(l) Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 261.

(m) In Simons v. Great Western B. Co. 2 C. B. (n. s.) 620, the plaintiff was told by the clerk, who offered a paper to be signed, "that the signature was a mere form," and it was held, that the goods were not delivered to the carriers under the special contract.

(n) The question whether a public notice, brought to the knowledge of the bailor, will constitute such special contract, or be equivalent thereto, is perhaps not entirely settled, but the decided weight of authority is that it will not The first case in which it was expressly ruled that such a notice was valid and binding, is that of Maving v. Todd, 1 Stark. 72, decided in 1816. For several years previous to this, as we shall presently see, carriers had been in the habit of publishing notices to the effect that they would not be responsible for goods beyond a certain value, unless their true

1 Where a passenger deposited goods at a cloak-room of a railway station, and received a ticket therefor, on the back of which he saw certain conditions restricting the liability of the company, but did not read them, it was held, that the goods were deposited subject to the conditions, and, being applicable to a loss of the goods, the company was not liable, the conditions not having been complied with. Harris v. Great Western R. Co. 1Q.B.D. 515. See Parker v. South Eastern R. Co. 1 C. P. D. 618; 2 C. P. D. 416. But Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 470, deckled that if the person receiving the ticket does not know that there is any writing on the back of the ticket, he is not bound by a condition printed on the back.

2 That the mere buying a ticket and taking baggage checks do not constitute such an agreement, see Baltimore, etc R. Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647. That assent to the carrier's limitation of liability must be express, see Gaines v. Union Trans. Co. 26 Ohio St. 418: that the receipt cannot limit liability against negligence, see Boscowitz v. Adams Ex. Co. 93 Ill. 523; and that, if assented to, it is binding, though not signed by the shipper, see Erie R. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill. 239. See Railroad Co. v. Manuf Co. 16 Wall. 318, to the point that an unsigned printed notice on the back of a receipt does not amount to a special contract limiting the carrier's common-law liability, although the receipt may have been taken by the consignee without dissent. Where a receipt contained exemptions in favor of companies other than the carrier receiving, the latter cannot take the benefit of them. Merchants' Trans. Co. v. Bolles. 80 Ill. 473.

