The next question we propose to consider is, from what point of time the six years are to be counted. The general answer is, from the period when the creditor could have commenced his action; because it is then only that the reason of the limitation begins to operate, whether we say, with the theory that the statute is one of presumption, that so long a delay makes it probable that the debt is paid; or suppose the statute to be one of repose, and say, that, after so long a neglect, the creditor ought to lose his action. Thus, if a credit is given, the six years begin when the credit expires; (v)l

(t) For cases holding the affirmative of this question, see Welford v. Liddel, 2 Ves. Sen. 400; Martin v. Heathcote, 2 Eden, 169; Barber v. Barber, 18 Ves. 286; Foster v. Hodgson, 19 id. 180; Ault v. Goodrich, 4 Russ. 430; Coster v. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. 522, 20 Johns. 576; Didier v. Davidson, 2 Barb. Ch. 477; Van Rhyn v. Vincent, 1 M'Cord, Ch. 310. And see Penn v. Watson, 20 Mo. 13.

(u) That this question is now settled in the negative in England, see Catling v. Skoulding, 6 T. R. 189; Robinson v. Alexander, 8 Bligh, 352; Inglis v. Haigh, 8 M. & W. 769. See, however, Tatam v. Williams, 3 Hare, 347. And such also is the weight of authority in this country. See Mandeville v. Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15; Spring v. Gray, 6 Pet. 151; Bass v. Bass, 6 Pick. 362; Watson v. Lyle, 4 Leigh, 236; Coalter v. Coalter, 1 Rob (Va.) 79;

Lansdale v. Brashear, 3 T. B. Mon, 330; Patterson v. Brown, 6 id. 10; Dyott v. Letcher, 6 J. J. Marsh. 541; Guichard v Superveile, 11 Texas, 522; Pridgen v. Hill, 12 id. 374; Ogden v. Astor, 4 Sandf. 329. And see Chambers o. Snooks, 25 Pa. 296; Thurston v. Maddocks, 6 Allen, 427.

(v) Thus, in Wittersheim v. Lady Carlisle, 1 H. BL 631, it was held, that where a bill of exchange is drawn payable at a certain future period, for the amount of a sum of money lent by the payee to the drawer, at the time of drawing the bill, the payee may recover the money in an action for money lent, although six years have elapsed since the time when the loan was advanced; the statute of limitations beginning to operate only from the time when the money-was to be repaid, namely, when the bill and if the money be payable on the happening of a certain event, the six years begin from the happening of the event, as on a marriage; (w) or if a bill be payable at sight, the six years begin on presentment and demand, (x) And this credit may be inferred, or lengthened by inference, (y) As if goods are sold on six months' * credit, and then a bill is to be given, payable at three months, whether the bill is given or not, the six years are said to begin after nine months; and if the bill may be at two or four months, at the purchaser's option, this, it seems, would be construed as a credit for ten months, (z) It may, however, be doubted whether the true construction of such a contract should not be a credit for six months; then a bill for two or four; and if the bill is given, the statute will begin to run when the bill is due, and not before; but if the bill is not given, this is a breach of the contract so far, and the credit ends with the six months, and the statute then begins to run. (a)

1 The six years' residence within the State necessary to create a bar under the statute of limitations must be years of 365 days each, excepting leap year, which must have 366. Bell v. Lamprey, 57 N. H. 168. See Bennett v. Cook, 43 N. Y. 537. - K.

Where there are third parties in the transaction, the same rule prevails. As if one sells property belonging to himself and another, and this other sues him for his share, the action is barred by the statute, only if six years have run from the time when the payment was made by the buyer, (b) And if the seller takes a promissory note for the goods, the six years do not run for him from the sale, nor yet from the maturity of the note; but only from the actual payment, because only then could the other owner demand his share, (c) So if a surety pays for his principal, the statute begins to run from his first payment for his principal, as to that payment; (d)1 but as to his claim on a co-surety, for contribution, it does not begin when he begins to pay, but only when his payments first amount to more than his share. (e) So in a contract of indemnity, the six years begin only with the actual became due. And see Wheatley v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 533; Irving v. Veitch, 3 id. 90; Fryer v. Roe, 12 C. B. 437, 22 Eng. L. &. Eq. 440; Tisdale r. Mitchell, 12 Texas, 68; Daugherty v. Wheeler, 125 Ind. 421; Schotte 0. Meredith, 138 Pa. 165.

(w) Shutford v. Borough, Godb. 437; Fenton v. Emblers, 1 W. Bl. 353.

(x) Wolfe v. Whiteman, 4 Harring. (Del) 246; Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323.

(y) See Brent v. Cook, 12 B. Mon. 267.

(z) Helps v. Winterbottom, 2 B. & Ad. 431.

(a) Per Parke, J., in Helps 0. Winter-bottom, supra.

(b) Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick. 133.

(c)Id. (d) Davies v. Humphreys, 6 M. & W. 153; Ponder v. Carter, 12 lred. 242; Gillespie v. Creswell, 12 Gill & J. 36; Bullock v. Campbell, 9 Gill, 182; Thayer v. Daniels, 110 Mass. 345.

(e) Davies v. Humphreys, supra.

1 A continuing guaranty is kept alive by every authorised advance under it Poughkeepsie Bank v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484. - K.

damnification. (f) As if one lends a note, on a promise of indemnity, the statute begins to run only from the time when he has to pay the note he lends. (g) If a demand be necessary to sustain an action, only after it is made does the statute begin. (h) But a note payable * "on demand" is due always, and the statute begins as soon as the note is made. (i) So it is with a receipt for money borrowed, whereby the borrower agrees to pay "whenever called upon to do so." (j) A bank bill is payable on demand; but here it is held not only that the statute does not begin until demand, but that, if a demand cannot be made because the bank has closed its doors, the statute does not begin to run, although an action may be begun without a demand, (jj)