(d) Hodsden v. Harridge, 2 Wms. 8aund. 62 a, n. (4); Child v. Horden, 2 Bulstr. 144. In Quarles v.George, 23 Pick. 400, by a contract between the plaintiff springs from the nature of the contract, though nothing be said about it.1 Generally, where anything is to be done by one party on the performance of some act by the other, this other must give notice of such act, (e) unless it be one and the defendant it was agreed that the defendant should deliver to the plaintiff one thousand barrels of flour, at the rate of six dollars per barrel, at any time within six months from the date of the contract, and give him six days' notice prior to the time of such delivery, and that the plaintiff should pay that price therefor on delivery. In an action by the plaintiff against the defendant for not delivering the flour within the six months, it was held, that under the provisions of this contract it was incumbent on the defendant to do the first act by giving notice of his readiness to deliver the flour; but that, as he had a right to give notice six days before the expiration of the six months, and had he then given notice, he would have had till the last day of the six months to deliver the flour, the actual breach of the contract by non-delivery must be taken to have occurred on such last day, and the damage computed accordingly. - In declaring on a promise to pay money on demand, if a third person shall fail to do a certain act, it is not necessary to aver a notice of the failure to do that act, or a demand of the money. Dyer v. Rich, 1 Met. 189.

(t) Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 M. & W. 442. 8 Bowl. P. C. 377, 4 Jur. 509, affirmed on error, 7 M. & W. 126, is an excellent case on this subject. There the declaration stated, that, by indenture, the defendant covenanted that he would, at any time or times thereafter, appear at an office or offices for the insurance of lives within London, or the bills of mortality, and answer such questions as might be asked respecting his age, etc, in order to enable the plaintiff to insure his life, and would not afterwards do or permit to be done any act whereby such insurance should be avoided or prejudiced. It then alleged, that the defendant, in part performance of his covenant, did, at the plaintiff's request, appear at the office of the Rock Lite Insurance Company, and did answer certain questions asked of him; and that the plaintiff insured the defendant's life with that company, by a policy containing a proviso, that if the defendant went beyond the limits of Europe, the policy should be null and void: Breach, that the defendant went beyond the limits of Europe, namely, to the province of Canada, in North America. Held, on special demurrer, that the declaration was bad, for not averring that the defendant had notice that the policy was effected. Lord Abinger said: "I am of opinion that the defendant in this case is entitled to our judgment, on two grounds. The plaintiff having reserved to himself the liberty of effecting the insurance at any office within the bills of mortality, the number of which is limited only by the circumscription of the place and having also reserved to himself the choice of time for effecting the insurance, it appears to me that he ought to give the defendant that carries * notice" of itself. And if the thing is to be done on the happening of an event not to be caused by notice of his having exercised his option, and of the insurance having been effected, before an action can be maintained. But there is also another ground, which weighs strongly with me in coming to this conclusion." Even supposing the defendant were bound to go to all the insurance offices within the bills of mortality, to ascertain whether such a policy had been effected, he would still be obliged to do something more; namely, to learn what were the particular conditions on which it was effected; because the covenant here is, not that the defendant shall not do anything to evade the covenants or conditions usually prescribed by insurance offices; but that he shall not violate any of the conditions by which such insurance might be avoided or prejudiced; i. e., he is bound to observe all the stipulations contained in any policy which the plaintiff may effect. Now, some conditions, totally distinct from the conditions in general use, might be annexed by a particular insurance office; and in such case it would be most unfair to allow the plaintiff to keep the policy in his pocket, and, without notice of them, to call on the defendant to pay for a violation of the stipulations contained in it. Suppose one of the conditions imposed by the policy were, that the party whose life was insured should live on a particular diet, or at a particular place, or cease from some particular practice to which he was addicted, or that he should abandon some course of exercise which might, if persevered in, cost him his life, and the forsaking of which the insurance office might be fully justified in making a condition of insuring the life at all, it would be hard if the plaintiff could, without giving the defendant notice of the existence of such a condition, make him pay the amount of the policy on its violation. The rule to be collected from the cases seems to be this, that where a party stipulates to do a certain thing in a certain specific event which may become known to him, or with which he can make himself acquainted, he is not entitled to any notice, unless he stipulates for it; but when it is to do a thing which lies within the peculiar knowledge of the opposite party, then notice ought to be given him. That is the common sense of the matter, and is what is laid down in all the cases on the subject; and if there are any to be found which deviate from this principle, it is quite time that they should be overruled." And Parke, B., said: "The general rule is, that a party is not entitled to notice, unless he has stipulated for it; but there are certain cases where, from the very nature of the transaction, the law requires notice to be given, though not expressly stipulated for. There are two classes of cases on this subject, neither of which, however, altogether resembles the present. One of them is, where a party contracts to do something, but the act on which the right to demand performance is to arise is perfectly indefinite, as in the case of Haule v. Hemyng, Vin. Abr. 'Condition' (A. d.), pl. 15; s. c. nom. Henning's case, Cro. Jac. 432, where the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff for certain weys of barley as much as the plaintiff sold them for to any other man; there the plaintiff is bound to aver notice, because the person to whom the weys are to be sold is perfectly indefinite, and altogether at the option of the plaintiff, who may sell them to whom he pleases; and, in such cases, the right of the defendant to a notice before he can be called on to pay, is implied by law from the construction of the contract. So, where a party stipulates to account before such auditors as the obligee shall assign, the obligee is bound to give him notice when he has assigned them; for that is a fact which depends entirely on the option or choice of the plaintiff. On the other hand, no notice is requisite when a specific act is to be done by a third party named, or even by the obligee himself; as, for example, where the defendant covenants to pay money on the marriage of the obligee with B, or perhaps on the marriage of B alone (for there are some cases to that effect), or to pay such a sum to a certain person, or at such a rate as A shall pay to B. In these cases there is a particular individual specified, and no option is to be exercised; and the party who, without stipulating for notice, has entered into the obligation to do those acts, is bound to do them. But there is an intermediate class of cases between these two. Let us suppose the defendant in this case bound to perform such stipulations as shall be contained on a policy to be effected at some office in London. Now, my present impression is, that where any option at all remains to be exercised on the part of the plaintiff, notice of his having determined that option ought to be given; and if this had been a covenant by the defendant to perform the conditions to be imposed by any insurance company then existing in London, I think it would be the duty of the plaintiff to notify to the defendant knowledge and motives to inquiry exist, and the court are satisfied that the party has abstained from inquiry, or avoided notice, with the intent of remaining in ignorance.