Any one adopting and using a trade-mark may so make it his, and advertise it as his to the public. But neither this adoption and use, for any length of time, nor any advertisement or publicity would now avail, unless the statute requirements of record, gone to the latter. An injunction was granted. See also Woodward v. Lazar, 21 Cal. 448; McCardel v. Peck, 28 How. Pr. 120. In Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215, the defendant was enjoined from publishing a magazine as a continuation of one published by the plaintiff. In Spottiswoode v. Clark, 2 Ph. 154, 2 Sandf. Ch. 628, the name and devices upon the cover of the defendant's almanac resembled those used by the plaintiff; but the imitation was not considered by the court sufficiently close to warrant an injunction, without a previous trial at law of the legal title. See Maxwell v. Hogg, Eng. Eq. Rep. 2 Ch. Ap. 305. In Matsell v. Flanagan, 2 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 459, the plaintiffs were publishers of the "National Police Gazette." The defendants were vendors of a publication of similar character called the "United States Police Gazette," evidently intended as an imitation of the former paper. An injunction was granted. So, in Clement v. Maddicks, 22 Law Rep. 428,1 Giff. 98, the defendants were restrained from publishing a paper under the title of the "Penny Bell's life," that being considered a fraudulent imitation of the plaintiff's paper, which was called "Bell's Life." The same principles are recognized in Snowden v. Noah, Hopkins, 347; Bell v. Lock, 8 Paige, 75;

Stevens v. De Conte, 4 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 47; Dayton v. Wilkes, 17 How. Pr. 510, in all which cases suits were brought by newspaper proprietors for fraudulent imitations of their publications, although injunctions were refused on the {ground that the imitations complained of were not close enough to deceive the public In Christy v. Murphy, 12 How. Pr. 77, the plaintiff had organized a band of musical performers, which he called "Christy's Minstrels," and whose performances had been attended with great success. During his temporary absence from the country the defendant and others, who had been employed by him as musicians, assumed the name of Christy's Minstrels. An injunction forbidding them to use that name was granted. In Peterson v. Humphrey, 4 Abb. Pr. 394, the defendant was restrained from using signs bearing the name of a partnership of which both plaintiff and defendant had formerly been members. In Congress Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring Co. 45 N. Y. 291, it was held that, "Congress Spring" and "Congress Water," being names of a well-known medicinal mineral water of high reputation, sufficiently indicated their objects, and the proprietors were entitled to protection in the use of these names as trade-marks.

bm etc., were complied with. In providing protection on these conditions, we should say it limited the protection to these conditions. It may still be true, as it has been, that if any name, whether in part a personal or not, has become by long use recognized as the name of a certain article, without reference to its manufacture or ownership, no one can appropriate this name, and acquire an exclusive right to it as his own trade-mark. (m)1 bm Some question may arise as to the degree of * novelty requisite to the validity of the trade-mark. It may be law, that if a name had been long and commonly used to designate certain articles, no one could now claim an exclusive right to this name, by making it his trade-mark. But the requirement of absolute novelty in the name or mark has not been pushed, and will not be, so far as the needed novelty of a patented invention. In an American case, in which the general question is considered, it

(m) Canham v. Jones, 2 Ves. & B. 217. The plaintiff had purchased the exclusive right to manufacture a medicine known as "Velno's Vegetable Syrup." The defendant sold a similar mixture under the same name. Vice-Chancellor Plumer held, that as there was no patent the plaintiff had no exclusive right to prepare and sell the mixture, and dismissed the bill. But this reason might not be held to apply to a trade-mark recovered under our statute. In Singleton v. Bolton, the plaintiff claimed an exclusive right to manufacture " Dr. Johnson's Yellow Ointment." In both these cases it was said that the defendant had a right to use the name of the original inventor, the court evidently considering that name as having become by use an essential part of the name of the mixture. See Perry v. True-fitt, 6 Beav. 66. In the peculiar case of Thomson v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 214, it was held, that the plaintiff's name had become by use so far identified with the name of the medicine invented and made by him, that any one having a right to make the medicine might call it by the plaintiff's name. C. J. Shaw said that, "without obtaining a patent, the plaintiff had no exclusive right or privilege to compound or vend the medicine called 'Thomsonian,' although he was the original inventor, and that he had no more right than the defendant to make and vend these medicines or call them Thomsonian, if this term had acquired a generic meaning, descriptive of a general kind, quality, or class of medicines, and if they were not sold as and for medicines, made and prepared by the plaintiff." Where one has acquired a right in a certain sign as his trade-mark another cannot adopt it, even though it be the family crest of the latter. Standish v. Whitwell, 14 W. R. 512. The following cases illustrate the converse of the rule stated in the text. In Morrison v. Salmon, 2 Man. & Gr. 385, the plaintiffs made and sold a certain preparation under the name of "Morrison's Universal Medicine." The defendant applied the same name to a mixture sold by himself. It was decided that the name had not become generic, and that, though the defendant might sell the same mixture, he could not do so under the plaintiff's name. In Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 312, the defendant had stamped the words "Millington & Crawley Millington " upon steel manufactured by him, supposing them to be used in the market merely as signs of quality; but as it appeared that the name was that of the plaintiff, and indicated that he was the manufacturer of the goods on which it was stamped, an injunction was decreed. In the case of Day v. Binning, 1 Cooper's Ch. 489, and Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84, it was decided that the name of the firm of Day & Martin, the noted blacking manufacturers, had not become so incorporated with the name of that article made by them as to become public property.