Demand of payment should be made by the holder, or his authorized agent, of the party bound to pay, or his authorized agent; (u) and at his usual place of residence, or usual place of business; if the former, within such hours as may be reasonably so employed, and if the latter, in business hours; but a demand at a bank where a note is payable, made after business hours, but while the bank is still open and the officers are there, has been held sufficient. (v) If the holder finds the dwelling-house or place of business of the payor closed, so that he cannot enter the same, and after due inquiry cannot find the payor, the prevalent doctrine in this country is, that he may treat the bill or note as dishonored. (w) If the payor has changed his residence to some other place within the same State, the holder must endeavor to find it and make demand there; but if he have removed out of the State, subsequent to making the note, the demand may be made at his former residence. (x) The presumption * is that the maker lives where he dates the note, and demand must be made there, unless when the note falls due the payor resides elsewhere within the State, and the holder knows it, and then the holder must make the demand there. (y)

(u) Lord Kenyon, in Cooke v. Callaway, 1 Esp. 115. - And a person in possession of a bill, payable to his own order, is a holder for this purpose. Smith v. McClure,

5 East, 476, 2 J. P. Smith, 43; - v.

Ormston, 10 Mod. 286. - A demand by a notary is sufficient. Hartford Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. 489; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 487; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230. - Parol authority to an agent to demand payment is sufficient. Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401.

(v) Shepherd v. Chamberlain, 8 Gray, 225; Salt Springs Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 430. See Hallowell v. Curry, 41 Penn. St. 322.

(w) Hine v. Allele. 4 B. & Ad. 624; Shedd v. Brett, l Pick. 413; Williams v. Bank of United States, 2 Pet. 96; Ogden v. Cowley, 2 Johns. 274; Fields v. Mallett, 3 Hawks, 465; Buxton v. Jones, 1 Man. & G. 83. - But in such case some inquiry or effort ought to be made to find the maker. Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 294; Sullivan v. Mitchell, 1 Car. L. Rep. 482; Collins v. Butler, Stra. 1087.

(x) Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns 114; McGruder v. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. 598; Gillespie v. Hannahan, 4 McCord, 503; Reid v. Morrison, 2 W. & S. 401; Wheeler v. Field, 6 Met. 290; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251. See Gilmore v. Spies, I Barb. 158.

(y) Fisher v. Evans, 5 Binn. 541; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251; Lowery v. Scott, 24 Wend. 358; Smith v. Philbrick, 10 Gray, 252. See also on this subject, Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145. A note specifying do place of payment, was dated, made, and indorsed in the State of New York, but the maker and indorser resided in Mexico, and continued to reside there when the note fell due. their place of residence being known to the payee and holder, both when the to grace. (a)1 And it has been *held that a bank post-note dated, which had across one end the words " due on " a certain day which excluded all the days of grace, which words the bank cashiers of Boston, where the note was issued, testified were placed there to indicate that the note was due and payable on that day without grace, was still entitled to grace. (b) But notes payable on demand are not entitled to grace, (c) nor are checks on banks, though payable on time. (d)

Presentment for payment, or demand, is sufficient, if made on one member of a partnership. If there be joint makers who are not partners, we hold it should be made on all. (yy) But it is not always so held. (yz) It has been held that the holder of negotiable paper may assume that a party resides where he resided when he put his name on the paper, unless he has notice or knowledge of a change of residence. (ya)

The whole law in respect of demand and notice is very much influenced by the usage of particular places, where such usage is so well established and so well known that persons may be supposed to contract with reference to it. Of this the English rule in relation to checks on bankers affords an instance, (z) and also the usage of the banks of our different cities as to notes discounted by them, or left with them for collection. In this country the practice is not uniform; but, in general, a demand is made some days before the maturity of a note, by a notice post-dated on the day of maturity, omitting the days of grace. But it is usual also, if the note be not paid on the last day of grace, to make a formal demand on that day, after business hours. Bills and notes sometimes express days of grace, but generally not. Usually, and in some States by statutory provisions, all bills and notes on time, when grace is not expressly excluded, are entitled note was given and when it matured; and it was held that a demand of payment on the maker and a notice to the indorser were necessary to charge the indorser. Gilmore v. Spies, 1 Barb. 158; affirmed on appeal, 1 Comst. 321. But it is said in Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320, that where the maker does not reside, and has no place of business in the State where the note is payable, no demand upon him is necessary to charge the indorser.

(yy) Blake v. McMillen, 22 Ia. 358; Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 504. So held as to joint indorsers, in Sayre v. Frick, 7 Watts & S. 383, and Shepard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 367; Red Oak Bank v. Orvis, 40 Ia. 332, Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518, 523.

