The prevention of litigation is a valid and sufficient consideration; for the law favors the settlement of disputes. (/) Thus, cient consideration for a promise to pay them more than the legal fees. Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463; Sweany v. Hunter, 1 Murphey, 181.

(j) Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 449; Freeman v. Boynton, id. 483; May v. Coffin, 4 id. 347; Silvernail v. Cole, 12 Barb. 685; Boss v. MeLauchlan, 7 Gratt. 86.

(k) Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East, 469.

(l) Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444. In this case a bill was filed in chancery to enforce specific performance of articles of agreement under seal entered into for the purpose of ascertaining and settling the boundaries of two provinces of America, and providing for mutual conveyances, etc. It was objected, amongst other things, that the agreement was merely voluntary, and that equity never decrees specifically without a consideration.

Upon which the chancellor (Lord Hard-wicke) observed that it was true that the court never decrees specifically without consideration; but that the agreement in question was not without consideration; for though nothing valuable was given on the face of the articles as a consideration, the settling boundaries, and peace and quiet, formed a mutual consideration on each side; and in all cases make a consideration to support a suit in chancery, for performance of the agreement for settling the boundaries. See also Wiseman v. Roper, 1 Chanc. 158; Stapilton v. Sta-pilton, 1 Atk. 3.

But performance or a promise to perform something which differs in any way, however slightly, from what is required to satisfy the previous obligation, is a good consideration.

Thus if a debtor gives or agrees to give new security for a debt or changes or agrees to change the time for its payment, or agrees to give increased interest there is sufficient consideration for a promise. Manufacturing Co. v. Bradley, 105 U. S. 175; Kinsey v. Wallace, 36 Cal. 462; Warner v. Campbell, 26 Ill. 282; Williams v. Scott, 83 Ind. 405; Gates v. Hamilton, 12 Ia. 50; Hubbard v. Igden. 22 Kan. 363; Preston v. Henning, 6 Bush, 556; Chute v. Pattee, 37 Me. 102; Eeirn v. Andrews, 59 Miss. 39; Clarkson v. Creely, 35 Mo. 95; Wright v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 548: Day v. Gardner, 42 N. J. Eq. 199; Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164; Fawcett v. Freshwater, 31 Ohio St. 637.

So if a ship's crew continue a voyage after the number of hands is so reduced that the continuation is a danger which they are not bound by their original articles incur, it will support a promise to pay extra wages. Hartley v. Ponsonby . 7 E. & B. 872.

So if the performance or promise to perform of an official goes beyond what his duty as such official requires of him, it will be a good consideration. England v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856; Morrell v. Quarks, 35 Ala. 544; Pilie v. New Orleans, 19 La. An. 274; Gregg v. Pierce, 53 Barb. 387; McCandless v. Allegheny Bessemer Steel Co., 152 Pa. 139; Texas, etc Mfg. Co. v. Mechanics' Fire Co., 54 Tex. 319; Davis v. Munson, 43 Vt. 676; Reif v. Page. 55 Wis. 496.

In Day v. Gardner, 42 N. J. Eq. 199, it was intimated that payment of taxes by the mortgagor would be sufficient consideration to support a promise by the mortgagee to relinquish a portion of his mortgage debt, though the mortgagor was legally bound to pay the taxes. This seems contrary to the weight of authority; and see especially, Newton v. Chicago, etc. By. Co., 66 Ia. 422.

a mutual submission of demands and claims to arbitration is binding so far as this, that the mutual promises are a consideration each for the other. (m) But the submission must be mutually binding; that is, equally obligatory on both parties, or the consideration fails. On the same ground a mutual compromise is sustained. (n) With the courts of this country, the prevention of litigation is not only a sufficient, but a highly favored consideration; (o) and no investigation *into the character or value of the different claims submitted will be entered into for the purpose of setting aside a compromise, it being sufficient if the parties entering into the compromise thought at the time that there was a question between them. (p)1

So giving up a suit or any equivalent proceedings, instituted to try a question of which the legal result is doubtful, is a good consideration for a promise to pay a sum of money for an abandonment thereof. (q) And in these cases inequality of con(m) Hodges v. Saunders, 17 Pick. 470; Jones v. Boston Mill Corp. 4 id. 507; Williams v. The Commercial Exchange Co., 29 E. L. & E. 429; s. c. 10 Exch. 569; Com. Dig. Action upon the Case on As-sumpsit (A. 1), (B. 2).

(n) Durham v. Wadlington, 2 Strob. Eq. 258; Van Dyke v. Davis, 2 Mich. 145; Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 216. In this case Gibson, C. J., held that a compromise of a doubtful title was binding upon the parties, although ignorant of their rights, unless vitiated by fraud sufficient to avoid any other contract. In Cavode v. McKel-vey, Addison, 56, where conflicting titles of lands were settled by one claimant purchasing the title of the other, it was held that the settlement was a good consideration to support such purchase, although the title was bad. In O'Keson v. Barclay, 2 Penn. St. 531, an action for slander was compromised by the defendant agreeing to give the plaintiff a certain sum. Held, by the Supreme Court, reversing the judgment of the court below, that there was a sufficient consideration for the promise, although the words laid in the declaration were not actionable.

(o) See in addition to the cases in the last note, Zane v. Zane, 6 Munf. 406; Taylor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb, 168; Fisher v. May, 2 id. 448; Truett v. Chaplin, 4 Hawks, 1*78; Brown v. Sloan, 6 Watts, 321; Stoddard v. Mix, 14 Conn. 12; Rice v. Bixler, 1 W. & S. 456; Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co., 4 Met. 270.

