. A revocation of authority may be made either expressly or by any action in relation to the subject-matter which is manifestly irreconcilable with a continuance of the authority. (bb)1 And it

(yy) Watts v. Kavanagh, 35 Vt. 34.

(z) Hazard v. Tredwell, Stra. 506;

------v. Harrison, 12 Mod. 346; Buller,

J., Salte v. Field, 5 T. R. 215; Spencer v. Wilson, 4 Munf. 130; Morgan v. Stell, 5 Binn. 305; Packer v. Hinckley Works, 122 Mass. 484; Ins. Co. v. McCain, 96 U. S. 84, Meyer v. Hehner, 96 Ill. 400; Ulrich v. McCormick, 66 Ind. 243; Bras-well v. Am. Ins. Co. 75 N. C. 8; Clatlin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 301; Fellows v. Hartford, etc. Co. 38 Conn. 197. See Eadie v. Ashbaugh, 44 Ia. 519; Hatch v. Codding-ton, 95 U. S. 48; Barkley v. Rensselaer, etc. R. Co. 71 N. Y. 205. - Where an agency constituted by writing is revoked, but the written authority is left in the hands of the agent, and he subsequently exhibits it to a third person, who deals with him as agent on the faith of it without any notice of the revocation, the act of the agent within the scope of the authority will bind the principal. Beard v. Kirk, 11 N. H. 397. This necessity for actual notice of revocation, or a general notoriety equivalent to notice, has been held to exist in full force in the case of an authority implied from cohabitation, joined with the previous sanction of acts of agency performed by the person held forth as wife. That the tradesman furnishing the goods in such a case has knowledge that the woman is only a mistress, does not affect his right to notice of separation. Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460, where Munro v. De Chemant, 4 Camp. 215, was commented on. Tier v. Lampson, 35 Vt. 179.

(a) See last note.

(b) Graham v. Hope, 1 Peake, 154; Parkin v. Carruthers, 3 Esp. 248; Ward-well v. Haight, 2 Barb. 549.

(bb) Potter v. Merchants Bank, 28 N. Y. 641; Gilbert v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 548; Meyer v. Hehner, 96 Ill. 400; Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206; Moore v. Stone, 40 Ia. 259; Wright v. Herrick, 128 Mass. 240.

1 If one is appointed sole agent for a time certain, neither his principal's sale of his business before that time, Rhodes v. Forwood, 1 App. Cas. 256; nor his bankruptcy, Orr v. Ward, 73 Ill. 318; nor his discontinuance from business voluntarily, entitles him to indemnity, Ex parte Maclure, L. R. 5 Ch. 737; contra, Lewis v. Atlas Ins. Co. 61 Mo. 534; Vanuxem v. Bostwick, 7 Atl. Rep. 598 (Pa.); unless there is has been held that a principal revoking an authority may compel the former agent to deliver up the paper conferring authority. (be) A mere appointment of another agent to do the same thing is not of itself a revocation of the first appointment. (bd)

The death of the principal operates per se as a revocation of the agency. (c) But not if the agency is coupled with an * interest vested in the agent. (d) Then it survives, and * 72

(6c) Spear v. Gardner, 16 La. An. 383.

(bd) Darrol v. Quimby, 11 Allen, 208.

(c) Co. Litt. § 66; Hunt v. Rousma-nier, 8 Wheat. 201; Watson v. King, 4 Camp. 272; Lepard v. Vernon, 2 Ves. & B. 51; Smont v. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1; Buxton v. Jones, 1 Man. & G. 84; Cam-panari v. Woodburn, 15 C. B. 4; Rigs v. Cage, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 350; Ferris v. Irving, 28 Cal. 645; Turuan v. Temke, 84 Ill. 286; Lincoln v. Emerson, 108 Mass. 87; Clayton v. Merritt, 52 Miss. 353; Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600; Davis v. Windsor Bank, 46 Vt. 728. In Cassi-day v. MeKenzie, 4 W. & S. 282; Dick v. Page, 17 Mo. 234; and Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520, it was held, in opposition to the current of authority, that a payment made by an agent, after the death of his principal, he being ignorant thereof, was valid as an act of agency. See also Garrett v. Trabue, 82 Ala. 227; s. c. sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 93 Ala. 173. Lunacy of the principal revokes, but the better opinion (according to Ch. Kent, 2 Com. 645) is, that the fact of the existence of lunacy must have been previously established by inquisition before it could control the operation of the power; and see Bell, Com. on the Laws of Scotland, § 413. - In Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. 156, it was held, that the authority of an agent, where the agency is revocable, ceases, or is suspended, by the insanity of the principal, or his incapacity to exercise any volition upon the subject-matter of the agency, in consequence of an entire loss of mental power; but that if the principal has enabled the agent to hold himself out as having authority, by a written letter of attorney, or by a previous employment, and the incapacity of the principal is not known to those who deal with the agent within the scope of the authority he appears to possess, the principal and those who claim under him may be precluded from setting up the insanity as a revocation. The court in this case also held, that the principle, that insanity operates as a revocation, cannot apply where the power is coupled with an interest, so that it can be exercised in the name of the agent. Whether it is applicable to the case of a power which is part of a security, or executed for a valuable consideration, was left undecided. Similar decisions are Drew v. Nunn, 4 Q. B. D. 661; Matthiesson v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L. 536. See Jones v. Noy, 2 Myl. & K. 125; Waters v. Taylor, 2 Ves. & B. 301; Huddlestone's case, 2 Ves. Sen. 34, 1 Swanst. 514, n.; Saver v. Bennet, 1 Cox's Cas. 107. - Bankruptey of the principal revokes the authority. Parker v. Smith, 16 East, 382; Minett v. Forrester, 4 Taunt. 541; Pearson v. Graham, 6 A. & E. 899. - [But not as to third parties who deal with the agent in ignorance of the bankruptcy. Ex parte Snowball, L. R. 7 Ch. 534, 548.] - Marriage of feme sole principal revokes. White v. Gilford, 1 Rol. Abr. Authoritie E. pl. 4; Charnley v. Winstanley, 5 East, 266. But generally otherwise now by statute.

(d) See ante, p. * 70, n. (y). Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 201; Merritt v. Lynch, 68 Me. 94; Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Caines's Casi 1; Smyth v. Craig, 3 W. & S. 14; Cassiday v. MeKenzie, 4 W. & S. 282; Knapp v. Alvord, 10 Paige, 205. The important question is what constitutes an authority coupled with an interest; and here there is some diversity in judicial definition. In Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 201, it was held (Marshall, C. J., giving the opinion of the court), that the interest which can protect a power, after the death of the person who creates it, must be an interest in the thing itself on which the power is to be exercised, and not an interest in that which is produced an agreement to pay the agent a certain sum if he lost his place, Ex parte Logan, L. R. 9 Eq. 149. Nor is a broker who was to find a purchaser of land within a month, and whose agency is revoked before the end of the month, entitled to his commission, though he found the purchaser within the month. Brown v. Pforr, 38 Cal. 550. But see Kaufman v. Manufacturing Co. 78 Ia. 679; Warren, etc. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586.