A bill once paid by the acceptor can no longer be negotiated; but until paid by him it is capable of indefinite negotia-tion. (n)1 * If paid in part it may be indorsed as to the residue. But while wholly due it cannot be indorsed in part; (o) and if it be indorsed in part, and is afterwards indorsed by the same indorser to the same indorsee for the remaining part, this is not a good indorsement. (p)

The holder of a bill or note payable to bearer, or of one payable to some payee or order and indorsed in blank, may transfer the same by mere delivery, (q) and is not liable upon it. (r) But where one obtains money on a bill or note by discount, and the bill or note is forged, if he did not indorse it he is still liable to refund the money to the party from whom he received it on the ground of an implied warranty that the instrument is genuine; and also on the general principle, that one who pays money without consideration may recover it back. (s) 1

(n) Connery v. Kendall, 5 La. An. 515; Pray v. Maine, 7 Cush. 253; Eaton v. Mc-Kown, 34 Me. 510. Per Lord Ellenborough, Callow v. Lawrence, 3 M. & Sel. 97; Beck v. Robley, 1 H. Bl. 89, n. - But if a bill is paid by the drawer, it may afterwards be reissued by the drawer, and the acceptor will be still liable to pay it. Hubbard v. Jackson, 3 C. & P. 134, 4 Bing. 390, 1 Mo. & P. 11.- In Callow v. Lawrence, supra, Lord Ellenborough said: "A bill of exchange is negotiable ad infinitum, until it has been paid by or discharged on behalf of the acceptor. If the drawer has paid the bill, it seems that he may sue the acceptor upon the bill; and if, instead of suing the acceptor, he put it into circulation upon his own indorsement only, it does not prejudice any of the other parties who have indorsed the bill that the holder should be at liberty to sue the acceptor. The case would be different if the circulation of the bill would have the effect of prejudicing any of the indorsers."

(o) Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raym.

360. And although an indorser has paid part of a bill to the indorsee, the latter may still recover the whole amount of the bill against the drawer. Johnson v. Kennion, 2 Wils. 262; Martin v. Hayes, 1 Busb. L. 423.

(p) Hughes v. Kiddell, 2 Bay, 324. This was an action against the indorser of a note. By one indorsement he had assigned part of the sum mentioned in the note, and the residue by another indorsement. The court held that the action could not be supported, on the ground that an indorsement for part of a note or bill is bad; and if so, then two vicious indorsements could never constitute a good one. See also Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raym. 360, Carth. 466; Johnson v. Kennion, 2 Wils. 262, per Gould, J.

(q) Davis v. Lane, 8 N. H. 224; Wil-bour v. Turner, 5 Pick. 526; Dole v. Weeks, 4 Mass. 451.

(r) Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373. See also Rogers v. Langford, 1 Cr. & M. 637.

1 In West Boston Bank v. Thompson, 124 Mass. 506, 514, to the point that " when the indorser of a note which has been in circulation takes it up, all indorsements on the note subsequent to his are cancelled, and he cannot afterwards negotiate the note so as to make the subsequent indorsers liable to any person with notice of the facts," Morton, J., said that " the mere fact that a note, before its maturity, comes in the usual course of business into the hands of the payee after having been once negotiated by him, does not destroy its negotiability, nor defeat the right of a bona fide holder to recover against all who are parties to the note at the time it is negotiated to him." See also West St. Louis Bank v. Shawnee County Bank, 95 U. S. 557, and Lemoine v. Bank of North America, 3 Dillon, 44. - K.

If a note be made payable on its face or by indorsement to a party or his order, that party can transfer the note in full property only by his indorsement; and when he indorses it he makes himself liable to pay it if those who ought to have paid * it to him, had he continued to hold it, fail to pay it to the party to whom he orders it to be paid. His indorsement is in itself only an order on them to pay the bill or note; but the law annexes to this order a promise on his part to pay the bill or note if they do not. He may guard against this by indorsing it with the words "without recourse," which mean, by usage, that the holder is not to have, in any event, recourse to the indorser. (t) While these words, or any words which convey clearly the same meaning, protect the indorser from any demand on him; they convey to the indorsee the paper itself, with all its negotiable qualities, in the same way as an indorsement with no words of restriction or exception could do. (u) The same purpose will be answered if he uses any other words, or others distinctly expressive of the same meaning. Without these the indorser is liable for the whole amount. (v)

It is this peculiarity which gives their great value and utility to bills and notes as instruments of commerce and business, and this liability is strictly defined and very carefully watched and protected. It is a conditional liability only. All [parties primarily liable] must have the bill or note presented to them, and

(s) Jones v. Ryde, 1 A. K. Marsh. 157,

5 Taunt. 489; Bruce v. Bruce, 1 A. K. Marsh. 165, 5 Taunt. 495; Gompertz v. Bartlett, 24 E. L. & E. 156; Gurney v. Womersley, 28 E. L. & E. 256, and editor's note; Eagle Bank v. Smith, 5 Conn. 71; Canal Bank v. Bank of Alhany, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 87; Thompson v. McCul-lough, 31 Mo. 224. Sed aliter, if the bill or note is discounted by the banker of the acceptor or maker, Smith v. Mercer,

6 Taunt. 76. The ruling of Abbott, C. J., in Fuller v Smith, Ry. & M. 49, is not consistent with Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taunton, 76:

(!) Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225; Upham v. Prince, 12 Mass. 14; Waite v. Foster, 33 Me. 424.

(u) Epler v. Funk, 8 Barr, 468. Such an indorsement transfers the indorser's whole interest therein, but taken with other circumstances, it is said to tend to show that the note was not indorsed for value, and therefore to open to the maker the same defences against the indorsee which he could have made against the payee. Richardson v. Lincoln, 5 Met. 201.