1 That infancy is a bar to an action for false and fraudulent representations by a vendor or pledger as to his ownership of property sold or pledged, see Doran v. Smith, 49 Vt. 353, and 17 Am. Law Reg n s. 42, and the elaborate note of E. H. Bennett in the latter, at p. 44. - K.

2 But not for a failure to drive the horse skilfully. Eaton v. Hill, 50 N. H. 235. - K.

Such may have been the case before the court; but the principle to be deduced from the decision is. that a fraudulent misrepresentation, whereby money or goods are obtained by an infant, is itself an actionable injury. It is stated in Bac. Abr. Infancy <v Age (I.). •'! " If an infant without any contract willfully takes away the goods of another, trover lies against him. Also it is said, that if he take the goods under pretence that he is of full age, trover lies, because it is a wilful and fraudulent trespass." So an infant is liable for a fraudulent execution of a trust confided to him. Loop v Loop, 1 Vt. 177.

(y) Badger v. Planner, 15 Mass. 359, Mills v. Graham, 4 B. & P, 140 per Mans field, C. J.; Furnes v. Smith, 1 Roll, Abr. 530, C. pl. 3. It has been suggested that the mere silence of the infant as to his age, knowing that the other party believed him an adult, would be a sufficient ground to enable the other party to reclaim the goods so parted with. See 20 Am. Jur. 265. But in Stikeman v. Dawson, 1 De Gex & S. 90, it was held that in the absence of any positive misrepresentation, the mere omission of the infant to disclose his minority was not a sufficient fraud to invalidate the contract So his note is voidable, although the payee did not know of his infancy, and although he was carrying on trade a- an adull.

Van Winkle v. Ketcham, 3 Caines, 323.

1 In accord with Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441, it has been held that an infant is liable in tort for fraudulent misrepresentations as to his age. Rice v Boyer, 108 Ind.472; Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121,129; Yeager v. Knight, 60 Miss. 730; Eckstein v Frank, 1 Daly, 334. And see McKamy v. Cooper, 81 Ga. 679, A contrary decision is Nash v. Jewett, 61 N't. 501.

In Kansas there is a statutory enactment providing that an infant cannot avoid

If he allows a person to buy his property, in good faith on the part of the purchaser, and without informing the purchaser that he is an infant, it has been intimated that he cannot recover his property from the purchaser. (z) The reasons for this view are not satisfactory, and the doctrine is denied in another case in the same State. (a) * When goods not necessaries are sold to an infant, without fraudulent representations by him, with a knowledge by the seller of his infancy, and the infant refuses to pay for them, and also refuses to return the goods, although they are within his possession and control, some question exists as to the rights of the seller. Some authorities support the doctrine that he is remediless, regarding the incapacity of the infant as his privilege and his defence. But it seems unreasonable and unjust to say that the infant may refuse to pay for the goods, without affecting the validity of the sale to him. It should seem enough if the infant has the power of rescinding the sale. This is an adequate protection; and if the goods are out of his possession when the sale is rescinded, the seller may be wholly without remedy. But when the sale is rescinded, the property in the goods should revest in the seller, so far, at least, that if he finds them in the possession of the infant, he may peaceably retake them as his own. And if he demands them, the refusal of the infant to deliver them would seem to be a tort wholly independent of the contract, on which trover might be maintained. And there are authorities which sustain that if the infant has received the goods and paid for them, he cannot avoid the contract and recover the money paid, without redelivering the goods. (c) this view. (b) *At all events, it seems to be admitted contracts made with one who from the infant's misrepresentations, or from his having engaged in business as an adult, had good reason to believe him capable of contracting. Dillon v. Burnham, 43 Kan. 77. And there is a somewhat similar statute in Iowa. See Jaques v. Sax, 39 Ia. 367.

(z) Hall v. Timmons, 2 Rich. Eq 120.

(a) Norris v. Wait, 2 Rich. Eq. 148.

And see Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind. I.

(b) Judge Reeve states similar views in his work on the Domestic Relations, p. 244. We think the case of Vasse v.

Concealment or misrepresentation of his age will not estop a minor either in law or in equity from avoiding contracts made with him on the supposition that he was of full age. Bartlett v. Wells, 1 B. & S. 836; DeRoo v. Foster, 12 C. B. n. s. 272; Bateman v. Kingston, 6 L. R. Ir. 328; Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300; Wieland v. Kobick, 110 III. 16; (cf. Davidson v. Young, 38 III. 145, 150); Alvey v. Reed, 115 Ind. 148; Baker v. Stone, 136 Mass. 405; Conrad v. Lane, 26 Minn. 389 ; Brantley v. Wolf, 60 Miss. 420; Burley v. Russell, 10 N. H. 184; Studwell v. Shapter, 54 N. Y. 249; Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79.

In a few cases, however, it has been held that if an infant entraps an adult into buying land from a third person, to which the infant has a secret title, he will be estopped from asserting it. Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121; Galbraith v. Lunsford, 87 Tenn. 89. See also Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369; Bull v. Sevier, 88 Ky. 515. And this doctrine is defended in Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.), p. 606, as avoiding the circuity of allowing a recovery by the infant and putting the adult to a cross-action for the tortious misrepresentation.

If an adult is led to make a contract with an infant by fraudulent misrepresentations of his age by the infant, the adult may avoid the contract on the ground of fraud. Lempriere v. Lange, 12 Ch. D. 675.