(p) Ex parte Lucy, 21 E. L. & E. 199; Mills v. Lee, 6 Monr. 91; Moore v. Fitzwater, 2 Rand. (Va.) 442; Bennet v. Paine, 5 Watts, 259; Pierson v. McCahill, 21 Cal. 122; Clark v. Gamwell, 125 Mass. 428; Flanuagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443. (q) In Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Ald. 117, it was held that the giving up a suit, instituted to try a question respecting which the law is doubtful, is a good consideration for a promise to pay a stipulated sum; and therefore where a ship, having on board a pilot required by law, ran foul of another vessel, and proceedings were instituted by the owners of the latter to compel the owners of the former to make good the damage, and the former vessel was detained until bail was given, and pending such proceedings, the agent of the owners of the vessel detained agreed, on the owners of the damaged vessel renouncing all claims on the other vessel, and on their proving the amount of the damage done, to indemnify them, and to pay a stipulated sum by way of damages; it was held that there being contradictory decisions as to the point whether shipowners were liable for an injury done while their ship was under the control of the pilot required by law, there was a sufficient consideration to sustain the promise made by the agents of the owners of the detained vessel to pay the stipulated damages. - But in Watters v. Smith, 2 B. & Ad. 889, where this case was relied upon, the case was that B & C being jointly indebted to A, the latter sued B alone. He remonstrated upon the hardship of the case, alluded to circumstances which would probably reduce the plaintiff's demand if sideration does not constitute a valid objection; it is enough if there be an actual controversy, of which the issue may fairly be considered by both parties as doubtful. But a promise by a son not to complain of his father's distribution of his estate, is * no consideration for the father's promise not to sue a note given by the son. (r) It has been said that equity regards the termination of family controversies as a sufficient consideration for an agreement, even if the controversies had no good foundation. (rr)

1 See post, p. * 441, note 1.

A promise to pay money, in consideration that the promisee would abandon proceedings in which the public are interested, is not sustainable, because such consideration is void on grounds of public policy. (s) 1 So, obtaining the passage of a law by corrupt means is no valid consideration. (t) he gained a verdict, and proposed to put an end to the action by paying part of the debt, and the costs of the suit. This was agreed to, and a receipt given for the sum paid, which was stated to be for debt and costs in that action. A having afterwards sued C, it was held, that the composition above meutioned did not operate as a discharge of the whole debt, but only to relieve B, and therefore it was no defence for C - In Wilkinson v. Byers, 1 A. & E. 106, the Court of King's Bench held, that where an action has been commenced for an unliquidated demand, payment by the defendant of an agreed sum in discharge of such demand, is a good consideration for a promise by the plaintiff to stay proceedings and pay his own costs. And, per Littledale, J., even in the case of a liquidated demand, the same promise made in consideration of the payment of such demand, may be enforced in an action of assumpsit, when the agreement has been such that the court would stay proceedings if the plaintiff attempted to go on. See Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284; Mills v. Lee, 6 Monr. 97; Union Hank v. Geary, 5 Pet. 114; Bennet v. Paine, 5 Watts, 259; Muirhead v. Kirkpatrick, 21 Penn. St. 237; Livingston v. Dugan, 20 Mo. 102; Hey v. Moorhouse, 6 Bing. N. C. 52; Stracy v. Bank of England, 6 Bing. 754; Atlee v. Backhouse. 3 M. & W. 648; Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229; Thornton v. Fairlie, 2 Moore, 397, 408, 409.

(r) White v. Bluett, 24 E. L. & E. 434.

(rr) Smith v. Smith, 36 Ga. 184; Supreme Assembly v. Campbell (R. I.) 22 At. Rep. 307; Burkholder's Appeal, 105 Pa. 31; Williams v. Williams, L. R. 2 Ch. 294.

(s) In Coppock v. Bower, 4 M. & W. 361, a petition having been presented to the House of Commons against the return of a member, on the ground of bribery, the petitioner entered into an agreement, in consideration of a sum of money, and upon other terms, to proceed no further with the petition. Lord Abinger said: "Then the next question is, whether this is an unlawful agreement; and I think that though it may not be so by any statute, yet it is unlawful by the common law. Here was a petition presented on a charge of bribery. Now this is a proceeding instituted not for the benefit of the individuals, but of the public; and the only interest in it which the law recognizes is that of the public. I agree that if the person who prefers that petition finds, in the progress of the inquiry, that he has no chance of success, he is at liberty to abandon it at any time. But I do not agree that he may take money for so doing, as a means and with the effect of depriving the public of the benefit which would result from the investigation. It seems to me as unlawful to do so as it would be to take money to stop a prosecution for a crime. In either case the prosecutor might say that he is not bound, at his own expense, to continue an inquiry in which the public alone are interested; but such a reason does not amount to an excuse, where he receives money for discontinuing the proceedings." Keir v. Leeman,

9 A. & E, (n. s.) 371; Wall v. Charlick, N. Y. Leg. Obs. July, 1850, 230

(t) Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.

Co., 16 How. 314.

1 Or an agreement in consideration of withholding suit upon a bond not to expose and make public the commission of the crime of adultery by the obligee with the obligor's wife. Brown v. Brine, 1 Ex. D. 5. - K.