(bb) Howard v. Holbroke, 9 Boew. 237.

Besides the last named States it is held in others without the aid of statute that the consideration need not be expressed. Ringgold v. Newkirk, 3 Ark 96; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192, 198; Dorman v. Bigelow, 1 Fla. 281; Ratliff v. Trout, 6 J. J. Marsh. 605; Wren v. Pearce, 12 Miss. 91 ; Halsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303; Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C. 293; Reed v. Evans, 17 Ohio, 128; Duckwall v. Rogers, 15 Ohio St. 544, 546; Thornton v. Kelly, 11 R. I. 498; Gilman v. Kibler, 5 Humph. 19 ; Fulton v. Robinson, 55 Tex. 401; Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292.

In England by stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, a memorandum of a guarantee is sufficient though it does not state the consideration, and in Georgia and New Hampshire also, though a statement of the consideration is necessary in other cases, it is not necessary in the case of a guarantee. Davis v. Tift, 70 Ga. 52; Goodnow v. Bond, 59 N. H. 150.

It has been held that where a promise is under seal it is not necessary that the consideration should be stated. Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35; Bush v. Stevens, 24 Wend. 256; Barnum v. Childs, 1 Sandf. 58; 11 Barb. 14. And the words "value received" have been held to have the same effect. Edelen v. Gough, 5 Gill, 103; Douglass v. Howland, supra.

1 A written guaranty to be responsible for the payment of any sum not to exceed 65,000," which W might require, sufficiently expresses a consideration to satisfy the statute of frauds. Poughkeepsie Bank v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484. - K.

(c) Brettel v. Williams, 4 Exch. 623; Tawney v. Crowther, 3 Bro. Ch. 318; Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238; Foster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696; 5 id. 308; Western v. Russell, 3 Ves. & B. 187; Allen v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. 169; Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685; Tooner v. Dawson, Cheves, 68. See also Ridgway v. Wharton, H. L. Cas. 238; Rhoades v. Castnet, 12 Allen, 130; Spear v. Hart, 3 Rob. 420; Raubitschek v. Blank, 80 N. Y.478; Cave v. Hastings, 7 Q. B. D. 125. See also Jones v. Victoria Graving Dock Co. 2 Q. B. D. 314; and Long v. Millar, 4 C. P. D. 450.

{d) Clinan v. Cooke, I Sch. & L. 22; Brodie v. St. Paul, 1 Ves. 326; Ide v.

Stanton, 15 Vt. 685; Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Ch. 273.

(e) Abeel v. Radclifif, 13 Johns. 297; Dodge v. Lean, id. 508; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192.

(f) Owen v. Thomas, 3 Mylne & K. 353. In this case an agreement in writing for the sale of a house did not, by description, ascertain the particular house, but it referred to the deeds as being in the possession of a person named in the agreement. The court held the agreement sufficiently certain, if it could be ascertained, by an inquiry before the master, that the deeds m the possession of the person named referred to the house in question.

1 Though it has been universally admitted that if a signed paper makes reference to other papers, all the papers may constitute one memorandum, much difficulty has arisen as to how far parol evidence is admissible to connect separate writings. The rule seems to be that such evidence is generally inadmissible. Studds v. Watson, 28 Ch. D. 305; North v. Mendel, 73 Ga. 400; Wilstach v. Heyd. 122 Ind. 574; Lincoln v. Erie Preserving Co., 132 Mass. 129; Tice v. Freeman, 30 Minn. 389; Johnson v Buck, 35 N. J. L. 338; Mentz v. Newwitter, 122 N. Y. 491,498; Meyer v. Adrian, 77 N. C 83. But where a signed paper refers to another paper ambiguously, parol evidence is admissible to identify a particular paper as the one referred to: and "you may go further than that, and if you find a reference to something which may be a conversation, or may be a written document, you may give evidence to show whether it was a conversation or a written document; and, having proved that it was a written document, you may put that written document in evidence." Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. D. 205, 208; compare Coombs v Wilkes [1891], 3 Ch. 77. See also Beckwith v. Talbot, 95 U. S. 289, Bavne v. Wiggins, 139 U. S. 210; Oliver v. Alabama, etc. Ins. Co., 82 Ala. 417; Freeland v. Ritz, 154 Mass. 257. In case all the papers are signed it is not essential that they should refer to each other. It is enough if all refer to the same parol contract. Studds v. Watson, 28 Ch. D. 305. See also Lerned v. Wanne-macher, 9 Allen, 412; Thayer v. Luce, 22 Ohio St. 62.

2 An agreement in a lease that arbitrators, to be selected in a prescribed manner, shall determine the value of the leased premises, and that the rent to be paid on a renewal shall be a certain proportion of the decided value, is sufficiently definite to satisfy the statute of frauds. Norton v. Gale, 95 III 533. - K.

be in its nature entire, and in one part it satisfies the statute, and in others does not, then it is altogether void, (g) But * if these parts are severable, then it may be good in part, and void in part (h)

If a contract in writing be sued, it may be shown in defence that the contract has been altered, orally, by agreement But if

(g) Cooke v. Toombs, 2 Anstr. 420; Lea v. Barber, id. 425, n.; Chater v. Beckett, 7 T. B. 201; Vaughan v. Hancock, 3 C. B. 766; Lexington v. Clarke, 2 Vent. 223; Mechelen v. Williams, 7 A, & E. 49; Thomas v. Williams, 10 B. & C. 664; Harman v. Reeve, 18 C. B. 587; Loomis p. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159; Dow-ling b. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478. In Irvine c. Stone, 6 Cush. 508, it was held, that a contract for the purchase of coals at Philadelphia, and to pay for the freight of the same to Boston, if void by the statute of frauds as to the sale, is void also, and cannot be enforced, as to the freight; though the latter part, if it stood alone, would not be within the statute. The declaration in this case contained the common counts, and also a special count. And Metcalf, J., after showing that the plaintiff could not recover on the special count, on the ground of variance, said: "The remaining question is, whether the good part of the contract before us can be separated from the bad, so that the plaintiff can enforce the part which is rood, on his general counts. And we are of opinion that, from the nature of the contract, this cannot be done. It is in its nature entire. The part which respects the transportation stands wholly on the other part which respects the sale, and which is invalid; and both must fall together. The transporting of the coal, apart from the sale of it, was of no benefit to the defendants, and could not have been contemplated by either party as a thing to be paid for or to be done* except in connection with the sale. The case therefore does not fall within the principle advanced by the counsel for the plaintiff, and sustained by the authorities. The good part of the contract cannot practically be severed from the bad, and separately enforced." So where an agreement was made for the sale by the plaintiff to the defendant of the plaintiff's crop of hemp, then on hand, and in like manner his crops to be raised the two succeeding years, it was held, that the whole contract came within the statute of frauds, as a contract not to be performed within the space of one year; and that the part of the contract which related to the crop of hemp on hand, could not be severed from the rest.