(d) The reason of this exception to the general doctrine is, that the public rely on the personal credit of the ostensible owner, and not on that of the dormant partners. Lord v. Baldwin, 6 Pick. 348; French v. Chase, 6 Greenl. 166. The authority of the two preceding cases is fully affirmed in Cammack v. Johnson, 1 Green, Ch. 163. See also Van Valen v. Russell, 13 Barb. 590; Brown's Appeal, 17 Pa. 480; Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. 70; Wright v. Herrick, 125 Mass. 154; Pinschower v. Hauks, 18 Nev. 99; Elliot v. Stevens, 38 N. H. 311.

(e) Winter v. Richards, 10 Conn. 37. This case determines that a first attaching creditor, who has dealt with a partner in the course of the business of the partnership, but at the same time in ignorance of its existence, shall not be postponed to subsequent attaching creditors, to whom applied to attachments by trustee process, and to direct attachments. (/)

1 An attachment of firm goods in a suit against one partner is not valid against a subsequent attachment by a firm creditor. Kistner v. Sindlinger; Bogue's Appeal, 83 Penn. St. 101; Eighth Bank v. Fitch, 49 N. Y. 539; Fargo v. Ames, 45 Ia. 491; First Nat. Bank v. Brenneisen, 97 Mo. 145; Cox v. Russell, 44 Ia. 556. - K.

* Formerly, both in England and in this country, the principle of moieties prevailed. That is, the private creditor took the proportion of the partnership stock which belonged by numerical division to his debtor. (g) But now, both there and here, the rule is well settled that if partnership effects can be taken either by attachment or on execution to secure or satisfy the debts of one of the partners, this can be done only to the extent of that partner's interest, and subject to the settlement of all partnership accounts. (h) The levy of execution does not give the creditor * a separate possession of the goods. The indebted partner had no such possession himself; and the levy gives to his creditor only that which the debtor had; and that is a right to call for an account, and then a right to the balance which may be found to belong to him upon a settlement. And it must still be regarded as unsettled, whether the dormant partners were known when the business transactions took place, or subsequently disclosed before their attachments, but that he shall be postponed if his claims did not arise from a partnership transaction, while that of the subsequent attaching creditor did. The court distinguished Lord v. Baldwin from the case before them, and remark: " The result in that case is perfectly compatible with the decision in this; and it is apparent that the court meant only to decide the case before them; for they say, 'Whether a private creditor of his could seize property so situated, and hold it against the ostensible owner, is a question of a very different nature.'" See Allen v. Dunn, 15 Me. 292.

(f) Fisk v. Herrick, 6 Mass. 271; Church v. Knox, 2 Conn. 514; Barber v. Hartford Bank, 9 id. 407; Lyndon v. Gorliam, 1 Gallis. 367; Mobley v. Lom-bat, 7 How. (Miss.) 318.

(g) Heydon v. Heydon, 1 Salk. 392. "Coleman and Heydon were copartners, and a judgment was against Coleman, and all the goods both of Coleman and Heydon were taken in execution, and it was held by Holt, C. J., and the court, that the sheriff must seize all, because the moieties are undivided; for if he seize but a moiety, and sell that, the other will have a right to a moiety of that moiety. But he must seize the whole, and sell a moiety thereof undivided, and the vendee will be tenant in common with the other partner," Jarky v. Butler, 2 Ld. Raym. 871; Bachurst v. Clinkard, 1 Show.

173; Marriott v. Shaw, 1 Comyns, 277; Rex v. Manning, 2 id. 616. See Eddie v. Davidson, Dougl. 650; Parker v. Pistor, 3 C. & P. 288; Wallace v. Patterson, 2 Har. & McH. 463; Lyndon v. Gorham, 1 Gallis. 367; McCarty" v. Emlin, 2 Dallas, 278; Church v. Knox, 2 Conn. 514. The same rule is recognized as law in Vermont, but not in equity. Peed v. Shep-ardson, 2 Vt. 120; Clark v. Lyman, 8 id. 290; Washburn v. Bank of Bellows Falls, 19 id. 278.

(h) Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445; Eddie v. Davidson, Dougl. 650; West v. Skip, 1 Ves. Sen. 239; Hankey v. Garratt, 1 Ves. Jr. 236; Taylor v. Fields, 4 id. 396; Young v. Keighley, 15 Ves. 557; In re Wait, 1 Jac. & W. 608; Lord Eldon: Dutton v. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193 Com-mercial Bank v. Wilkins, 9 Greenl. 33; Doner v. Stauffer, 1 Penn. St. 198; Winston v. Ewing, 1 Ala. (N. S.) 129; Story on Part. § 261, Coll. on Part. § 822, n., ante, note (h); Crane v. French, 1 Wend. 311; Tappan v. Blaisdell, 5 N. H. 190; Burgess v. Atkins, 5 Blackf. 337, 338. Dewey, J.: " The general rule of law i-, that in levying an execution against one partner for his separate debt, the officer may take possession of all the joint property of the firm, in order to inventory and appraise it. He has no authority to divide it; ho can only sell the joint interest of the debtor whatever it may be, and the purchaser will stand in the place of the debtor, and hold the same interest in the joint concern which he held." a sheriff levying an execution of a separate creditor on a partner's interest, can take any, and if any what, actual possession have belonged to his debtor, and would have, perhaps, the same right of possession. (j) 1 That the private creditors of one of the partners cannot reach the partnership funds until the claims of the partof the partnership property. (i) * Considering the great

(i) In Scrugham v. Carter, 12 Wend. 131, it was held that replevin does not lie against a sheriff in such a case for taking the property and removing it to a place of safe custody, and the remedy of the other partners is to obtain an order staying proceedings until an account be taken in equity. In Burrall v. Acker, 23 id. 606, he was held authorized to take joint possession, with the other partners, of the partnership property, after the levy and before the sale, but whether he was entitled to exclusive possession, was not decided. The subject was fully discussed by Mr. Justice Cowen, in Phillips v. Cook, 24 "Wend. 389, and it was decided that, on an execution at law against one of two partners, the sheriff might lawfully seize, not merely the moiety, but the corpus of the joint estate, or the whole, or as much of the entire partnership effects as might be necessary to satisfy the execution, and deliver the property sold to the purchaser; and if he purchases with notice of the partnership, he takes subject to an account between the partners, and to the equitable claims of the partnership creditors. Bates v. James, 3 Duer, 45. It has since been held that he is equally subject to an account whether he had such notice or not. Walsh v. Adams, 3 Denio, 125. The same cases affirm his power to deliver all the goods of the partnership to the purchaser. Birdseye v. Kay, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 158, affirms Phillips v. Cook, so far as it relates to the seizure of the whole of the joint estate by the sheriff on an execution against one partner for his separate debt. But the sheriff subjects himself to an action if he sells the entire property in the goods of the copartnership, or any thing more than the debtor partner's interest in them. Waddell v. Cook, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 47, n.; Walsh v. Adams, 3 Denio, 125. In New York, it is held that neither a court of law nor of equity will stay execution at law against the joint estate for a separate debt until an account be taken. Moody v. Payne, 2 Johns. Ch. 548; In re Smith, 16 Johns. 106, n; Phillips v. Cook, 24 Wend. 389; Hergman v. Dettlebach, 11 How. Pr. 46. See Reed v. Howard, 2 Met. 36. But the rule has been disapproved. Cammack v. Johnson, 1 Green, Ch. 168. In Alabama, the sheriff is held justified in taking exclusive possession of the goods of the firm until the aid of a court of equity is successfully invoked. Moore v. Sample, 3