconditional answer to the statute; and if these authorities be unquestionable, the verdict which has been given for the plaintiff ought to stand, and the rule for a new trial ought to be discharged. But if there are conflicting authorities upon the point, if the principles upon which the authorities I have mentioned are founded appear to be doubtful, and the opposite authorities more consonant to legal rules, we ought, at least, to grant a new trial, that the opportunity may be offered of having the decision of a court of error upon the point, and that for the future we may nave a correct standard by which to act ... If an acknowledgment had the effect which the cases in the plaintiffs favor attribute to it, one should have expected that the replication to a plea of the statute would have pleaded the acknowledgment in terms, and relied upon it as a bar to the statute; whereas the constant replication, ever since the statute, to let in evidence of an acknowledgment is, that the cause of action accrued (or the defendant made the promise in the declaration) within six years; and the only principle upon which it can he held to be an answer to the statute is this, that an acknowledgment is evidence of a new promise, and, as such, constitutes a new cause of action, and supports and establishes the promises which the for the relief and quiet of defendants, the law reached the conclusion, justly and forcibly expressed by Mr. Justice Story, in the case to which we have before referred.(k) He says: "I consider the statute of limitations a highly beneficial statute, and entitled, as such, to receive, if not a liberal, at least a reasonable construction, in furtherance of its manifest object. It is a statute of repose, the object of which is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time, and surprising the parties, or their representatives, when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost, or the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time, or the defective memory, or death, or removal of witnesses. The defence, therefore, which it puts forth, is an * honorable defence, which does not seek to avoid the payment of just claims or demands, admitted now to be due, but which encounters, in the only practicable manner, such as are ancient and unacknowledged; and, whatever may have been their original validity, such as are now beyond the power of the party to meet, with all the proper vouchers and evidence to repel them. The natural presumption certainly is, that claims which have been long neglected are undeclaration states. Upon this principle, whenever the acknowledgment supports any of the promises in the declaration, the plaintiff succeeds; when it does not support them (though it may show clearly that the debt never has been paid, hut is still a subsisting debt), the plaintiff fails." His lordship then proceeds to an elaborate review of the authorities, and continues: " All these cases proceed upon the principle, that under the ordinary issue on the statute of limitations, an acknowledgment is only evidence of a promise to pay; and unless it is conformable to, and maintains, the promises in the declaration, though it may show to demonstration that the debt has never been paid, and is still subsisting, it has no effect." And see Fearn v. Lewis, 4 Moore & P. 1; Brigstocke v. Smith, 1 Cromp & M. 483; Hardon v. Williams, 7 Bing. 163; Cory v. Bretton, 4 C. ft P. 462; Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402; Routledge v. Ramsay, 8 A. & E. 221; Williams v. Griffith, 3 Exch. 335; Cawley v. Furnell, 12 C. B. 291; Smith v. Thorn, 18 Q. B. 134, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 391; Hart v. Prendergast, 14 M. & W. 741. In this last case, Parket B., said: "There is no doubt of the principle of law applicable to these cases, since the decision in Tanner v. Smart; namely, that the plaintiff must either show an unqualified acknowledgment of the debt, or, if he show a promise to pay, coupled with a condition, he must show a performance of the condition; so as in either case to fit the promise laid in the declaration, which is a promise to pay on request. The case of Tanner v. Smart put an end to a series of decisions which were a disgrace to the law, and I trust we shall be in no danger of falling into the same course again.' For recent American cases to the same effect, see Gilkyson v. Larue, 6 Watts & S. 213; Morgan v. Walton, 4 Pa. 321; Laforge v. Jayne, 9 id. 410; Christy v. Flemington, 10 id. 129; Gillingham v. Gillingham, 17 id. 303; Kyle v. Wells, id. 286; Bell v. Crawford, 8 Gratt. 110; Boss v. Boss, 20 Ala. 105; Ten Eyck v. Wing, 1 Mann. (Mich.) 40; Butterfield v. Jacobs, 15 N. H. 140; Veri-tris v. Shaw, 14 id. 422; Sherman v. Wake-man, 11 Barb. 254; Ellicott v. Nichols, 7 Gill, 85; Mitchell v. Sellman, 5 Md. 376; Carruth v. Paige, 22 Vt. 179; Phelps v. Williamson, 26 Vt. 230; Hay den v. Johnson, id. 768; Cooper v. Parker. 25 id. 502; Hill v. Kendall, id. 528; Brainard v. Buck, id. 573; Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 131; Deloach p. Turner, 6 Rich. 117, 7 id. 143; Butler v. Winters, 2 Swan, 91; Brown v. Edes, 37 Me. 318; Broddie v. Johnson, 1 Sneed, 464. And see, the leading case of Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 35L (k) See ante, p. * 64, n. (h).