It has been held recently in Massachusetts, that there is no value was disclosed, and freight paid accordingly; and these notices had received the sanction of the courts. In the case of Ellis v. Turner, 8 T. R. 531, decided in 1800, a notice of a different character made its appearance. It was an action against the defendants as shipowners for the loss of goods. They had published a notice to the effect that they would not be answerable for any loss or damage that might happen to any cargo, unless such loss or damage should be occasioned by the want of ordinary care and diligence in the master and crew, in which case they would pay £10 per cent on the loss or damage, provided such payment did not exceed the value of the vessel, but that they were willing to insure against all accidents, on receiving extra freight in proportion to the value. The case, however, went off upon another point, so that the validity of the notice did not come in question. In 1804, came the case of Lyon v. Mells, 8 East, 428, in which a notice of the same import had been given. But this case also went off without drawing in question the validity of the notice. In 1818, in the case of Evans v. Soule, 2 M. & Sel. 1, a notice appeared which extended the exemption of the carrier still further. That also was an action against the owner of a vessel. He had given notice that he should not consider himself liable to make good to any extent any loss or damage arising from any accident or misfortune whatever, unless occasioned by the actual negligence of the master or mariners. The plaintiff's counsel did not deny the validity of the notice, but contended that it had been waived. The court merely decided that it had not been waived, and gave judgment for the defendant. Thus stood the cases when Maving v. Todd came up, in 1815. This was an action against the defendants, who were lightermen, for the loss of goods intrusted to them to carry. It appeared that the goods, while in the defendants' custody, had been accidentally destroyed by fire, and the question was, whether they were liable for the loss. It appeared that they had so limited their responsibility by a notice, that it did not extend to a loss by fire. Holroyd, for the plaintiff, submitted "whether the defendants could exclude their responsibility altogether. This was going further than had been done in the case of carriers, who had only limited their responsibility to a certain amount." But, per Lord Ellenborough: "Since they can limit it to a particular sum, I think they may exclude it altogether, and that they may say, we will have nothing to do with fire." Holroyd: "They were bound to receive the goods." Lord Ellenborough: "Yes, but they may make their own terms. I am sorry the law is so; it leads to very great negligence." The next year came the case of Leeson v. Holt, 1 Stark. 186. The plaintiff in this case had sent some chairs by the defendant, who was a common carrier. The defendant had given a notice to the effect that all household furniture sent by him would be entirely at the risk of the owner as to damage, breakage, etc. Lord Ellenborough, in summing up to the jury, said: " If this action had been brought twenty years ago, the defendant would have been liable, since, by the common law, a carrier is liable in all cases except two; where the loss is occasioned by the act of God, or of the king's enemies, using an overwhelming force, which persons with ordinary means of resistance cannot guard against. It was found, that the common law imposed upon carriers a liability of ruinous extent, and, in consequence, qualifications and limitations of that liability have been introduced from time to time, till, as in the present case, they seem to have excluded all responsibility whatsoever; so that, under the terms of the present notice, if a servant of the carriers had, in the most wilful and wanton manner, destroyed the furniture intrusted to them, the principals would not have been liable. If the parties in the present case have so contracted, the plaintiff must abide by the agreement, and he must be taken to have so contracted, if he chooses to send his goods to be carried after notice of the conditions. The question then is, whether there was a special contract. If the carriers notified their terms to the person bringing the goods, by an advertisement, which, in all probability, must have attracted the attention of the person who brought the goods, they were delivered upon those terms; but the question in these cases always is, whether the delivery was upon a special contract." This is the last that we hear of notices of this character in England, until they were finally put an end to by the Carriers Act already alluded to. See the act, post, p. * 241, note (r). On this side of the Atlantic these notices were extensively discussed, for the first time, in Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, and Cole v. Goodwin, id. 261. These cases were decided in 1888. The defendants in both cases were coach proprietors, and had legal presumption that a passenger on a railroad read a notice published notices to the effect that all baggage sent by their lines would be at the risk of the owners. The Supreme Court of New York, after a most careful consideration of the question, declared that the notices were of no avail; that the defendants were, notwithstanding, subject to all their common-law liability. Mr. Justice Cowen, who delivered the opinion in the last case, placed the judgment of the court, as we have already seen, on grounds of public policy, which extended equally to such notices and to special contracts. But in the former case the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Bronson, and he took the ground that such notices were not, upon sound principles of construction, equivalent to a special contract. Upon this point he uses the following language: "Conceding that there may be a special contract for a restricted liability, such a contract cannot, I think, be inferred from a general notice brought home to the employer. The argument is, that where a party delivers goods to be carried, after seeing a notice that the carrier intends to limit his responsibility, his assent to the terms of the notice may be implied. But this argument entirely overlooks a very important consideration. Notwithstanding the notice, the owner has a right to insist that the carrier shall receive the goods subject to all the responsibilities incident to his employment. If the delivery of goods under such circumstances authorizes an implication of any kind, the presumption is as strong, to say the least, that the owner intended to insist on his legal rights, as it is that he was willing to yield to the wishes of the carrier. If a coat be ordered from a mechanic, after he has given the customer notice that he will not furnish the article at a less price than one hundred dollars, the assent of the customer to pay that sum, though it be double the value, may perhaps be implied; but if the mechanic had been under a legal obligation, not only to furnish the coat, but to do so at a reasonable price, no such implication could arise. Now the carrier is under a legal obligation to receive and convey the goods safely, or answer for the loss. He has no right to prescribe any other terms; and a notice can, at the most, only amount to a proposal for a special contract, which requires the assent of the other party. Putting the matter in the most favorable light for the carrier, the mere delivery of goods, after seeing a notice, cannot warrant a stronger presumption that the owner intended to assent to a restricted liability, on the part of the carrier, than it does that he intended to insist on the liabilities imposed by law; and a special contract cannot be implied where there is such an equipoise of probabilities." To the same effect are the remarks of Redfield, J., in Fanners and Mechanics Bank v. The Champlain Transportation Co. 28 Vt. 186, 205. "We are more inclined," says he, "to adopt the view which the American cases have taken of this subject of notices by common carriers, intended to qualify their responsibility, than that of the English courts, which they have, in some instances, subsequently regretted. The consideration that carriers are bound, at all events, to carry such parcels, within the general scope of their business, as are offered to them to carry, will make an essential difference between the effect of notices by them, and by others who have an option in regard to work which they undertake. In the former case, the contractor having no right to exact unreasonable terms, his giving public notice that he shall do so, where those who contract with him are not altogether at his mercy, does not raise the same presumption of acquiescence in his demands as arises in those cases where the contractor has the absolute right to impose his own conditions. And unless it be made clearly to appear, that persons contracting with common carriers expressly consent to be bound by the terms of such notices, it does not appear to us that such acquiescence ought to be inferred." And see Kimball v. Rutland & B. R. R. Co. 26 Vt. 247. The same doctrine is held in Crouch v. London & North-Western R. Co. 14 C. B. 255; Clark v. Faxton, 21 Wend. 158; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344; Dorr v. N. J. Steam Nav. Co. 4 Sandf. 136; Parsons v. Monteath, 13 Barb. 353; Stoddard v. The Long Island Railway Co. 5 Sandf. 180; Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 394; Moses v. Boston & M. R. R. Co. 4 Foster (N. H.), 71; Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St. 181. See ante, note (j). Some of our courts, however, even 'since Hollister v. Nowlen, and Cole v. Goodwin were decided, have held similiar notices valid. But they have generally done so with reluctance, and upon the ground that they considered themselves bound by the decisions of their predecessors. See C. & A. Railroad Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Penn. St. 67; Laing v. Colder, 8 Penn. St. 479; Bingham v. Rogers, 0 W. & S. 500. See also Sager v. The Portsmouth Railroad Co. 31 Me. 228. We think there cannot be on the back of a check given him, having on its face the words, "look on the back." (nn) In Louisiana a carrier receiving a package of gold with knowledge of its contents, defended against a claim for its value, by showing that the printed receipt which mentioned no amount, limited the liability of the carrier to fifty dollars, unless the actual value were stated on the receipt, and the defence was held insufficient. (no) 1 A notice given to a person only employed to deliver the goods to the carrier, is not sufficient unless the bailor has knowledge of it; (np) nor is a written or printed notice which cannot easily be read, as where one was covered up by the revenue stamp. (nq) 2 The agreement by which the liability of the carrier is limited, must indeed be proved like any other contract. (nr)