A contract made by a party under compulsion is void;1 because consent is of the essence of a contract, and where there is compulsion there is no consent, for this must be voluntary. (t) Such a contract is void for another reason. It is founded on wrong. The violence was itself an injury to the party suffering it; the party using the violence had no right to do so, and cannot establish a right on his own wrong-doing.

(s) Swift v. Clark, 15 Mass. 173; Johnson v. Sims, 1 Pet. Ad. 215; Flanders' Marit. Law, § 404; The Schooner Emulous & Cargo, 1 Sumner, 207; The A. D. Patchin, 1 Blatch. C. C. 414. And in the George Home, 1 Hagg. Ad. 370, on an engagement to go "from London to Batavia, the East India seas or elsewhere, and until the final arrival at any port or ports in Europe." It was held, that upon the arrival of the ship at Cowes for orders (as previously agreed between the owners and masters), the seamen were not bound to proceed on a further voyage to Rotterdam. But in Webb v. Duckingfield, 13 Johns. 391, where a seaman who had signed shipping articles, by which he engaged not to absent himself from the vessel without leave " until the voyage was ended, and the vessel was discharged of her cargo," on the vessel's arriving at her last port of discharge, and being there safely moored, refused to remain and assist in discharging the cargo, but absented himself without leave; it was held, that by such desertion he had forfeited his wages. - So, mutinous and rebellions conduct of the mariner, if persisted in. forfeits their right to wages. Relf v. Ship Maria, 1 Pet. Ad. 186. - So does desertion; and the statute of the United States, declaring any unauthorized absence of a seaman from his ship for forty-eight hours to be desertion, applies to all cases where the seaman does not return within such time, although he may have been prevented by the sailing of the ship. For the ship is not bound to wait for him, but he is bound to rejoin the ship within that period, suo periculo. Collin v. Jenkins, 3 Story, 108.

1 In Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, an action by the payee of a promissory note against the maker who was a married woman, it was held no defence that the defendant was induced to sign the note by threats made to her by her husband, if the payee took the note in ignorance of this. Holmes, J., in his opinion said: " No doubt if the defendant's hand had been forcibly taken and compelled to hold the pen and write her name, and the note had been carried off and delivered, the signature and delivery would not have been her acts; and if the signature and delivery had not been her arts for whatever reason, no contract would have been made, whether the plaintiff knew the facts or not There sometimes still is shown an inclination to put all cases of duress upon this ground. Barry v. Equitable Life Assurance Sue., 59 N. Y. 587. 591. But duress, like fraud, rarely, if ever, becomes material as such, except on the footing that a contract or conveyance has been made which the party wishes to avoid. It is well settled that where, as usual, the so-called duress consists only of threats the contract is only voidable." And see Bank of Grand Rapids v. Butler, 48 Mich. 192; Clark v. Pease, 41 N. H. 414.

It is not, however, all compulsion which has this effect; it must amount to durities, or duress. But this duress may be either actual violence, or threat. (u) And actual violence, if not so slight as to be quite unimportant, is sufficient to annul a contract made under its influence. Imprisonment in a common jail or elsewhere, is duress of this kind; but to have this effect it must either be unlawful in itself, or, if lawful, then it must be accompanied with such circumstances of unnecessary pain, privation, or danger, that the party is induced by them to make the contract. (v) Duress by threats does not exist wherever a party has entered into a contract under the influence of a threat, but only where such a threat excites a fear of some grievous wrong; as of death, or great bodily injury, or unlawful imprisonment.1

(0 1 Roll. Abr. 688.

(u) 1 Bl. Cora. 131.

(v) Watkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. 511; Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508; Stouffer v. Latshaw, 2 Watts, 167; Nelson v. Suddarth, 1 Hen. & M. 350. - An arrest, though for a just cause, and under lawful authority, yet if it be for an unlawful purpose, is duress of imprisonment. Severance v. Kimball, 8 N. H. 386. In Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508, it was held, that where there is an arrest for improper purposes, without just cause, or an arrest for just cause, but without lawful authority, or an arrest for a just cause, and under lawful authority, for an improper purpose, and the person arrested pays money for his enlargement, he may be considered as having paid the money by duress of imprisonment, and may recover it back in an action for money had and received. - But an agreement by a prisoner to pay a just debt made while under legal imprisonment, cannot be avoided on the ground of duress. Shephard v. Watrous, 3 Caines, 166; Crowell v. Gleason, 1 Fairf. 325; Meek v. Atkinson, 1 Bailey, 84. But a bond given for the maintenance of a bastard child, as required by some statute, is void for duress, if the warrant and other proceedings before the magistrate are not according to the statute. Fisher v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252. - So a bond executed through fear of unlawful imprisonment may be avoided on account of duress. Whitefield v. Longfellow, 13 Me. 146. - But contra, as to a mortgage given as security for payment of a sum to the county, as the condition of a pardon. Rood v. Winslow, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 68. A threat by a judgment creditor to levy his execution, is not such duress as to make void an agreement to pay the sum due. Wilcox v. Howland, 23 Pick. 167; Waller v. Cralle, 8 B. Mon. 11. - Nor a threat of lawful imprisonment. Eddy v. Herrin, 17 Me. 338; Alexander v. Pierce, 10 N. H. 497. - And a note given to obtain the release of property from an illegal levy of an execution, is not void. Bingham v. Sessions, 6 Sm. & M. 13. See Bowker v. Lowell, 49 Me. 429; Hackett v. King, 6 Allen, 58.