This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
A one-sided contract, as one by which one party binds himself to buy or to sell, and the other does not bind himself to sell, is not favored in equity; but may be enforced when it is a part of a lease, or otherwise rests upon sufficient consideration, (nn)
If one who enters into a contract fixes a certain sum which he will pay if he violates the contract, he may nevertheless be held to specific performance, if the equities of the case require this. (no)
The contract of which performance is sought must be clearly proved, and its terms should be so specific and distinct as to leave no reasonable doubt of their meaning. (o)1 But the court
J., held, that the agreement could not be executed, for want of mutuality. Bronson v. Cahill, 4 McLean, 19. Sed quaere.
(n) Thus, if A, for a consideration moving from B, contract to confer a benefit on B, and also another benefit on C, B may obtain a specific performance of that contract as an entirety. Ford v. Stuart, 15 Beav. 493, 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 166, 172.
(nn) Hawralty v. Warren, 3 Green, Eq. 124.
{no) Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brews. 342; [National Prov. Bank v. Marshall 40 Ch. D. 112; Lyman v. Gedney, 114 III 388; Higbie v. Farr, 28 Minn. 439. The same principle applies as well where the appropriate remedy is injunction as where it is specific performance. Drury v. Macale, 2 Drury & W. 275.]
(o) Harnett v. Yielding, 2 Sch. & L. 549, 558; Webb v. Direct London and Portsmouth Railway Co. 1 De G., M. & G. 521 (and see the observations of Lord St. Leonards, upon this case, in Hawkes v. Eastern Counties Railway Co. 1 De G., M. & G. 757); Moseley v. virgin, 3 Ves. 184; Ormond v. Anderson, 2 Ball & B. 363; Tatham v. Piatt, 9 Hare, 660, 15 Eng. L. & Eq. 190; Price v. Griffith, 1 De G., M. & G. 80; Morgan v. Milman, 3 De G., M. & G. 24; Jackson v Cocker, 4 Beav. 59; Hopcraft v. Hickman, 2 Simons & S. 130 (a case of an uncertain award); Colson v Thompson, 2 Wheat. 336; Boston and Maine Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 3 Cush. 228; King's Heirs v. Thompson, 9 Pet. 204; Stoddert r. Bowie, 5 Md. 18; Gill v. McAttee, 2 Md. Ch. Dec. 255;
Dodd v. Seymour, 21 Conn. 476; Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa. 180; Parrish v. Koons, 1 Pars. Eq. 94. Lord Manners refused to grant a reference or issue to ascertain the terms of the contract, where the case, as presented before him, was not one of contradictory evidence, but of no evidence as to essential parts of the contract. Savage v. Carroll, 1 Ball & B. 265. In the following cases, the difficulty of some waut of certainty existed, but not in a sufficient degree to prevent the court from undertaking to enforce specific performance. Butler v. Powis, 2 Collver, 156; Saunderson v. Cockermouth & Workington Railway, 11 Beav. 497; Fitzgerald v Vicars, 2 Drury & W. 298. A contract made abroad, and referring to a custom of the foreign country, may be construed as incorporating the terras of the foreign custom into the agreement, and with such construction may be executed specifically by a domestic court of equity. Foubert v. Turst, 1 Bro. P. C. 38. Action taken by the defendant towards a performance of the contract, may remove the difficulty of some want of explicitness in the terms of the contract itself. Price v. Corporation of Penzance, 4 Hare. 509. A contract sufficiently certain and definite to enable the court as well to enforce its specific performance as to be assured that in doing so effect is given to the entire agreement between the parties, must be set forth in the bill. Allen v Burke, 2 Md. Ch. Dec. 534. In general, a plaintiff who abandons the agreement, as set forth in his bill, and by valid if it would be void without one. (r) But while the mere form of the contract is comparatively immaterial, it must be definite and certain, (rr) If the contract be in writing, a subsequent oral agreement varying its terms, resting on no consideration, will not suffice to prevent a decree for specific performance of the original contract, (rs) A refusal by a wife to release dower is no defence to an action for specific performance by a vendee who offers to waive this release, (rt) If the contract be to convey certain lots of land, and they are not described with sufficient certainty, but may be made certain by parol evidence, a decree for specific performance may issue, (ru)
1 An agreement in a lease to renew it at its expiration, the " rent to be proportioned to the valuation of said premises at said time/' but with no provision made for determining that valuation, is too vague to be enforced in equity. Pray v, Clark, 113 Mass. 283.- K.
*is bound by no technical rules in this respect Nor does it greatly regard the form of the contract, (p) Thus, a bond for * money, with a penalty for not doing a certain thing, will be held to be a contract to do that thing, (q) Nor is a seal regarded as necessarily making a contract an amended bill relies upon a different agreement admitted by the defendant in his answer, will be granted a specific performance of such latter agreement; and this on the ground that by his acceptance of the defendant's statements of the contract, he makes it binding upon himself also, so that there is a perfect mutuality. Lord Redesdale, C, Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & L. 1; Willis v. Evans, 2 Ball & B. 225. But it follows, from this ground of the rule, that the plaintiff cannot have relief, if, in his amended bill, he does not abandon the contract as originally set forth, but as well insists upon that as asks, in the alternative, for the specific execution of the agreement admitted in the answer. Lindsay v. Lynch, ubi supra. Where the evidence shows a contract, but one differing materially from that alleged in the plaintiff's bill, the usual practice has been to dismiss the bill without prejudice to a new bill. Legal v. Miller, 2 Ves. Sen. 299; Main waring v. Baxter, 5 Ves. 457; Woolam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 222. See Molloy v. Egan, 7 Irish Eq. 590. But the court will not always dismiss the bill. Where the plaintiff has not been in fault, and especially if he have done acts of part performance, he may have leave to amend his bill in conformity with the proof, and then take a decree for a specific performance. Harris v. Knickerbocker, 5 Wend. 638; Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 585. See Beard v. Lin-thicum, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 348. Sometimes a decree will be granted him upon the bill as it stands, without amendment., Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Ves. Jr. 243; Bass v. Clivley, Tamlyn, 80. In Drury v. Conner, 6 Harris & J. 288, the plaintiff s having failed to establish the contract, as alleged in the bill, which was an agreement for the sale of a certain tract of land, a decree was nevertheless granted by the Court of Appeals (reversing the decision of the Chancellor, who had dismissed the bill), for a conveyance of one-fourth of the tract, the evidence showing an agreement for the sale of so much. Martin, J., in giving the opinion of the court, distinguished the case where the contract proved is of an entirely different character from that alleged in the bill, from the case where the plaintiff only fails to make out his claim to the extent in which he set it up. In this case the statute of frauds was pleaded, and the defendants resisted the contract in toto. Compare Small v. Owing*, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 363, where Drury v. Conner does not appear to have been brought to the attention of the learned Chancellor. If the plaintiff state in his bill, as part of the agreement, something which he does not prove, but which would operate altogether against himself, the failure of proof in this respect will not defeat his prayer for a specific performance. Mundy v. Jolliffe, 5 Mylne & C. 176; Gregory v. Mighill, 18 Ves. 328. See Beard v. Lmthicum, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 349.
 
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