1 In computing time from the date, or from the day of the date, or from a certain act or event, the day of the date is to be excluded, unless a different intention is manifested by the instrument or statute under which the question arises. Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502. In this case Gray, C. J., elaborately reviews all the authorities on this question. The word "until" ordinarily includes the day to which it relates, but this construction yields to the manifest intention of the parties. Kendall v. Kingsley, 150

* Generally, where the party whose interests the compu tation affects, is not the one who may determine when the event shall happen, the longest time is given him, and therefore the day of the making is excluded. (u) If the contract refers to "the day of the date," or "the date," and expresses any date, this day, and not that of the actual making, is taken. But if there is in the contract no date, or an impossible date - as if a thing is execution, which is "within one year from the time of executing, by the officer to the purchaser, the deed thereof," the day on which the deed is executed is to be excluded. And Wilde, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said, "Before the case of Pugh v. The Duke of Leeds, all the cases agree that the words, 'from the day of the date,' are words of exclusion. So plain was this meaning thought to be, that leases depending on this rule of construction were uniformly declared void, against the manifest intention of the parties. Of this doctrine, thus applied, Lord Mansfield very justly complains; not, however, on the ground that the general meaning of the words had been misunderstood, but because the plain intention of the parties to the contract had been disregarded. All that was decided in that case was, that 'from the day of the date' might include the day, if such was the clear intention of the contracting parties; and not that such was the usual signification of the words. I think, therefore, we are warranted by the authorities to say, that when time is to be computed from or after the day of a given date, the day is to be excluded in the computation; and that this rule of construction is never to be rejected, unless it appears that a different computation was intended. So also if we consider the question independent of the authorities, it seems to be impossible to raise a doubt. No moment of time can be said to be after any given day, until that day is expired." See also Pellew v. Wonford, 9 B. & C. 134, where the clause "two days after" a certain day was held to exclude that day. A sensible criterion seems to be to reduce the time to one day, and see whether yon do not obtain an absurdity, unless you exclude the first day; and you must have the same rule whatever be the number of days. This was the rule adopted in Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 M.& W. 473, where goods were sold on the 5th of October to be paid for in two months. It was held, that no suit could be sustained until after the expiration of the 5th of December following. And see, to the same effect, Bigelow v. Willson, supra; Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & C. 603. Rex v. Adderley, 2 Doug. 463, was decided on a particular ground, under a statute in favor of sheriffs, and cannot be considered as laying down any general rule. It is true that in Glassington v. Rawlins, 3 East, 407, the first day seems to have been included; but there the party lay in prison on the day he went there, and also a portion of each of the twenty-eight days necessary under the statute to amount to an act of bankruptcy; and, as the law takes no cognizance of a part of a day, the case does not upon careful examination conflict with the rule in the text, namely, to regard the first day as excluded. Rex v. Cumberland, 4 Nev. & M. 378, is to the same effect. See Wilkinson v. Gaston, 9 Q. B. 141; Gorst v. Lowndes, 11 Sim. 434; Farwell v. Rogers, 4 Cush. 460; Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb. 117; Bissell v. Bissell, 11 id. 96; Thomas v. Afflick, 16 Penn. St. 14, overruling Goswiler's Estate, 3 Penn. 200; 4 Kent's Com. p.95,n. (a); Blake v. Crowninshield, 9 N. H. 304; Ewing v. Bailey, 4 Scam. 420; Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193; Weeks v. Hull, 19 Conn. 376; Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 28; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69; Wiggin v. Peters, 1 Met. 127; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Denio, 12.

(u) Lester v. Garland, 15 Yes. 248, 156; Pellew v. Wonford, 9 B. & C. 134, 144, per Lord Tenterden. So the phrase "until a certain day," has been held to exclude that day. Wicker v. Norris, Cas. temp. Hardw. 108. But it may admit of a different interpretation according to the subject-matter and context. Rex v. Stevens, 5 East, 244.

Mass. 94. Under the U. S. Rev. Sts. § 9044, an attachment, made on September 9th, was held to be dissolved by an assignment in bankruptcy under a petition filed on the January 9th following. Richards v. Clark, 124 Mass. 491. following Dutcher v. Wright, 94 U. S. 553. See Blackman v. Nearing, 48 Conn. 56; Roehoer v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. 63 N. Y. 160.

(v) Styles v. Wardle, 4 B. & C. 908. This was an action of covenant on an indenture, dated the 24th December, 1822, whereby the plaintiff, in consideration of £924, leased to the defendant a house and premises for ninety-seven years; subject to an agreement for an underlease to A for twenty-one years; and the defendant covenanted, that he would, within twenty-four calendar months then next after the date of the indenture, procure A to accept a lease of the premises for the term of twenty-one years from Christmas-day, 1821; and that, in case A would not accept the lease, that he, the defendant, would, within one calendar month next after the expiration of the said twenty-four calendar months, pay to the plaintiff a certain sum of money. The declaration, after setting forth the indenture as above, assigned as a breach that the defendant did not procure A to accept of said lease within said twenty-four calendar months, nor pay the said sum of money within one calendar month after the expiration of said twenty-four calendar months. The defendant pleaded, that the indenture was not in fact executed and delivered until the 8th of April, 1823; and that at the time of the commencement of the action, twenty-five calendar months had not elapsed from the time of the execution of the indenture. To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the court sustained the demurrer. Bayley, J., said: "The question in this case is simply as to the construction to be put upon the words of this deed. A deed has no operation until delivery, and there may be cases in which, ut res valeat, it is necessary to construe date delivery. When there is no date, or an impossible date, that word must mean delivery. But where there is a sensible date, that word in other parts of the deed means the day of the date, and not of the delivery. This distinction is noticed in Co. Litt. 46 6, where it is said: 'If a lease be made by indenture bearing date 26th of May, to hold, etc., for twenty-one years from the date, or from the day of the date, it shall begin on the 27th day of May. If the lease bears date the 26th of May, to have, etc., from the making hereof, or from henceforth, it shall begin on the day on which it is delivered, etc.' And afterwards it is said: