A promise to give to a woman, or settle upon her, a specific sum or estate on her marriage, is valid. Marriage is regarded as one of the strongest considerations in the law, either to raise a use, or to found a contract, gift, or grant. (u) 2 But such promises are certainly within the statute of frauds, as made "in consideration of marriage," (v) although a promise to marry

(p) Thompson v. Ross, 6 H. & N. 16.

(q) See Ingersoll v. Jones, 5 Barb. 661, and Hartley v. Richtmyer, 2 Barb. 182; Davidson v. Goodall, 18 N. H. 423; White v. Nelis, 31 N. Y. 406; Lipe v. Eisenlerd, 82 N. Y. 229. In Updegraff v. Bennett, 8 la. 72, held, that the right of a father to recover for the seduction of a minor daughter, has not been changed by the Code, but this rule has been so relaxed, that he may now recover, although such minor daughter be not living with him, and there may be no actual loss. See also Doyle v. Jessup, 29 Ill. 460.

(r) George v. Van Horn, 9 Barb. 528; Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 Comst. 38; Dain v. Wycoff, 3 Seld. 191; Mulvehall v. Millward, 1 Kern. 343. In other American cases, the principle of the English law seems to prevail, as in Lee v. Hodges, 13 Gratt. 726; Roberts v. Connelly, 14 Ala. 235; Kendrick v. McCrary, 11 Ga. 603; Heinrichs v. Kerchner, 35 Mo. 878.

(s) Irving v. Greenwood, 1 C. & P. 850.

(t) Vaughan v. Aldridge, Forest, 42.

(u) Holder v. Dickeson, 1 Freem. 96; Smith v. Stafford, Hob. 216; Waters v. Howard, 8 Gill, 262.

(v) Randall v. Morgan, 12 Yes. 67. In this case it is doubted whether a settlement after marriage, founded upon a parol agreement before marriage, could is not. * They must therefore be in writing in England, and in those of our States which have enacted this clause of the statutes of frauds. And the celebration of the marriage is not such part performance of the contract as to take it out of the statute. (w) But the Court of Chancery has frequently interfered where there was a writing, and in some instances where there was none, to compel parties to carry into effect the intentions of such a contract, or the expectations justly raised by the conduct and declarations of relatives and friends. (x) But a mere representation concerning the property or prospects of a party about to be married, if made in good faith, will not bind a party to make it good, even in equity, although the representation be untrue in fact. (y) Letters from parents, or persons standing in loco parrentis, promising provisions, if sufficiently specific and explicit, have been held to satisfy the requirements of the statute. (z)

1 In Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. 147, it was held, that if the father required his daughter, while employed by a third person, to spend a part of every Sunday at home, and while there to work for him, she was his servant, so that he could maintain an action for her seduction.

2 Thus a settlement by an insolvent debtor of a large amount of real estate upon a woman was upheld, although she knew that he was financially embarrassed, Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22; and where no fraud on the husband's creditors can be laid to the wife, a settlement of his whole estate upon her is good, though they had cohabited and had children before the marriage, Herring v. Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628. Gay v. Parpart, 106 U. S. 679, held the assignment of a mortgage by a man to a woman whom he had married and by whom he had children, after her discovery that he had a wife living at the time of the marriage, is a meritorious act, and not impeachable for immorality of consideration.

Contracts or gifts by way of settlement upon a wife, after marriage, are valid if not in fraud of creditors. (zz) l If the husband were insolvent at the time, they would be deemed fraudulent; but they would not be deemed necessarily fraudulent, if he were not insolvent, although he was indebted at the time; but a fraudulent intent might be shown and it would invalidate the settlebe sustained against creditors. The same question occurred in Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196, and Lord Thurlow seemed to think such settlement might be valid. He says to counsel: "I should be glad to hear you support it (that is, his objection to such settlement), though it is mere matter of curiosity, if the first point be against you." This question does not seem to be distinctly settled. Perhaps the courts would take this distinction; where the property was the wife's, and had come to the husband by a marriage made after a promise to secure it to her, a settlement in fulfilment of the promise would be sustained against creditors, because they lose nothing by it; but not so if the property had been originally the husband's.

(w) Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196; Montacute v. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 618; ft. c. 1 Stra. 286. In Simmons v. Simmons, 6 Hare, 362, it is said, that although a parol agreement by the husband, made before marriage, that the wife should possess certain chattels for her own use, is not binding upon him, yet if the parties voluntarily place the property under the dominion of trustees as part of the property under trust, the agreement may then be made effectual.

(x) Hunsden v. Cheyney, 2 Vera. 150; Beverley v. Beverley, id. 131.

(y) Mereweather v. Shaw, 2 Cox, 124.

