If the consideration is valuable it need not be adequate; that is, the court will not inquire into the exact proportion between the value of the consideration and that of the thing to be done for it. (c) But it must have some real value: and if this be very small, this circumstance may, even by itself, and still more when connected with other indications, imply or sustain a charge of fraud. (d) The courts, both of law and of equity, refuse to disturb contracts on questions of mere adequacy, whether the consideration is of benefit to the promisor, or of injury to the promisee.1 Nevertheless, if an agreement be unreasonable or unconscionable, but not in such a way or to such a degree as to imply fraud, courts of equity will not decree a specific performance, (e) and though courts of law will not declare the contract void, they will give only reasonable damages to the plaintiff who seeks compensation for a breach of it. (/) When adequacy of consideration becomes material, whether it exists is a question for the court. (g)

Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. 97; Geer v. Archer, 2 Barb. 420. This was expressly held in Franklin v. Beatty, 27 Miss. 347. (y) Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 811; Meyer v. Haworth, 8 A. & E. 467; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 id. 438. See also Lloyd v. Lee, 1 Stra. 94. [In accord with the later English cases are Hethorington v Hixon, 46 Ala. 297; Waters v. Bean, 15 Ga.358; Maher v. Martin, 43 Ind. 314; Musick v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624; Watkins v. Halstead, 2 Sandf. 311; Kent v. Rand, 64 N. H. 45; Hayward v. Barker, 52 Vt. 429. Contrary decisions are Goulding v. Davidson, 26 N. Y. 604; Hemphill v. Mc-Climans, 24 Pa. 367.]

(a) "Vance v. Wells, 8 Ala. 399; Hubbard v Bugbee, 55 Vt. 506. But see contra, Thomas v. Passage, 54 Ind. 106.

(b) It appears to be so determined by Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 A. & E. (N. s.) 483, although the court had some difficulty in coming to this conclusion. See also on this point Binnington v. Wallis, 4 B. & Ald. 650; Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 496; Annandale v. Harris. 2 P. Wms. 432; Walker v. Perkins, l W. Bl. 517; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A.& E.438; Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill.229; Phillips v. Pullen, 50 N. J. L. 439. But see, contra, Massey v. Wallace, 32 S. C. 149.

(c) Skeate v. Beale, 11 A. & E. 983; Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 id. 438, 456; Hub-bard v. Coolidge, 1 Met. 84; Whittles Skinner, 23 Vt. 532; Sanborn v. French, 2 Foster (N. H.), 246; Phillipps v. Bateman, 16 East, 372; Kirwan v. Kirwan, 2 Cr. & M. 623; Cole v. Trecothick, 9 Ves 246; Floyer v. Sherard, Ambl. 18; Mar. Ghee v. Morgan, 2 Sch. & L. 395, d. (a); Low v. Barchard, 8 Ves. 183; Speed v. Phillips, 3 Anst. 732; Harlan v. Harlan, 20 Penn. St. 303; Davidson v. Little, 22 id. 245.

(d) Cockell v. Taylor, 15 E. L. & E. 101; s. c. 15 Beav. 103; Edwards v. Burt, id. 435; s. c. 2 De G. M. & G. 55; Johnson v. Dorsey, 7 Gill, 269; Wormack v. Rogers, 9 Ga. 60; Judge v. Wilkins, 19 Ala. 765; Milnes v. Cowley, 8 Price, 620; Preble v. Boghurt, 1 Swanst. 329; Mayor v. Williams, 6 Md. 235. Mere folly or weakness or want of judgment, will not defeat a contract. This is well illustrated by the case of James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111; s. c. 1 Keb. 569. An action was brought in special assumpsit, on an agreement to pay for a horse a barley-corn a nail, for every nail in the horse's shoes, and double every nail, which came, there being thirty-two nails, to five hundred quarters of barley; and on a trial before Hyde, J., the jury under his direction, gave the full value of the horse, £8, as damages; and it is to be collected that the contract was considered valid; for the report states, that there was afterwards a motion to the court in arrest of judgment, for a small fault in the declaration, which was overruled, and the plaintiff had judgment. See Chitty, Cont. 32. And where in an action of assumpsit it was alleged that in consideration of 2s. 6c?. paid, and £4 17s. 6d. to be paid, the defendant promised to deliver two rye-corns on the next Monday, and double in geometrical progression every succeeding Monday (or every other Monday), for a year, which would have required the delivery of more rye than was grown in the whole year, the court on demurrer seemed to consider the contract good; and Powell, J., said, that although the contract was a foolish one, yet it would hold good in law, and that the defendant ought to pay something for his folly; but no judgment was given, the case being compromised. Thornborrow v. Whiteacre, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164. See Chitty, Cont. 32; Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head, 289.

(e) Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 23; Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292 , Gasque v. Small, 2 Strob. Eq. 72.

1 A leading case is Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309. In that case, the defendants had given the plaintiffs a guarantee on behalf of J. L. to the extent of £10,000. This guarantee was probably not legally binding because without consideration. The defendants, becoming desirous of withdrawing the guarantee, agreed to pay certain bills of exchange amounting to nearly £10,000 if the plaintiffs would give up the guarantee, which they did. Held that the promise of the defendants to pay the bills of exchange was founded on sufficient consideration, the court saying: "It is also the opinion of all the court, with the exception of my brother Maule, who entertained some doubt on the question, that the words both of the declaration and the plea import that the paper on which the guarantee was written was given up; and that the actual surrender of the possession of the paper to the defendant was a sufficient consideration without reference to its contents." And in general, " The adequacy of the consideration is for the parties to consider at the time of making the agreement, not for the court when it is sought to be enforced." Per Blackburn, J., in Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 55. See also, Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294; Colt v. McConnell, 116 Ind. 249; Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380, 384; Williams v. Jensen, 75 Mo. 681; Perkins v. Clay, 54 N. H. 518; Traphagen's Exec. v. Voorhees, 44 N. J. Eq. 21; Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362; Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596; Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91; Cummings's Appeal, 67 Pa. 404; Giddings v. Giddings's Adm., 51 Vt. 227.