(g).

(c) Shep. Touch. 82; Roe v. Tranmarr, Willes, 682.

(d) Smith v. Frederick, 1 Russ. 174, 209; Adams v. Steer, Cro. Jac. 210; Lynch v. Livingston, 8 Barb. 463, 2 Seld. 422.

(e) Shep. Touch. 81, 82.

(/) Shep. Touch. 82.

(g) Doe v. Adams, 2 Cromp. & J. 232; Doe v. Goldsmith, id. 674; Treport's case, 6 Rep. 15.

(h) Molyn's case, 6 Rep. 6 a; Churchwardens of St. Saviour, 10 id. 67 b.

(i) Thus in Evans v. Sanders, 8 Port. 497, there was a promise to pay a sum of money, Jan. 1, 1836, "with interest from 1835." Held, that the expression "from 1835," in order that it might have some operation, must be construed as meaning from the first of January, 1835. This rule is well illustrated also by a case put by Rutherforth, in his Institutes of Natural Law, b. 2, c. 7. "If a testator," says he, "bequeathes all his plate to his elder son, except one thousand ounces, which he bequeathes to his younger son, and directs that the elder shall, at a certain time, deliver to the younger one thousand ounces of the said plate, of such sort and such pieces as he pleases; this rule would determine the intention of the testator to have been, that his younger son should have the choice of the sort and the pieces. The ambiguous words - of such sort and such pieces as he pleases - would in the contrary construction be needless, and produce no effect. If the choice had been intended for the elder son, the testator would have had no occasion to add these words. For by leaving all his plate to the elder, except one thousand ounces of it, which the elder within a certain time is to deliver to the younger, the sort and pieces to be delivered would of course have been even parts or provisions which are comparatively unimportant, and may be severed from the contract without impairing its effect or changing its character, will be suppressed as it were, if in that way, and only in that way, the contract can be sustained and enforced.

This desire of the law to effectuate rather than defeat a contract, is wise, just, and beneficial. But it may be too strong. And in some instances language is used in reference to this subject which itself needs construction, and a construction which shall greatly qualify its meaning. Thus, Lord C. J. Hobart said: "I do exceedingly commend the judges that are curious and almost subtle, astute (which is the word used in the Proverbs of Solomon in a good sense when it is to a good end), to invent reasons and means to make acts according to the just intent of the parties, and to avoid wrong and injury, which by rigid rules might be wrought out of the act." (j) Lord Hale quotes and approves these words, (k) and Willes, C. J., quoting * Hale's approbation, adds his own. (l) And yet this cannot be sound doctrine; it cannot be the duty of a court that sits to administer the law, and for no other purpose, to be curious and subtle or astute, or to invent reasons and make acts in order to escape from rigid rules. All that can be true or wise in this doctrine is, that courts should make, not rigid, but wise and just rules, and should then, by their help, effectuate a contract or an instrument wherever this can be done by a perfectly fair and entirely rational construction of the language actually used. To do more than this would be to sacrifice to the apparent right of one party in one case, that steadfast adherence to law and principle, which constitutes the only protection and defence of all rights, and all parties.

Another rule requires that all instruments should be construed "contra proferentem;" that is, against him who gives or undertakes, or enters into an obligation. (m) This rule of construction at the option of the elder; since the younger would by the will have had no claim but to a certain weight of plate." See also Stratton v. Pettit, 16 C. B. 490.

(j) Clanrickard v. Sidney, Hob. S77.

(k) Crossing v. Scudamore, 1 Vent. 141.

(l) Doe v. Salkeld, Willes, 676; Roe v. Tranmarr, id. 684.

(m) Windham's case, 5 Rep. 7 b;

