But the contrary view has also found considerable support. Godden v. Pierson, 42 Ala. 370; Brand v. Whelan, 18 111. App. 186; May .v Williams, 61 Miss. 125; Bissig 9. Britton, 59 Mo. 204; Draughan v. Bunting, 9 lred. 10; Ferrell v. Maxwell, 28 Ohio St. 383, Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471; Simpson v. Nance, 1 Speers, 4; Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438.

(q) Thus, where the defendant promised to pay the debt of his son, who was In custody on an execution at the suit of the plaintiff, in consideration of his son's being discharged out of custody with the plaintiff's consent, it was held that the promise was not within the statute, because by such discharge the debt of the son was extinguished. Goodman v. Chase, 1 B. & Ald. 297 Lane v. Burghart, 1 Q. B. 933. So in Curtis v. Brown, 5 Cush. 488, 492, Shaw, C. J., says: "When, by the new promise, the old debt is extinguished, the promise is not within the statute; it is not then a promise to par the debt of another, which has accrued, but it is an original contract, on good consideration, and need not be in writ-ting." And see to the same effect, Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. 883; Butcher v. Stenart, 11 M. & W. 857; Decker v. Shaffer, 3 Ind. 187; Emerick v. Sanders. 1 Wis. 77; Draughan v. Bunting, 9 Ired.

10; Stanly v. Hendricks, 13 id. 86; Bason v. Hughart, 2 Tex. 476. See White v. Solomousky, 30 Md. 585; Booth v. Eigh-mie, 60 N. Y. 238; Yale v. Edgerton, 14 Minn. 194; Parker v. Heaton, 55 Ind. 1. And see also, ante, vol. i. pp. * 217, * 220.

(r) Stephens v. Squire, 5 Mod. 205, Comb. 362. In this case it appeared that an action had been brought against the defendant, an attorney, and two others, for appearing for the plaintiff without a warrant. The cause was carried down to be tried at the assizes; and the defendant promised in consideration the plaintiff would not prosecute the action, that he would pay ten pounds and costs of suit. And now an action was brought against the defendant upon this promise. Sir Bartholomew Shower, for the defendant, objected that the promise was within the statute. Holt, C. J.: "No; 'tis an original promise, and himself was liable." Shower: " What if himself had not been a party, then it were plainly within the statute." Holt, C. J.: "Put that case when it comes; but if A saith, Do not go on against B, etc, this being to be performed within a year, it will bind him; 'tis like the case of buying goods for another man, which is every day's practice. But if A saith, Do not go on against B and 1'11 give you ten pounds in full satisfaction of that action, that might be within the statute; but here he appears to be a party concerned in the former action."It will be seen that one of the grounds upon which his lordship thought the case to be out of the statute, was that the defendant was one of the parties originally liable. This position will be noticed hereafter. But he was also of opinion that the case would have been out of the statute, though the defendant had not been concerned in the former action, for the reason that it did not appear that the ten pounds were to be paid in satisfaction. In other words, the liability of the original party would have still continued, notwithstanding the than *upon any other. Thus, if a creditor has a lien on certain property of his debtor to the amount of his debt, and a third person, who also has an interest in the same property, promises the creditor to pay the debt in consideration of the creditor's relinquishing his lien, this promise is not within the statute, (u) The performance of the promise, it is true, will have the effect of discharging the original debtor; but there is no reason to suppose that this constituted, in any degree, the inducement to the promise, or was at all in the contemplation of the promisor. So if A, who is indebted to B, assigns to him in payment a debt due to himself from C, with a guaranty that C shall pay it to B when it becomes due, the transaction is not within the statute. For, although the undertaking of A is in form a promise to answer for the debt of another, his object is merely to pay a debt of his own in a particular way. (v)1 And, generally, a * promise to pay one's own debt; to a third party, as by A, to pay to C, at B's request, a debt due

* So, if the debt for which one engages to answer is to be kept alive, but to be held for the benefit of the guarantor, the case is out of the statute. Thus,'where one purchases the debt of another by his own promise, as if A promised to pay B a thousand dollars in three months, and thereupon B transferred to him C's debt to B for twelve hundred dollars, payable in a year, this certainly is a purchase of a debt, and not a promise to pay the debt of another, (s)

It may indeed be stated as a general rule, that wherever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer for another, but to subserve some purpose of his own, his promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a promise to pay the debt of another, and although the performance of it may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing the liability of another. (t) There are several classes of cases which may perhaps be more satisfactorily explained upon this principle performance of the defendant's promise. And see Noyes v. Humphreys, 11 Graft. 686. This is also, we think, the true ground of the decision in Read v. Nash, 1 Wilson, 305. It there appeared that one Tauck, the plaintiff's testator, had brought an action of assault and battery against one Johnson. The cause being at issue, the record entered, and just coming on to be tried, the defendant Nash, being then present in court, in consideration that Tanck would not proceed to trial, but would withdraw his record, promised to pay him fifty pounds and costs. It was held, that the defendant's promise was out of the statute. It has sometimes been supposed, that the judgment of the court in this case proceeded upon the ground, that a promise to answer for a tort committed by another was not within the statute. And some of the language attributed to the Lord Chief Justice would seem to justify this opinion. But so far as the decision was based upon this ground, it cannot now be regarded as law, as we shall hereafter show. See, for the rule of law stated in the text, Day v. Cloe, 4 Bush, 563; Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich. 351.