When a thing is borrowed, to be used by the borrower, without any reward or compensation to be received by the owner from him, this transaction resembles the two former, in so far as it is gratuitous. But it is unlike them, in that the benefit belongs exclusively to the bailee; and he is therefore bound to great care, and liable for slight negligence. (q) 1

What constitutes this negligence, or, in general, what are the rules which belong to this species of bailment, we cannot ascertain to any great extent from adjudicated cases, as there are few which distinctly decide such questions. But in the case of Coggs v. Bernard, so often cited, Holt lays down certain principles, which he takes from Bracton, who borrows them from the civil law. Resting upon such authority, and also upon manifest reason and justice, they may be deemed the rules of law on this subject; and we give them in a note below, in the words of Holt. (r) case was left quite correctly to the jury. The defendant was shown to be a person conversant with horses, and was therefore bound to use such care and skill as a person conversant with horses might reasonably be expected to use; if he did not, he was guilty of negligence. The whole effect of what was said by the learned judge as to the distinction between this case and that of a borrower, was this: that this particular defendant, being in fact a person of competent skill, was in effect in the same situation as that of a borrower, who in point of law represents to the lender that he is a person of competent skill. In the case of a gratuitous bailee, where his profession or situation is such as to imply the possession of competent skill, he is equally liable for the neglect to use it." Alderson, B.: "The learned judge thought, and correctly, that this defendant being shown to be a person of competent skill, there was no difference between his case and that of a borrower; because the only difference is, that there the party bargains for the use of competent skill, which here becomes immaterial, since it appears that the defendant has it." Rolfe, B. "The distinction I intended to make was, that a gratuitous bailee is only bound to exercise such skill as he possesses, whereas a hirer or borrower may reasonably be taken to represent to the party who lets, or from whom he borrows, that he is a person of competent skill. If a person more skilled knows that to be dangerous which another not so skilled as he does not, surely that makes a difference in the liability. I said I could see no difference between negligence and gross negligence -that it was the same thing, with the addition of a vituperative epithet." It does not distinctly appear by the report of this case whether the bailor knew that the bailee possessed superior skill or not. We think, however, it must be presumed that he did not know it, or at least had reason to suppose that such was the case. See ante, p. * 98, note (i).

(q) Phillips v. Condon, 14 Ill. 84. See also to same effect, Howard v. Babcock, 21 Ill. 269, where the liability is carefully stated; and also Bennett v. O'Brien, 87 Ill. 260.

(r) "As to the second sort of bailment, namely, commodatum, or lending gratis, the borrower is bound to the strictest cart and diligence, to keep the goods so as to restore them back again to the lender, because the bailee has a benefit by the use of them, so as if the bailee be guilty of the least neglect he will be answerable; as if a man should lend another a horse to go westward, or for a month; if the bailee go northward, or keep the horse above a month, if any accident happen to the horse in the northern journey, or after the expiration of the month, the bailee will be chargeable; because he has made use of the horse contrary to the trust he was lent to him under, and it may be if the horse had been used no otherwise than he was lent, that accident would not have befallen him. This is mentioned in Bracton, fol. 99 a; his words are: Is autem cui res aliqua utenda datur, re obligatur, quae com-modata est, sed magna differentia est inter mutuant et commodatum; quia is qui rem mutuam accepit ad ipsam restituendam tene-tur, vel ejus pretium, si forte incendio, ruina, naufragio, aut latronum vel hostium incursu, consumpta fuerit, vel deperdita, subtracta, vel ablata. Et qui rem utendam accepit, non sufficit ad rei custodiam, quod talem diligen-tiam adhibeat, qualem suis rebus propriis adhibere solet, si alius eam diligentius potuit custodire; ad vim autem majorem vel casus fortuitos non tenetur quis, nisi culpa sua inter-venerit. Ut si rem sibi commodatam domi, secum detulerit cum peregre profectus fuerit, et illam incursu hostium vel praedonum vel naufragio amiserit, non est dubium quin ad rei restitutionem teneatur. I cite this author, though I confess he is an old one, because his opinion is reasonable, and very much to my present purpose, and there is no authority in the law to the contrary. But if the bailee put this horse in his stable, and he were stolen from thence, the bailee shall not be answerable for him. But if he or his servants leave the house or stable doors open, and the thieves take the opportunity of that, and steal the horse, he will be chargeable; because the neglect gave the thieves the occasion to steal the horse. Bracton says, the bailee must use the utmost care, but yet he shall not be chargeable where there is such a force as he cannot resist." See also Scranton v. Baxter, 4 Sandf. 5; Booth v. Terrell, 16 Ga. 20; 2 Ld. Raym. 915. A gratuitous loan is considered as strictly a personal trust, unless from other circumstances a different intention can fairly be presumed. This is well illustrated by the case of Bringloe v. Morrice, 1 Mod. 210. That was an action of trespass for immoderately riding the plaintiff's mare. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff lent him the mare, and gave him license to ride her, and that by virtue of this license the defendant and his servant had ridden the mare alternately. The plaintiff demurred to the plea. And, per curiam, "The license is annexed to the person, and cannot be communicated to another; for this riding is a matter of pleasure." And North, C. J., took a difference, where a certain time is limited for the loan of the horse, and where not. In the first case, the party to whom the horse is lent hath an interest in the horse during that time, and in that case his servant may ride, but in the other case not. A difference was also taken between hiring a horse to go to York, and borrowing a horse; in the first place, the party may let his servant ride; in the second not. But where a horse was for sale, and the agent of the vendor let A have the horse for the purpose of trying it, A was held justified in putting a competent person upon the horse to try-it, an authority to do so being implied. Lord Camoys v. "Scurr, 9 C. & P. 883.

1 Hagebush v. Ragland, 78 Ill. 40.

It would seem that a gratuitous lender for use, is liable to the party to whom he lends, for mischief directly resulting from the unsafe condition of the article, if that be known to the lender. (s)