(x) Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178. Shepley, J.: " It is quite obvious that there may be a difference between the goods coming to the use of the firm, and a benefit derived to the dissenting partner from their delivery to the firm. The bargain may have proved to be a very losing one, and this may have been foreseen by the dissenting partner and have been the very cause of the notice; and why should he be held to pay, perhaps from his private property, for goods, the purchase and sale of which may have absorbed the whole partnership stock, when he had provided against such a calamity by expressing his dissent from the contract before it was consummated 1 "

(y) Rothwell v. Humphreys, 1 Esp. 406. And see Ex parte Bonbonus, 8 Ves. 540.

(z) Graeff v. Hitchman, 5 Watts, 454; Bevan v. Lewis, 1 Sim. 376; Emly v. Lye, 15 East, 6; Salem Bank v. Thomas, 47 N. Y. 15.

(a) Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Hare, 218. And see Greenslade v. Dower, 7 B. & C. 635; Stewart v. Caldwell, 9 La. Ann. 419; King v. Faber, 22 Penn. St. 21.

of the firm. (b)l Nor can he bind his copartner by an indorsement of a writ in his own name. (c) A lender of money to a partner cannot, in general, recover of the firm, without showing that the money was applied to the use of the firm. For the presumption would be that it was borrowed by the partner on his own account, and not lent to the firm. But although it be proved that the monoey was not applied to the use of the firm, yet the firm will be liable for it, if it were borrowed in their name by a partner whom they had apparently clothed with authority to borrow it for them. (d) If the partnership *be carried on in the name of an individual, the presumption of law is that a note signed by him is his own note, and the contrary must be shown. (e) 2 If, however, a partner of a firm having other names, or the word "company " in its partnership style, sign a bill or note with his own name, and without the proper partnership style, or in other words to indicate that it is on partnership account, for money borrowed, he alone is answerable, although the money was borrowed for and applied to a partnership purpose. (f) 3 Questions

(b) Breckenridge v Shrieve, 4 Dana, 378. See also Sims v. Brutton, 5 Exch. 802; Wilkinson v Candlish, 5 Exch. 91; Harman v. Johnson, 3 Car. & K. 272; Plumer v. Gregory, L. R. 18 Eq. 621.

(c) Davis v. Gowen, 17 Me 387.

(d) In Etheridge v. Binney, 9 Pick. 272, it was held that in case of a limited and dormant partnership carried on by one of the partners in his individual name, if he borrow money representing it to be for the use of the partnership, the dormant partners will be liable without proof by the creditor that the money went to the use of the partnership. But it was held otherwise, if there were no such representations. - See Whitaker v. Brown, 16 Wend. 505, where it was held that a note, given by one partner in the name of the firm, is of itself presumptive evidence of the existence of a partnership debt, and if the other partners seek to avoid the payment, the burden of proof lies upon them to show that the note was given in a matter not relating to the partnership business, and that also with the knowledge of the payee. See Thicknesse v. Bromilow, 2 Cr & J. 425; Barrett v. Swann, 17 Me. 180; Ensmin-ger v. Marvin, 5 Blackf. 210; Bank of the United States v. Binney, 5 Mason, 176; Wright v. Hooker, 6 Selden, 51.

(e) See cases in former note, and Oli-phant v. Mathews, 16 Barb. 608.

(f) Ripley v. Kingsbury, 1 Day, 150, d.; Foley v. Robards, 3 Ired. E. 179; Jaqnes v. Marquand, 6 Cowen,497; Willis v. Hall, 2 Dev & B. 231; Logan v. Pond, 13 Ga. 192; Hogan v. Reynolds, 8 Ala. 59. Otherwise, if the paper be signed with the partnership clause. Pearce v. Wilkins, 2 Comst. 469; Hamilton v Summers, 12 B. Mon. 11.

1 Neither can a partner in a law firm bind his copartner by giving a note in the firm name, even for a partnership debt, unless he has special authority, or it was necessary for carrying on the business, Smith v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285; nor bind his firm by a post-dated check drawn in the name of the firm, Forster v. Mackreth, L. R. 2 Ex. 163. See Garland v. Jacomb, L. R. 8 Ex. 216. - K.

2 Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson, 4 C. P. D. 204, decided that if the name of a firm is identical with that of an individual member of it, proof that such name was signed to a bill of exchange by the authority and for the purposes of the linn is necessary to make the firm liable; but it was said in the same case, on appeal, in 5 C.. P. D. 109, affirming the judgment in the particular case, that the presumption in such a case is that the bill was given for the firm, and is binding upon it, at least where the individual carries on no business separate from the business of the firm, which presumption may be rebutted by proof that the bill was signed not in the name of the partnership, but of the individual for his private purposes. - K.

3 If a note or other obligation is executed by all the partners individually, it is the of this kind can be decided in many cases only by the special circumstances attending the transaction. For it is certain that if money has been actually borrowed by one partner on the credit of the firm, and in the course of the business of the firm, the other partners are liable for it, although the money was misapplied by him who borrowed it. (g) And if the money be borrowed by one partner, not expressly on his individual credit, and it was in part borrowed for and used by the firm, the copartners are liable. (h) *And where the money of a third person is in the hands of a copartner as trustee, and he applies it to the use of the firm, with the knowledge and consent of the copartners, they are obligation of the individuals only and not of the firm. Freeman v Campbell, 55 Cal. 197; Dunnica v. Clinkscales, 73 Mo. 500; Turner v. Jaycox, 40 N. Y 470; Second Nat. Bank v. Burt, 93 N. Y. 233, 245.

(g) Emerson v, Harmon, 14 Me. 271; Church v. Sparrow, 5 Wend. 223; Onondaga County Bank v. De Puy, 17 id. 47; Waldo Bank v. Lumbert, 16 Me. 416; Winship v. Bank of United States, 5 Pet. 529; Steel v. Jennings, Cheves, 183 - But see Lloyd v. Freshfield, 2 C. & P. 325, where Bayley, J., is reported to have said: " In point of law, one of several partners may pledge the partnership name for money bond fide lent, the lender supposing that one partner has the authority of the house to borrow, and that he is borrowing for the purposes of the house. But if there be gross negligence, and the transaction be out of the ordinary course of business, the lenders cannot recover of the other partners, if the money be misapplied."