The statute of James provides, that if the plaintiff, at the time when the cause of action accrues, is within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond the seas, he may bring his action at any time within six years after the disability ceases or is removed.

(rw) Hunter v. Robinson. 30 Ga. 479.

(rx) Dean v. Munroe, 32 Ga. 28. (ry) Williams v. Durst, 25 Texas, 667. (re) Nolin v. Blackwell, 2 Vroom, 170; Thompson c. Sickles, 46 Barb. 49. (ra) Lichty v. Hugus, 55 Pa. 260. (s) Harris v. Osbourn, 2 Cromp & M. 629. But see Hale's Exec. v. Ard's Exec.

48 Pa. 22; Nicholls v. Wilson. 11 M. & W. 106; Whitehead v. Lord, 7 Exch. 691, 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 587; Rothery v. Mannings, 1 B. & Ad. 15; Phillips v. Broad ley, 9 Q. B. 744; Foster v. Jack, 1 Watts, 334; Jones v. Lewis, 11 Texas, 359. (t) Vansandan v. Browne, 9 Bing. 402.

1 An executor summoned as trustee cannot set off against a legacy due the defendant a promissory note to himself, signed by the defendant as maker and the testator as surety, if such note is barred by limitation before the testator's death. Wadleigh 9. Jordan, 74 Me. 483. - K.

2 An action for a continuing nuisance or a continuing trespass is not barred by the expiration of the statutory period from its beginning. The continuance is a constant injnry starting the statute afresh. Hunt v Iowa Central R. R. Co. 52 Northwestern Rep. 668 (la 1892); Wells v. New Haven, etc Co. 151 Mass 46; Knox v. Metropolitan 4c. Ry. Co 128 N. Y 624; Cedar Lake Hotel Co. v. Cedar Lake Hydraulic Co., 79 Wis. 297. Compare Porter v. Midland Ry Co. 125 Ind. 476. But damages can only be recovered for injuries which have occurred within the statutory period. Lentz v. Carnegie Bros. 145 Pa. 612. One entitled to life support is not barred by the failure to demand such support for any length of time. Coleman v. Whitney, 62 Vt, 123.

If, therefore, either of these disabilities exist, when the cause of action arises, then, so long as it exists, the statute does not run; but as soon as the disability is removed, the statute begins to run. (u)

It should be remarked that, generally, neither prescription nor statutory limitation runs against a State; but this rule is not applied where the State has but a nominal interest in the action, its name being used only to enforce the rights of a legal or actual person.(uu)

In general, if the statute begins to run, its operation cannot afterwards be arrested. (v)1 Thus, if the disability should not exist when the cause of action arose, but should begin one month afterwards, and remain, as if the creditor should go abroad and not return, the statute runs in the same way as if the disability never existed. So if it exists when the cause of action begins, and is afterwards removed, although temporarily, the statute begins to run as soon as the disability is removed, and then continues. And it has been held, not only that if the creditor returns to his home for a short time, and then goes abroad again, and remains there, the statute begins to operate; but if there be joint creditors, who were abroad when the cause of action accrued, and one of them returned home, the six years begin as to all from such return. (w)

If the law is changed after prescription or limitation begins, the time before the change is computed on the old law, and that which follows on the new law. (ww)

If several disabilities coexist when the right of action accrues, * the statute does not begin to run until all are

(u) An acknowledgment by an infant of a debt due for necessaries is effective, for the purpose of taking the debt out of the operation of the statute. Williams v. Smith, 4 Ellis & B. 180, 38 Eng. L. & Eq. 276.

(uu) Miller v. State, 38 Ala. 600.

(v) Smith v. Hill, 1 Wilson, 134; Gray v. Mendez, Stra. 556; Ruff v. Bull, 7 Harris & J. 14; Young v. Mackall, 4 Md. 362; Coventry v. Atherton, 9 Ohio, removed (x) But if there exists but one disability at the time when the cause of action accrues, other disabilities, arising afterwards, cannot be tacked to the first, so as to extend the time of limitation. (y)

34; Pendergrast v. Foley, 8 Ga. 1; Stewart v. Sneddon, 5 Md. 433.

(w) Perry v. Jackson, 4 T. R. 516; Marsteller v. M'Clean, 7 Cranch, 156; Henry v. Means, 2 Hill (S. C), 328; Riggs v. Dooley, 7 B. Mon. 236; Wells v. Ragland, 1 Swan, 501. But see contra, Gourdine v. Graham, 1 Brev. 329.

(ww) Whitworth v. Ferguson, 18 La. An. 602; Trapnall v. Burton, 24 Ark. 371.

1 When the statute begins to run no subsequent disability will arrest its progress. Harris v. McGovern, 99 U. S. 161. See further McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619; Bonney v. Stoughton, 122 111. 536; Walker v. Hill, 111 Ind. 223; Piper v. Hoard, 107 N. Y. 67; Douglas v. Irvine, 126 Pa. 643. Proof that the defendant resided out of the State when the contract in suit was entered into, raises a presumption of continued resideuce out of the State. Alden v. Goddard, 73 Me. 346. - K.

But it is obvious that an action cannot be brought if the defendant cannot be reached, any more than if the plaintiff cannot act. And therefore, the statute of the fourth of Anne, c. 16, § 19, provides, that if any person against whom there shall be a cause of action, shall, at the time when such cause of action accrues, be beyond the seas, then the action may be brought at any time within six years after his return. This statute also has been substantially re-enacted here. In England, it seems to have been held, that if the debtor returns but for a few days, and his return is wholly unknown to the creditor, the statute begins to run from the date of bis return. (z) But it has been held here, that if the debtor come back within the jurisdiction, and remain some weeks, but hide himself, so that the creditor has not actually an opportunity of suing him, this return does not satisfy the purpose of the statute, and the six years do not begin. (a) It has further been held here, that, in * order to put the statute in operation, the defendant is bound to show, either that the plaintiff knew of his return, so as to have had an opportunity to arrest him, or that his return was so public as to amount to constructive notice or knowledge, and to raise the presumption that if the plaintiff had used ordinary diligence, the defendant might have been arrested, (b)l