630; Poph. 108, pl. 2, and is cited with approbation by Lord Coke in Margaret Podger's case (9 Rep. 106 a), appears to us to govern the present. There the entry to be good must have been made within the five years; it was made within that time, but till ratified it was merely the act of a stranger, and so had no operation against the line; by the ratification it became the act of the party in whose name it was made, but that was not until alter the five years - he could not be deemed to have made an entry till he ratified the previous entry - and he did not ratify until it was too late to do so. In the present case the stoppage could only be made during the transitus; during that period, the defendants, without authority from Illins, made the stoppage. After the transitus was ended, but not before, Illins ratified what the defendants had done; from that time the stoppage was the act of Illins. But it was then too late for him to stop; the goods had already become the property of the plaintiffs, free from all right of stoppage. We are therefore of opinion that there must be judgment for the plaintiffs." - See also Chapman v. Lee, 47 Ala. 143; Day v. McAllister, 15 Gray, 433; Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124; Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St.405. It is somewhat remarkable, in view of the present state of the law, that it was at one time strenuously contended that the doctrine of ratification reached less broadly in contract than in tort; and that although a principal unknown at the time could afterwards adopt the act of the agent in the latter case, he could not in the former. See Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 M & Sel. 485, and per Parke, J., in Hull v. Pickersgill, 1 Br. & B. 287.

(h) Holt, C. J., in Bolton v. Hillersden,

1 Ld. Raym. 224, 225; Thorold v. Smith,

11 Mod. 72; Byrne v. Doughty, 13 Ga. 46; Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627; Perkins v. Boothby, 71 Me. 91. The principal, when he has once affirmed a contract made by the agent without authority, and even fraudulently, cannot afterwards disaffirm it; bringing assumpsit against the third party is an affirmance. Smith v. Hodson, 4" T. R. 211, 217. Yet if the

1 And in general conduct may show a ratification. Chamberlain v. Collinson, 45 Ia. 429; Gibson v. Norway Bank, 69 Me. 579, Blakely v. Graham, 111 Mass. 8; Monitor Ins. Co. v. Buffum, 115 Mass. 343. Bearce v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 129; Harrod v. McDaniels, 126 Mass. 413; Duncan v. Hartman, 143 Pa. 595 does not disavow the acts of his agent as soon as he can after they come to his knowledge, he makes these acts his own.1 Nor will the delay of a third party to assert his rights against the principal for the acts of the agent, discharge the former from his liability, if the relative position of principal and agent have not in the mean time been altered. But the failure of the principal to notify the agent of his dissent, does not, as between them, ratify the act; (k) for the agent knew his own want of authority. An adoption of the agency in part adopts it in the whole, because a principal is not permitted to accept and confirm so much of a contract made by one * purporting to be his agent, as he shall think beneficial to himself, and reject the remainder. (l) party, alleged to be principal, after denying that the agent had authority from him to purchase goods, receive them from the agent in payment of a debt due from the latter, the original seller (whatever other remedy he may have) cannot hold such supposed principal liable as having ratified the purchase made by the agent. Hastings v. Bangor House, 18 Me. 436 -The ratification of an act of an agent, in order to bind the principal, must be with a full knowledge of all the material facts. Freeman v. Kosher, 13 Q. B. 780; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607; Penn & Co. v. Dand-ridge, 8 G. & J. 248, 323; Hays v. Stone, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 128; Copeland v. Mercantile Ins. Co. 6 Pick. 198. - Conduct which would be sufficient to charge an individual as principal, may not amount to ratification in the case of a State. Delafield v. Illinois, 26 Wend. 192; Warden v. Eich-baum, 3 Grant, 42; Drennen v. Walker, 21 Ark. 539.

(k) Lewin v. Dille, 17 Mo. 64.

(l) Wilson v. Poulter, 2 Stra. 859; Smith v. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211; Hovil v. Pack, 7 East, 164; Brewer v. Sparrow, 7 B. & C. 310; Wright v. Crookes, 1 Scott, N. R. 685; Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. H. 145; Farmers' Loan Co. v. Walworth, 1 Comst. 447; N. E. Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf, 8 Pick. 56; Culver

1 This principle is generally admitted, though not always expressed in the same way. Frequently it is said that it is necessary for a principal to disavow the unauthorized acts of an agent or one purporting to act as such, " immediately," " promptly," or "as soon as he can "after receiving notice. Ward v. Williams, 26 Ill. 447; Keillor v. Kemble, 26 La. An. 713; Foster v. Rockwell, 104 Mass. 167; Crane v. Bedwell, 25 Miss. 507; Kelsey v. National Bank, 69 Pa. 426; Hart v. Dixon, 5 Lea, 336.

But more generally it is said that such a disavowal need only be made within a reasonable time after the principal has acquired full knowledge of the facts. Gold Mining Co. v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 640; Mobile, etc. Ry. Co. v. Jay, 65 Ala. 113; Breed v. Central City Bank, 6 Col. 235; Bray v. Gunn, 53 Ga. 144; Alexander v. Jones, 64 Ia. 207; Clay v. Spratt, 7 Bush, 334; Lafitte v. Godchaux, 35 La. An. 1161; Johnstone v. Wingate, 29 Me. 404; Maddux v. Bevan, 39 Md. 485; Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 157; Peck v. Ritchey, 66 Mo. 114; Wright v. Boynton, 37 N. H. 9; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327; Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431.

The duty resting on a principal to disavow the acts of one purporting to act as his agent without authority, seems generally regarded as the same in extent as his duty to disavow such acts of his agent as are beyond the scope of the agent's authority. See cases supra. But in Ward v. Williams, 26 Ill. 447, 451, Caton, C. J., said: "Where an agent is authorized to do an act, and he transcends his authority, it is the duty of the principal to repudiate the act as soon as he is fully informed of what has been thus done in his name by the agent, else he will be bound by the act as having ratified it by implication; but where a stranger, in the name of another, does an unauthorized act, the latter need take no notice of it, although informed of the act thus done in his name, and he shall only be bound by an affirmative ratification." See also DeLand v Dixon Nat. Bank, 111 Ill. 323. Probably the more guarded expression of Colt, J., in Foster v. Rockwell, 104 Mass. 167, 172, is more accurate. "Implied ratification from mere silence more readily arises when the act is in misuse or excess of authority given."