(z) Bird v. Blosse, 2 Vent. 361; Sea-good v. Meale, Prec. Ch. 561; Cookes v. Mascall, 3 Vern. 200; Moore v. Hart, 1 id. 110. In Wankford v. Fotherley, 2 id. 322, £3,000 were decreed to be paid on the strength of a letter written by the father's direction, wherein he offered to give £3,000 portion with his daughter. He was afterwards privy to the marriage, and seemed to approve thereof. See Ayliffe v. Tracy, 2 P. Wms. 66. In Douglas v. Vincent, 2 Vern. 201, an uncle promised by letter to give his niece £1,000,"but in the same letter dissuaded her from marrying the plaintiff;" and the court refused to decree payment, but left the plaintiff to his action at law.

(zz) Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala, 116; Belford v. Crane, 1 Green, 266; Woolston's Appeal, 61 Penn. 462.

1 Patrick v. Patrick, 77 111. 555; Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U. S. 479.

ment. (za) If those who were creditors at the time fail to receive their debts, this would go far to prove legal fraud; and hence it is said that a voluntary conveyance by a husband to or for his wife cannot be sustained against existing creditors. (zb)

Contracts have been frequently declared void, on the ground that they were in fraud of settlements and marriage portions, or promises thereof. As where a private bargain was made with the husband, or even with husband and wife, to pay back a part of the wife's portion; (a) or to return a part of an * annuity or other provision apparently given to a son to enable him to marry; (b) or to restore money given to impart to one an appearance of wealth by which he or she may induce another to marry him. (c) A note given fraudulently to induce a marriage contract is good against the maker. (d) So creditors who conceal or deny debts due to them from a man about to be married, that their debtor may get the consent of the woman or her parents to the marriage, are bound by such representations as effectually as by a release. (e) Any private agreement impairing or avoiding an open and public treaty of marriage, is considered fraudulent; and it is sometimes laid down as a principle, that whoever acts fraudulently in such cases shall not only not gain, but shall lose by his fraud.

How far a direct gift or transfer, without consideration, of land from husband to wife is valid,1 and in what way it may be made

(za) Larkin v. McMullin, 49 Penn. St. 29; Clayton v. Brown, 30 Ga. 490; Claw-son v. Clawson, 25 Ind. 229; Moritz v. Hoffman, 36 Ill. 553.

(zb) Sargent v. Chubbuck, 19 la. 37.

(a) Thurton v. Benson, 1 P. Wms. 496; s. c. 2 Vera. 764; Pitcairn v. Og-bourne, 2 Ves. Sen. 375. See also Jackson v. Duchaire, 3T.R. 552.

(b) Peyton v. Bladwell, 1 Vera. 240; Palmer v. Neave, 11 Ves. 165; Morisone v. Arbuthnot, 8 Bro. P. C. 247.

(c) Scott v. Scott, 1 Cox. 357; Thomson v. Harrison, id. 344. In this last case effectual, must depend in each State upon the present condition of the statute law in that State in relation to the rights and powers of husband and wife, and of the adjudication on this subject. At common law, and now therefore wherever the common law is unchanged, such gift or transfer, unless through the medium of a trustee, would be void. Recent decisions have held, in Ohio, that the conveyance is void both in law and equity; (ee) in Arkansas, that it is void at law, but (being bond fide) will be sustained in equity; (ef) and in Michigan, that a husband may make such conveyance at law. (eg) Although the husband be insolvent or bankrupt, he may give the wife whatever neither his creditors, nor assignees could take. (eh)

Lord Thurlow says: "It is a rule, in cases of frauds on marriage, that although the husband be a party to such fraud, yet his interest is not to be affected, since it is impossible to make him liable in respect thereof, without involving the wife and children, and the family upon whom the deceit has been practised." See also Gale v. Lindo, 1 Vera. 475.

(d) Montefiori v. Montefiori, 1 W. BL 363.

(e) Redman v. Redman, 1 Vera. 848; Neville v. Wilkingson, 1 Bro. Ch. 543.

1 Gifts or conveyances are, however, good as between the husband and wife themselves, Kitchen v. Bedford, 13 Wall. 413; Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27; Sims v. Rickets, 35 Ind. 181; such as choses in action, Campbell v. Galbreath, 12 Bush, 459; an assignment of a claim, Seymour v. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 178 ; a deposit in a savings-bank to her account, Spelman v. Aldrich, 126 Mass. 113; see Way v. Peek, 47 Conn. 23; and rents and profits of land, Hutchison v. Mitchell, 39 Tex. 487. Neither a child, not dependent, Horder v. Horder, 23 Kan. 891; nor his heirs can impeach such a gift or conveyance if reasonable, Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610; Majors v. Everton, 89 Ill. 56. A wife may encumber or dispose of land so conveyed. McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127; Myers v. James, 2 Lea, 159.