The general rule is that this right exists as long as the goods are in transitu. But it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the goods which it is sought to stop are still in transitu. (y)1

(y) If part of the goods have been delivered, the rest may nevertheless be stopped. Buckley v Furniss, 17 Wend 504. So held where the goods were separated, and one wagon-load had been delivered before the rest arrived. See also Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614. Ex parte Cooper, 11 Ch. D. 68. In Tanner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28, goods were shipped for London, and were landed at a wharf, and entered on the wharfinger's books in the consignor's name; he had also given the vendee an order for their delivery, under which he had received and sold the greater part; held, notwithstanding, that the transitus of the rest might be arrested. On the other hand, in Hammond v. Anderson, 4 B. & P. 69, the vendor and vendee both lived in the same town, and the goods lay at the wharf of a third person. The vendee, having received an order for the delivery of the property, went to the wharf, weighed the whole, and took away a part; it was held, that the vendor had then no right to stop the remainder. So in Slu-bey v. Heyward, 2 H. Bl. 504, the whole property arrived at the port of delivery, the consignees entered the whole cargo at the custom-house, they also removed a part before the consignor attempted to stop the goods. It was held too late. See also Jones v. Jones, 8 M. & W. 431; Bunney v. Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 571, where part delivery of a portion of a haystack, with intent to separate that from the remainder, was held not sufficient. A valid stoppage of a part of the goods forwarded under an entire contract, will not abrogate the effect of an actual or constructive possession acquired by the consignor of the residue. Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436, a very important case. The dictum of Taunton, J., in Betts v. Gibbins, 2 A. & E. 57, that a partial delivery is prima facie a delivery of the whole, has been denied. See Tanner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 37. This seems to have been mainly on the ground that it was not intended by the vendee, by taking possession of part, to take possession of the whole, but to separate that part, and take possession of it alone. In Crawshay v. Eades, 1 B. & C. 181, A delivered a quantity of iron to be conveyed to B the vendee. The carrier landed a part of the iron on B's wharf, when, learning that B had stopped payment, he reloaded the same on his barge, and carried the whole to his own premises. Held, that the vendor might stop all the goods, the carrier goods are still in the custom-house, the right to stop them is not defeated, although the vendee has paid the freight, the goods having been not entered through loss of the invoice. (b) The entry of the goods without payment of duties is not a termination of the transit. (c)

1 As long as the goods are in the possession of the carrier as such, and the bill of lading has not been transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value, the right continues, even though the end of the route has been reached, and when the carrier gives up his possession the right ceases. Ex parte Watson, 5 Ch. D. 35; Ex parte Golding, 13 Ch. D: 628, Greve v. Dunham, 60 Ia. 108; Symns v. Schotten, 35 Kan. 310; Seymour v. Newton, 105 Mass. 272, 275; Mohr v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co., 106 Mass. 67; Kingman v. Denison, 84 Mich. 608; Morris v. Shrycock, 50 Miss. 590; U. S. Wind Engine, etc. Co. v. Oliver, 16 Neb. 612; Calahan v Babcock, 21 Ohio St. 281; Wenger v. Barn-hart, 55 Pa. 300; Treadwell v. Aydlett, 9 Heisk. 388; Halff v. Allyn, 60 Tex. 278. But if the goods have reached the place named by the buyer to the seller, the transit is at an end, though the buyer or his agent forward them to another place. Kendal v. Marshall, 11 Q. B. D. 356; Ex parte Miles, 15 Q. B D. 39, Brooke Iron Co. v. O'Brien, 135 Mass. 442; Becker v Hallgarten, 86 N. Y. 167; Guilford v. Smith, 30 Vt. 49; Cf. p. * 606, note 1, post.

The vendee or his agent may stop the goods while in transit, and thereby determine the vendor's right before the destination originally agreed upon is reached. Wood v. Yeatman, 15 B. Mon. 270; Mohr v. Boston, etc. R. R., 106 Mass. 67, 72. See Poole v. Houston, etc. R. R. Co., 58 Tex. 134.

It seems to be settled that they are so not only while *in motion, and not only while in the actual possession of the carrier (although he was appointed and specified by the consignee), but also while they are deposited in any place distinctly connected with the transmission or delivery of them, (z.) or, rather, while in anyplace not actually or constructively the place of the consignee, or so in his possession or under his con-trol that the putting them there implies the intention of delivery v. Thus, if goods are lodged in a public warehouse for non-payment * of duties, they are not in the possession of the vendee, and the vendor may stop them, (a)1 So where having a lien on the whole for his freight, and as he had shown do assent to their delivery without payment of his lien, no part of the goods ever came into the possession of the vendee. See on this subject also Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504; Dixon v Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313 , Blackman v. Pierce, 23 Cal. 508.

(z) This point was much discussed in Sawyer v. Joslin, 20 Vt. 172. There the goods were shipped at Troy, N. Y., directed to the purchaser at Vergennes, Vt. They were landed upon the wharf at Vergennes, half a mile from the purchaser's place of business. The purchaser's goods were usually landed at the same place, and it was not customary for the wharfinger or the carrier, or any one for them, to have any care of the goods after they were landed; but the consignee was accustomed to transport the goods from the wharf to his place of business, as was also the custom with other persons having goods landed there. The goods while on the wharf were not subject to any lien for freight or charges; it was held, that a delivery on the wharf was a constructive delivery to the vendee. and that the right of stoppage was gone when the goods were landed. The cases on this point were thus classified by Hall, J., who delivered the opinion of the court: " The cases cited and relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel, where the transit was held not to have terminated, will, I think, all be found to fall within one or the other of the following classes; 1. Cases in which it has been held that the right of stoppage existed, where the goods were originally forwarded on board of a ship chartered by the vendee. 2. Where the delivery of the goods to the vendee has been deemed incomplete, by reason of his refusal to accept them. 3. Where goods remained in the custom-house, Bull ject to a government bill for duties, 4 Where the) were still in the hands of the carrier, or wharfinger, as his agent, sub-ject to the carrier's lien for freights. 5 Where the goods, though arrived at their port of delivery, were Mill on shipboard, or in the hands of the ship's lighterman, to be conveyed to the wharf 6. Where the goods had performed part of their transit, hut were in the hands of a middleman, to be forwarded on by other carriers." Tinker v Humphrey, 1 Mo. & P. 378, is an important case. 'I here goods were shipped on board a vessel addressed to the defendant's wharf for one Gilbert. An invoice was sent to Gilbert, stating that the goods were bought and shipped for him. and on his account and risk; and in the ship's manifest the) were marked to be delivered "to order." Before the arrival of the vessel, the pur chaser became bankrupt, and after the vessel reached the wharf, but before the goods were landed, they were claimed by a person on behalf of the consignor, and they were delivered to him. In an ac tion by the assignees of the consignee to recover the goods, held. that the consignor had a right to stop them. See other instances in Richardson v. Goss, 3 B & P. 127; Loeschman v. Williams, 4 Camp 181; Mills v. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457; Rowe v Pickford, 1 J. B. Moore, 526; Leeds v. Wright, 3 B. & P. 320; Marshall v. fall, 9 La. An. 92.