Presentment for acceptance should be made by the holder or his authorized agent to the drawee or his authorized agent, (p) during the usual hours of business. (q) And the drawee has until the next day to determine whether he will accept, but may answer at once. (?•)

A bill may be in some sort accepted before it is drawn, for a written promise to accept a certain bill hereafter to be made

(o) Muilman v. D'Equino, 2 H. Bl. 565. It was here held that there is no fixed time within which a bill payable at sight, or a certain time after, shall be presented to the drawee. It must be a reasonable time; and that is a question for the junto decide from the circumstances of each case. See also Fry v. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397; Mullick v. Radakissen, 28 E. L. & E. 86; Montelius v. Charles, 76 Ill. .303. - No cause of action arises upon a bill payable at sight, until it is presented. Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323; Thorpe v. Booth, Ry. & M. 388.

(p) Cheek v. Roper, 5 Esp. 175. It is not sufficient to call at the residence of the drawee and present the bill to some person, who is unknown to the party calling. Id.

(q) Elford v. Teed, 1 M. & Sel. 28; Church v. Clark, 21 Pick. 310; Bank of United States v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Harrison v. Crowder, 6 Sm. & M. 464; Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385. - And presentment after banking hours, and an authorized person then answering, has been held sufficient. Garnett v. Woodcock, 1 Stark. 475. A presentment, however, at eight o'clock in the evening, at the drawee's residence, has been held at a reasonable hour. Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp. 537.- But eleven or twelve at night has been held otherwise Dana v. Sawyer, 22 Me. 244. So of a demand at eight in the morning. Lunt v. Adams, 17 Me. 230. Sec Flint v. Rogers, 15 Me. 67; Commercial Bank v. Hamer. 7 How. (Miss.) 448; Cohea v. Hunt, 2 Sm. & M. 227. - The rule in all cases is that the presentment should he at a reasonable time; and when the paper is due from or at a bank, it should, as we have already said, as a general rule, he presented within banking hours. But in other cases the period ranges through the whole day, down to the time of going to bed. Cayuga Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 635; Skelton v. Dustin, 92 Ill. 49. See Wiseman v. Chiapella, 23 How. 368, for a discussion of the cases on presentment for acceptance.

(>•) Montgomery County Bank v, Albany City Bank, 8 Barb. 399.

is * construed as an acceptance, if precisely that bill is drawn within a reasonable time after such promise. (s) But a bill payable so many days after sight, cannot have its day of payment fixed, except by presentment; and it has therefore been said, that an acceptance by previous promise does not apply except to bills payable on demand, or at so many days after date. (t) It does not seem quite clear, however, why the acceptance by such promise might not be held valid to bind the acceptor, leaving the day of payment to be fixed by presentment. That is, if a bill payable at sixty days after sight were presented and acceptance refused, and the protest fixed the day of presentment and therefore the day when it should be paid, it is not clear why the acceptor might not be held on his promise to accept that very bill when it should be made and presented.

An acceptance must be absolute, and not differ in any respect from the terms of the bill. If any other be given, the holder may assent and so bind the acceptor, but must give notice, as in case of non-acceptance, to other parties, in order to bind them; (u) and the acceptor is held only so far as he promises by his acceptance. (v) The usual way of accepting is by writing the word "accepted" on the face of the bill, and signing the acceptor's name; but there is no precise formula or method which is necessary to constitute a good acceptance. It seems to be enough if it is substantially a distinct promise to pay the bill according to its terms, whether it be in writing upon the bill or upon a separate paper, or by parol. (w)1 And a written promise to pay a bill,

(s) Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr, 1670; Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Wilson v. Clements, 3 Mass. 1; Goodrich v. Gordon, 15 Johns. 6; Parker v. Greele, 2 Wend. 545; Kendrick v. Campbell, 1 Bailey, 522; Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Met. 381; Storer v. Logan, 9 Mass. 55; McEvers v. Mason, 10 Johns. 207; Sehimmelpennch v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 264; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 121; Williams v. Winans, 2 Green (N. J.), 339; Bayard v. Lathy, 2 McLean, 462; Vance v. Ward, 2 Dana, 95; Reed v. Marsh, 5 B. Mon. 8; Howland v. Carson, 15 Penn. St. 453; Beach v. State Bank, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 488; Cassell v. Dows, 2 Blatch. 335; Lewis v. Kramer, 3 Md. 275; Naglee v. Lyman, 14 Cal. 450. See also Exchange Bank v. Rice, 98 Mass. 288; Central Bank v. Richards, 109 Mass. 413.

(t) Story on Bills of Exch. § 249; Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story, 22; Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story, 213; Franklin Bank v. Lynch, 52 Md. 270. Contra is Ulster Bank v. McFarlan, 3 Den. 553.

(u) Walker v. Bank of State of New York, 13 Barb. 636; Lyon v. Sundius, 1 Camp. 423; Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891. And see Niagara Bank v. Fairman, etc. Manufacturing Co. 31 Barb. 403; Taylor v. Newman, 77 Mo. 257; Gibson v. Smith, 75 Ga. 33.

(v) Sallery v. Prindle, 14 Barb. 186. See, however, Clarke v. Gordon, 3 Rich. L. 311.

(w) Edson v. Fuller, 2 Foster (N. H.), 183; Barnet v. Smith, 10 Foster (N. H.), 256; Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East, 514: Fair-lee v. Herring, 3 Bing. 625. In this case, operates as an acceptance of the bill when drawn; but it should be sufficiently precise to identify the bill as that authorized. (ww) In many *of our States there are statutes respecting acceptance of bills. (x)

1 Retention or destruction of a bill by the drawee is not equivalent to an acceptance. Jeune v. Ward, 2 B. & Ald. 653; Colorado Bank v. Boettcher, 5 Col. 185, 15 Col. 16; Holbrook v. Payne, 151 Mass. 383; Overman v. Hoboken Bank, 30 N. J. 61, 31 N. J. 563.

An acceptance can be made only by a drawee, or by one for honor; but an acceptance by one of many drawees binds the acceptor. (y)