It may be said here, as in marine and life policies, that any legal or equitable interest may be insured. It is very common the direction of insurance offices should not choose to undertake the risk of such consequences, even in cases of clear and undoubted insanity. It is well known that the conduct of insane patients is, in some degree, under the control of their hopes and fears, and that especially their affection for others often exercises a sway over their minds where fear of death or of personal suffering might have no influence; and insurers might well desire not to part with this restraint upon the mind and conduct of the assured, nor to release from all pecuniary interest in the continuance of the life of the assured, those on whose watchfulness its preservation might depend; and they might, further, most reasonably desire to exclude from all questions between themselves and the representatives of the assured, the topic of criminality, so likely to excite the compassionate prejudices of a jury, which were most powerfully appealed to on the trial of this cause." Tindal, C. J., held, that the terms "dying by his own hands," being associated with the terms "dying by the hands of justice or in consequence of a duel," which last cases, designated criminal acts, on the principle of noscitur a sociis, should be interpreted as meaning felonious self-destruction. It will be observed, the majority of the court in the above case exclude from the condition cases of mere accident, and of insanity extending to unconsciousness of the act done or of its physical consequences. In Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437, which was determined in the Exchequer Chamber, in 1846, where the condition was that the policy should be void if the life-insured "should commit suicide," it was held by a majority of the court (Rolfe, B., Patteson, J., Alderson, B., Parke, B.), that the terms of the condition included all acts of voluntary self-destruction, and therefore if the life-assured voluntarily killed himself, it was immaterial whether he was or was not at the time a responsible moral agent. Pollock, C. B., and Wightman, J., dissented. So held also in Dufaur v. Professional Life

Ass. Co. 25 Bear. 599. On the other hand in New York, in a case decided before the above cases, it was held, that a provision in a life policy, that it is to be deemed void in case the assured shall "die by his own hand," imports a criminal act of self-destruction, and the underwriters were liable, where the assured drowned himself in a fit of insanity. Breasted v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 4 Hill, 73. The decision of the Supreme Court was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, but not with unanimity, five judges voting for an affirmance, and three for a reversal The opinion of the majority, delivered by Wil-lard, J., and the dissenting opinion of Gardiner, J., present the arguments on their respective sides, the latter sustaining the decisions of the English courts, 4 Seld. 299. In Dean v. American Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 96, the policy provided that it should be void if the assured should "die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the known violation of any State, national, or provincial law." The assured cut his throat with a razor, and the plaintiffs alleged, that the act whereby his death was caused was the direct result of insanity, and that his insanity was what is called suicidal impression, impelling him to take his life, and that suicide was the necessary and direct result of such insanity or disease. The court held that the defendants were not liable. The opinion was expressed, that if the death was caused by accident, by superior or overwhelming force, in the madness of delirium, or under any combination of circumstances from which it might be fairly inferred that the act of self-destruction was not the result of the will or intention of the party, adapting means to the end, and contemplating the physical nature and effects of the act, that it might be justly held a loss not excepted within the meaning of the proviso. Where a condition of the policy is, that it shall be void, if the party "shall die by his own hand in or in consequence of a duel," it is held to include the case of suicide by swallife of the other. Thus, not only may a wife insure the life of her husband, (j)1 but a sister may insure the life of a brother on whom she is dependent for support. (k) 2 A father has an insurable interest in the life of his minor child. (l) 3 A clerk may insure the life of one who has promised to employ him a certain number of years; but not the life of one from whom he has only a promise, from which he may expect an act of important kindness. (ll) This dependence may undoubtedly exist without any relationship. And generally it is said to be enough, if, according to the ordinary course of events, pecuniary loss or disadvantage will naturally and probably result from the death of the life-insured. (m)

* for creditors to insure the life of a debtor, and for a debtor to insure his own life, and make the insurance payable to a creditor for his security. (f) But if the debt be not founded on a legal consideration, it does not sustain the policy. (g) In a recent case, M. Y. & S. formed a copartnership, M. & V. furnished the capital, and S. shared equally in the profits, on account of his skill in the business; but in lieu of capital on the part of S. and as an indemnity, an insurance was effected on his own life by S., and it was agreed between the partners that should S. die during the continuance of the partnership, and unmarried, the benefit of the policy should go to the survivors of the firm. It was held, that this was not a wager policy. (h) And a person may effect insurance on his own life, in the name of a creditor, for a sum beyond the amount of the debt, the balance to enure to his family, and the policy will be valid for the whole amount insured. (i)

Courts have given a wide construction to the rule requiring interest. It may now be said, that wherever there is a positive *and real dependence of one person upon another, the person so dependent has an insurable interest in the lowing arsenic; and the first part of the clause is to be separated from the latter, as the whole taken together would lead to an absurdity. Hartman v. Keystone Insurance Co 21 Penn. State, 466, and Cooper v. Massachusetts Ins. Co. 102 Mass. 227 In Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338, the insured died from laudanum accidentally taken by him when drunk, and the insurers were held.