1 See Eames v. Home Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 621; Harris's Case, L.R7 Ch. 587; Piedmont Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 92 U. S. 377; Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 23 Wall. 85; Strohn v. Hartford Ins. Co. 37 Wis. 625.

In our mutual insurance companies, it is a general rule that every one who is insured becomes a member of the company. It follows that all who are insured insure each other; and also that every one insured is bound by all the laws and rules of the company, for he himself is one of those who made them.

In practice, there is this difference between marine policies and fire policies, issued by mutual companies. Mutual fire insurance companies require that there shall be a written application for insurance. This application is upon a printed sheet, and contains a very large number of questions, very carefully drawn up, for the purpose of eliciting by the answers to them the whole of the information which the insurers need, to enable them to determine whether they will take the risk at all, or at what rate of premium. To all these questions, there must be written and specific answers. Then the application itself, with all its contents, is made a part of the policy by the terms of the policy itself. (g) Then the statements in this paper are warranties; although the application itself may be regarded as having no other purpose than that of identifying the property. There are cases going to show, that, without expressions declaring a paper referred to to be a part of the policy, there may be a reference to a paper so connecting it to the policy as to make it a part. But a mere reference, to have this burned, while the proposal of the company and the acceptance of the applicant remained in the possession of the agent of the latter, the company was held not to be liable. Thayer v. Middlesex Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 826. Where the applicant Is notified that the payment of the premium is a condition precedent to the taking effect of the insurance, no contract subsists while it remains unpaid. Flint v. Ohio Ins. Co. 8 Ohio, 501; Berthoud v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 18 La. 689. See also

Buffum v. Fayette Ins. Co. 8 Allen, 860.

But generally a parol contract of insurance may be made by a stock company. See ante, p. * 350, n. (a). In respect to a ratification, see De Bolle v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co. 4 Whart. 68. See for parol contract, New England Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 586.

(d) See ante, p. * 860, n. (b).

(e) The term "the insured" in a mutual fire Insurance company, means the person who owns the property, applies for the insurance, pays the premium and signs the deposit notes, and not the person to whom the money is payable in case of loss, although he may have a lease of the premises. Sanford v. Mechanics Ins. Co. 12 Cush. 641.

(f) De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Co. 1 Hall, 112. See Alliance Ins. Co. v. La. State Ins. Co. 8 La. 11. and post, p. •442.

(g) Susquehanna Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 7 Watts & S. 348; Holmes v. Charlestown Ins. Co. 10 Met. 211; Smith v. Bowditch Ins. Co. 6 Cush. 448; McMahon v. Portsmouth Ins. Co. 2 Foster, 16.

• 422 effect, must be very distinct and determinate. (h) The principles which should determine * between warranties and representations, and which apply either to the one or to the other, the proper rules of construction, or of the effect of either warranties or representations, are substantially the same in fire policies as in marine policies. (i)

A person who accepts a policy of insurance in which it is expressly provided that it is agreed and declared that the policy is made and accepted, upon and in reference to the application, cannot deny that the application is his, nor can he assert that it was made by an agent employed by him to procure insurance, but without authority to bind him by representations. (j) And fraud in inducing a person to accept a policy of insurance, will not render the insurers liable in an action of contract upon it, if by the terms of the policy such action cannot be maintained. (k)

Under a by-law, which provides that a policy of insurance shall be void "if the insured shall neglect, for the term of thirty * days, to pay his premium note, or any assessment thereon, when requested to do so by mail or otherwise, the policy is avoided by the neglect of the assured for thirty days, after a written request for payment deposited in the post-office, prepaid, and duly directed to him, would in due course of mail reach the place of residence as set forth in the policy, whether he received such request or not. (l) 1

(k) Where the policy insures certain property as described, or more particularly described on the application, such a reference is not sufficient to make the application a part of the policy and give it the effect of a warranty, and it is sufficient if it be not false in any material point. Jefferson Ins. Co. v, Cotheal, 7 Wend. 72; Snyder v. Farmers Ins. Co. 13 Wend. 92, 16 id. 481; Delonguemare v. Tradesmen's Ins. Co. 2 Hall, 611; Stebbins v. Globe Ins. Co. 2 id. 632; Burritt v. Saratoga Co. Ins. Co. 6 Hill, 190; Wall v. Howard Ins. Co. 14 Barb. 383; Insurance Co. v. Southard, 8 B. Mon. 684. But see Sillem v. Thornton, 8 Ellis & B. 868, 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 288. Where, in the policy, this clause occurred, "reference being had to the application of A B for a more particular description of the conditions annexed, as forming a part of this policy," Beardsley, J„ said: "The conditions are thus undoubtedly made a part of the contract of insurance; as much so as if embodied in the policy. But it is otherwise with the application. That, as it seems to me, is referred to for the mere purpose of describing and identifying the property insured, and not to incorporate its statements into the policy as parts thereof." Trench v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co. 7 Hill, 124. But see contra, Jennings v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co. 2 Denio, 76. In Sheldon v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 22 Conn. 285, where the policy referred to the survey in these words: " Reference is had to survey No. 83, on file at the office of the Protection Insurance Company," and the survey consisted of answers to questions, some of which were intended to draw forth a minute description of the premises, and others to enable the insurer to estimate the risk, it was held, that the reference to the survey was not merely for a fuller description, but for the purpose of incorporating all the survey into the policy. Where the application is referred to "as forming a part of the policy," it will have the effect of a warranty. Burritt v. Saratoga Co. Ins. Co. 6 Hill, 188; Williams v. N. E. Ins. Co. 81 Me. 224; Murdock v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co. 2 Comst. 210; Sexton v. Montgomery Co. Ins. Co. 9 Barb. 200; Kennedy v. St. Lawrence Co. Ins. Co. 10 Barb. 286; Egan v. Mut. Ins. Co. 6 Denio, 826; Gates v. Madison Co. Ins. Co. 1 Seld. 469.