(yz) A demand on one of three joint promisors held sufficient in Harris v. Clark, 10 Ohio, 5; Allen v. Harrah, 30 Ia. 363, to the same effect, with regard to an Ohio note, following Harris v. Clark, supra.

(ya) Ward v. Perrin, 54 Barb. 89. But see Peters v. Hobbs, 25 Ark. 67.

(z) Robson v. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388. By the practice of the London bankers, if one banker who holds a check drawn on another banker presents it after four o'clock, it is not then paid, but a mark is put on it to show that the drawer has assets, and that it will be paid; and checks so marked have a priority, and are exchanged or paid next day at noon, at the clearing-house; held, that a check presented after four, and so marked, and carried to the clearing-house next day, but not paid, no clerk from the drawee's house attending, need not be presented for payment at the banking-house of the drawee. Such a marking, under this practice, amounts to an acceptance, payable next day at the clearing-house. It is not necessary to present for payment a check payable on demand till the day following the day on which it is given. A person receiving a check on a banker is equally authorized in lodging it with his own banker to obtain payment, as he would be in paying it away in the course of trade. Although in consequence thereof the notice of its dishonor is postponed a day, one day being allowed for notice from the payee to the drawer, after the day on which notice is given by the bankers to the payee. See Bancroft v. Hall, Holt, 476; Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitt. 124. See Heywood v. Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 428.

It sometimes happens that when a bill is drawn in one country, and made payable in another, the laws in relation to presentment and demand differ in those countries; and then the question arises, which law shall prevail. It would seem that the law of the place in which it is payable prevails; (c) but it has been decided that the law of the country in which the bill is indorsed shall govern exclusively as to the liabilities and duties of the indorsers, on the ground that every indorsement is substantially a new contract. (/) Hence, a bill drawn in one place and

(a) Corp v. McComb, 1 Johns. Cas. 328; Jackson v. Richards, 2 Caines, 343. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the legal presumption is, that in every State in the Union three days of grace are allowed by law on bills of exchange and promissory notes. Wood v. Corl, 4 Met. 203. In this case, Shaw, C. J., said: " We consider it well settled, that by the general law-merchant, which is part of the common law, as prevailing throughout the United States, in the absence of all proof of particular contract or special custom, three days of grace are allowed on bills of exchange and promissory notes; and when it is relied upon that by special custom no grace is allowed, or any other term of grace than throe days, it is an exception to the general rule, and the proof lies on the party taking it." See also Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. 102; Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581; Mills v. United States Bank, 11 id. 431; Cook v. Darling, 2 R. I. 385; Reed v. Wilson, 12 Vroom, 29. The days of grace on negotiable notes constitute a part of the original contract. Savings Bank v. Bates, 8 Conn. 505, but the notes may be declared on according to their terms without adding the days of grace. Padwick v. Turner, 11 Q. B. 124. - Whenever the maker of a note is entitled to grace, the indorser has the same privilege. Pickard v. Valentine, 13 Me. 412; Central Bank v. Allen, 16 Me. 41.

(b) Perkins v. Franklin Hank, 21 Pick. 483, confirmed in Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Met. 13.

(c) In re Brown, 2 Story, 503; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; Somerville v. Williams, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 484; Cammer v. Harrison, 2 McCord, 246.

(d) Bowen v. Newell, 5 Sandf. 326; Way v. Towle, 155 Mass. 374. Contra, Culter v. Reynolds, 64 Ill. 321.

(e) Rothschild v. Currie. 1 Q, B. 43. This was an action by an indorsee against the payee and indorser of a bill of exchange drawn in England on, and accepted by, a French house, both plaintiff and defendant being domiciled in England; held, that due notice of the dishonor of the bill by the acceptor was parcel of the contract; that the bill being made payable by the acceptor abroad was a foreign bill, and the lex loci contractus must therefore prevail; and that it was sufficient for the plaintiff to show that he had given the defendant such notice of the dishonor and protest as was required by the law of France. See also Gibbs v. Fremont, 9 Exch. 25; Phillips v. Im Thurn, l L. R. C. P. 463; Rouquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525 , Todd v. Neal. 49 Ala. 266; Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546.

(f) Aymer v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439

1 On mere instalments of interest, however, no days of grace are allowed. Mac-loon v. Smith, 49 Wis. 200; Bank of N. A. v. Kirby, 108 Mass. 497, 501. - K.

payable in * another, and there accepted, must be governed, as to the acceptor, by the laws of the place in which it is accepted. (g) And as no indorsement becomes effectual until actual transfer, the place of the actual transfer is the place of the contract of indorsement. (h)