We have seen that each partner is for many purposes the agent of all the rest, by force of law, without any express authority. (r) 1 obliged by stress of weather to put into Norfolk, where M. sold the return cargo, except a small parcel of coffee, and for the avails received bills of exchange, which he indorsed and remitted, with the parcel of coffee, to P. & R., to whom A. and M. were jointly indebted, and M. on his private account, to a greater amount, for advances made at the time of the purchase of the outward cargo. P. & R. collected the bills and sold the coffee so remitted, and applied the same to the payment of the debts so due to them from A. and M. P. and R. had notice, if not at the time of the shipment of the outward cargo, certainly before the bills remitted by M. were collected, and the coffee sold and converted into money, that B. and K. were interested in and owned one-fourth of the cargo so sold by M.; and B. and K. demanded of P. and R. their proportion of the proceeds so remitted by M., after deducting commissions, etc, but P. and R. refused to pay or deliver the same, alleging their right to retain the same, for the payment of the debt due to them from A. and M. It was held, that there was no partnership existing between A. and M. and B. and K., so as to render the disposition of the return cargo, by M. binding, as the act of a partner on B. and K.; that there was no agreement constituting a partnership in the purchase of the outward cargo, or to share jointly in the ultimate profit and loss of the adventure; and though there might be a partnership so far as respected the transportation and selling of the outward cargo, for the joint profit and loss of the owners, yet it terminated in the sale of the outward cargo; and their interest in the return cargo was separate and distinct, each being entitled to his respective proportion of it without any concern in the profit and loss which might ultimately arise; and that P. and R., not having received the bills in the course of trade, and knowing of the interest of B. and K. before the bills were paid, had no right to retain their share, for the payment of the debt of A. and M., but must account to B. and K. for their proportion; and that a bill for a discovery and account by them, against P. and R., was sustainable in the Court of Chancery; that court having a concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of law in all matters of account. - In Coope v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 37, A, B, C, and D, agreed to buy jointly all the oil they could get, as their joint purchase, but A alone was to buy, and B, C, and D were to share equally in the oil he bought. A buys of E on credit. The oil falls in value, and A fails. E sues B, C, and D, as his partners. They were held not to be his partners, because it appeared that A was not to sell for the rest; but when he had bought, B, C, and I) were to receive from him each one-fourth; and there was no community in the disposition of the oil. - A firm cannot be charged with a debt contracted by one of the partners before the partnership was constituted, although the subject-matter which was the consideration of the debt, has been carried into the partnership as stock. Brooke v. Evans, 5 Watts, 196; Ketchum v. Durkee, 1 Hoff. Ch. 538.

(q) Felichy v. Hamilton, 1 Wash. C. C. 491.

(r) Boswell v. Green, 1 Dutcher, 390; Western Stage Company v. Walker, 2 Ia. 504.

1 Thus one partner may buy and sell, Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339, Birks v. French, 21 Kan. 238 , Corning v. Abbott, 54 N. H. 469; Johnson v. Barry, 95 Ill. 483; notwithstanding notice to withhold credit from him, Campbell v. Bowen, 49 Ga. 417; or accept delivery, Kenney v. Altvater, 77 Penn. St. 34; Crosswell v. Lehman, 54 Ala. 363; or hire servants, Carley v. Jenkins, 46 Vt. 721; or assign a firm chose in action, Clarke v. Hogeman, 13 W. Va 718; or receive security for money lent, In re

Loans, purchases, sales, assignments, pledges, or mortgages, effected by one partner on the partnership account, *and with good faith on the part of the creditor or other third party, are binding on all the firm. And this agency, as it generally springs from a community of interest, so it is generally limited by this community.

A partner may transfer all his interest in the partnership, and it has even been held, contrary as we think to the prevailing rule, that such assignment by a partner to his individual creditors was valid against the partnership creditors. (s)1

Among the questions which have arisen as to the limitations to the general power of a partner over the partnership property, one, not yet perhaps perfectly settled, is as to the power of one partner to make an assignment of the whole property, to pay the partnership debts. (t) We think the weight of authority

(s) Wilson v. Bowden, 8 Rich. L. 9, and Norris v. Vernon, id. 13.

(t) Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 456. It was held in this case that the right of one partner to hind another by such assignment results from his general power to dispose of the partnership property, and if made bona fide is valid. Marshall, C. J, said: "Had this, then, been a sale for money, or on credit, no person, 1 think, could have doubted its obligation. I can perceive no distinction in law, in reason, or in justice, between such a sale and the transaction winch has taken place. A merchant may rightfully sell to las creditor, as well as for money. He may give goods in payment for a debt. If he may thus pay a small creditor, he may thus pay a large one. The quantum of debt, or of goods sold, cannot alter the right. Neither docs it, as I conceive, affect the power, that these goods were conveyed to trustees to be sold by them. The mode of sale must, I think, depend on circumstances. Should goods be delivered to trustees, for sale without necessity, the transaction would be examined with scrutinizing eyes, and might, under some circumstances, be impeached. But if the necessity be apparent, if the act be justified by it's motives, if the mode of sale be such as the circumstances require, I cannot say that the partner has exceeded his power." The assignment was also held valid in Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 300, although under seal. Robinson v. Crowder, 4 McCord, 519. And see to the same effect Mills v. Barber, 4 Day, 428; Deckard v. Case, 5 Watts, 22; Tapley v. Butterfield, 1 Met. 515, Gordon v. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387; Scruggs v. Burruss, 25 W. Va. 670; Lasell v. Tucker, 5 Sneed, 33; Mabbett v. White, 2 Kern. 442; Kemp v. Carnley,