Chapman v. Dalton, Plowd. 289; The Ada, Daveis, 407; Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 202; per Alderson, B., in Meyer v. Isaac, 6 M. & W. 612. This rule of construction - verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem - is well illustrated by the case of Dann v. Spurrier, 3 B. & P. 899, in which it was held, that a lease to one, "to hold for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years," gave to the lessee, and is reversed in its application to the grants of the sovereign; for these are construed favorably to the sovereign, although he is grantor. (n) The reason of the rule ucontra * proferenhim alone, the option at which of the periods named the lease should determine. See also Doe v. Dixon, 9 East, 15. - The construction of grants should be favorable to the grantee. Throckmorton v. Tracy, Plowd. 154, 161; Doe v. Williams, 1 H. Bl. 25; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 589; Jackson v. Blodget, 16 Johns. 172; Melvin v. Proprietors, etc. on Mer. River, 5 Met. 15, 27; Cocheco Han. Co. v. Whittier, 10 N. H. 305; Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Me. 169; Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98; Window v. Patten, 34 Me. 25; Pike v. Monro, 36 id. 309. This construction, however, must be a fair and just one; for "there is a kind of equity in grants, so that they shall not be taken unreasonably against the grantor, and yet shall with reason be extended most liberally for the grantee." Per Saunders, J., in Throckmorton v. Tracy, Plowd. 161.

(n) Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 243; Jackson v. Reeves, 3 Caines, 293. They shall, however, "have no strict or narrow interpretation for the overthrowing of them," but a "liberal and favorable construction for the making of them available in law, usque ad plenitudinem, for the honor of the king." 2 Inst. 496. "And so note," saith Lord Coke, "the gravity of the ancient sages of the law to construe the king's grant beneficially for his honor, and the relief of the subject, and not to make any strict or literal construction in subversion of such grants." Molyn's case, 6 Rep. 6 a. See also Churchwardens of St. Saviour, 10 id. 67 b. Accordingly, the rule in question is of less weight than the rule that an instrument should be supported rather than defeated; and is not applied to defeat a contract entirely, but only to limit the extent of the grant; for a grantor, whether king or subject, is always held to have intended something by his grant. "It is a well-known rule, in the construction of private grants, if the meaning of the words be doubtful, to construe them most strongly against the grantor. But it is said that an opposite rule prevails in cases of grants by the king; for where there is any doubt, the construction is made most favorably for the king and against the grantee. The rule is not disputed. But it is of very limited application. To what cases does it apply? To such cases only where there is a real doubt, where the grant admits of two interpretations, one of which is more extensive and the other more restricted: so that a choice is fairly open, and either may be adopted without any violation of the apparent objects of the grant. If the king's grant admits of two interpretations, one of which will make it utterly void and worthless, and the other will give it a reasonable effect, then the latter is to prevail; for the reason (says the common law), 'that it will be more for the benefit of the subject and the honor of the king, which is more to be regarded than his profit.' 10 Co. 67 b. And in every case the rule is made to bend to the real justice and integrity of the case. No strained or extravagant construction is to be made in favor of the king. And if the intention of the grant is obvious, a fair and liberal interpretation of its terms is enforced." Per Story, J., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 591, 597. It is laid down by Mr. Justice Story, that the grants of the sovereign are construed against the grantee only in cases of mere donation, and not where there is a valuable consideration; that the rule has no application in cases of legislative grants. 11 Pet. 597, 598. It is just and reasonable that the construction should be favorable to the grantee, in the case of a conveyance of lands by the sovereign for a valuable consideration; but where exclusive privileges are given to an individual or to a company, and rights conferred restrictive of those of the public or of private persons, the construction, in cases of doubt or ambiguity, is against the grantee, especially where burdens are imposed upon the public, as in the case of rates of toll imposed for the benefit of a company. In Stourbridge Can. Co. v. Wheeley, 2 B. & Ad. 792, where a right of taking toll was given to a company, Lord Tenterden used the following language: "This, like many other cases, is a bargain between a company of adventurers and the public, the terms of which are expressed m the statute; and the rule of construction in all such cases is now fully established to be this: that any ambiguity in the terms of the contract must operate against the adventurers, and in favor of the public; and the plaintiffs can claim nothing which is not dearly given to them by the act.' Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Can. Nav. 1 Mylne & K. 154, 162, per Lord Eldon; Gildart v. Gladstone, 11 East, 675, 685; Leeds and Liverpool Can. Co. v. Hustler, 1 B. & C. 424; Barrett v. Stockton, &c tem" is, that men may be supposed to take care of themselves; and that he who gives, and chooses the words by which he gives, ought to be held to a strict interpretation of them, rather than he who only accepts. (o) l But the reason is not a very strong one, nor is the rule of special value. It is indeed often spoken of as one not to be favored or applied, unless other principles of interpretation fail to decide a question. (p) It is of course most applicable to deeds-poll; (q) as, * if tenant in fee * 508