(e) Barfoot v. Freswell, 3 Keble, 465; Saltourn v. Houstoun, 1 Bing. 433; Sampson v. Easterby, 9 B. & C. 505.

(f) Clapham v. Moyle, 1 Lev. 155, 1 Keble, 842, Shep. Touch. 122; Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106. "Where the language of an agreement can be resolved into a covenant, the judicial inclination is so to construe it; and hence it has resulted, that certain features have ever been held essential to the constitution of a condition. In the absence of any of these, it is not permitted to work the destructive effect the law otherwise attributes to it." Per Bell, J., in Paschall v. Passmore, 15 Penn. St 295, 307.

(a) Thus, in Wickham v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63, A and B conveyed to D and his heirs certain lands, excepting and reserving to A, B, and C, their heirs and assigns, liberty to come into and upon the lands, and there to hawk, hunt, fish, and fowl: Held, that this was not in law a reservation properly so called, but a new grant by D (who executed the deed) of the liberty therein mentioned, and therefore that it might enure in favor of C and his heirs, although he was not a party to the deed. See also Doe d. Douglas v. Lock, 2 A. & E. 705, 743.

(h) Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 845; Woodward v. Seeley, 11 Ill. 157; Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533. The distinction between a license which is coupled with a grant, and a license which operates merely as a license, is admirably stated by Lord Chief Justice Vaughan, in Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaugh. 330, 351. "A dispensation or license," says he, "properly passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful, which without it has been unlawful; as a license to go beyond the seas, to hunt in a man's park, to come into his house, are only actions which, without license, had been unlawful. But a license to hunt in a man's park, and carry away the deer killed to his own use; to cut down a tree in a

* Even a bond may be made without the words "held and firmly obliged," although they are technical and usual. Any writing under seal which acknowledges a debt, or indicates that the maker intends to be bound to the payment of a definite sum of money, would be construed as a bond. (i)

A question, to which we have already alluded, whether parties have by a certain instrument made a lease, or only an agreement for a future lease, sometimes presents very considerable difficulty. There do not seem to be any fixed and precise rules which will always suffice to decide this question. Indeed each case must be determined upon its own merits; and little more can be said by way of rule, than that, wherever the obvious and natural interpretation of the words used would indicate the intention of the party actually in possession to divest himself thereof forthwith, in favor of the other who is to come into possession under him for a definite time, these words will constitute an actual lease for years, although the words used may be more proper to a release or covenant, or to an agreement for a subsequent lease. But if the whole instrument, fairly considered, indicates that it is only the purpose and agreement of the parties hereafter to make such a lease, then it must be construed as only such agreement, although some of the language might indicate a present lease. (j) man's ground, and to carry it away the next day after to his own use, are licenses as to the acts of hunting and cutting down the tree; but as to the carrying away of the deer killed, and tree cut down, they are grants. So to license a man to eat my meat, or to fire the wood in my chimney to warm him by, as to the actions of eating, firing my wood, and warming him, they are licenses; but it is consequent necessarily to those actions that my property be destroyed in the meat eaten and in the wood burnt; so as in some cases by consentient and not directly, and as its effect, a dispensation or license may destroy and alter property."

(i) Dodson v. Kayes, Yelv. 193; Core's case, Dyer, 20 a.

(j) "It may be laid down for a rule," says Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, "that whatever words are sufficient to explain the intent of the parties, that the one shall divest himself of the possession, and the other come into it for such a determinate time, such words, whether they run in the form of a license, covenant, or agreement, are of themselves sufficient, and will in construction of law amount to a lease for years as effectually as if the most proper and pertinent words had been made use of for that purpose; and, on the contrary, if the most proper and authentic form of words, whereby to describe and pass a present lease for years, are made use of, yet if upon the whole deed there appears no such intent, but that they are only preparatory and relative to a future lease to be made, the law will rather do violence to the words than break through the intent of the parties; for a lease For years being no other than a contract for the possession and profits of the lands on the one side, and a recompense of rent or other income on the other, if the words made use of are sufficient to prove such a contract, in what form soever they are introduced, or however variously applicable, the law calls in the intent of the parties, and models and governs the words accordingly." Bac. Abr. tit. Leases (K.). See also, for a full discussion of this subject and an analysis of the cases, Platt on Leases, pt. 3, ch. 4, sec. 3; Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, § 37 et seq.; and the late case of Stratton v. Pettit, 16 C B. 420, 30 E. L. & E. 479.

All legal instruments should be grammatically written, and should be construed according to the rules of grammar. But this is not an absolute rule of law. On the contrary, it is so far immaterial in what part of an instrument any clause is written, that it will be read as of any place and with any context, and, if necessary, transposed, in order to give effect to the certain meaning and purpose of the parties. (k) Still this will be done only when their certain and evident intent requires it. Inaccuracy or confusion in the arrangement of the parts and clauses of an instrument is, therefore, always dangerous; because the intent may in this way be made so uncertain as not to admit of a remedy by construction. (l) Generally, all relative words are read as referring to the nearest antecedent. (m) But this rule of grammar is not a rule of law, where the whole instrument shows plainly that a reference was intended to an earlier antecedent. (n)