(k) Flinn v. Headlam, 9 B. & C. 003; Clason v. Smith, 3 Wash. C. C. 156; Rice v. New England Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 443; Sibbald v. Hill, 2 Dow, P. C 263.

(l) Burritt v. Saratoga Co. Ins. Co. 5 Hill, 188; Dennison v. Thomaston Ins. Co. 20 Maine, 126.

(m) Whittingham v. Thornburgh, 2 Vern. 200; Wilson v. Ducket, 3 Burr. 1301.

(n) Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 535; Sawyer v. Coasters Ins. Co. 0 Gray, 221; Dennison v. Thomaston Ins. Co. 20 Maine, 125.

(o) Maryland Ins. Co. v. Ruden, 6

Cranch, 338; Hurtin v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 1 Wash. C. C. 400.

(p) See cases supra, p. * 402, note (k).

(o) Biays v. Union Ins. Co. 1 Wash. C. C. 506; M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co. 1 Pet. 170; Neptune Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 11 Gill 4 J. 256.

(r) As where a vessel is represented as expected to sail at or within a certain time. Bowden v. Vaughan, 10 East, 415 ; Whitney v. Haven, 13 Mass. 172; Rice v. New England Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 430; Bryant v. Ocean Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 200; Hubbard v. Glover, 3 Camp. 313; Astor v. Union Ins. Co. 7 Cow. 202.

(s) Macdowall v. Fraser, 1 Doug. 260; Pawson v. Watson, 2 Cowp. 788.

ally sufficient; (t) but it may relate to the future, and then it must be complied with in the future. (u)

Generally, the insured is bound to state what he has learned only from rumor, unless the rumor is manifestly frivolous or the authority is not worthy of credit; (v) but he need not disclose matters of common notoriety; (w) or what the insured knew as well as he; (x) or what he had every reason to believe the insurer knew as well; (y) or what is distinctly provided for in the policy. (z)

If different policies are connected together by identity of subject and by mutual understanding, a misrepresentation made to the first insurer operates on subsequent policies as if made in reference to them. (a)

A misrepresentation made before the insurance is made, has the same effect as if made at the time, if it were made in connection with the insurance and had any effect upon it. (b)

It may be doubted on authority, whether insurers are discharged when the insured concealed a material fact in ignorance of it, and therefore could not have stated it, but his ignorance was caused by the fraud of his master, in wilfully withholding information from him. (c) There are certainly reasons for holding a policy void,

(t) Driscol v. Passmore, 1 B. ft P. 200.

(u) Flinn v. Headlam, 9 B. & C. 693; Dennistoun v. Lillie, 8 Bligh, 202; Edwards v. Footner, 1 Camp. 530; Clark v. Manuf. Ins. Co. 8 How. 235; Houghton v. Manuf. Ins. Co. 8 Met. 114; Underhill v. Agawam Ins. Co. 6 Cush. 440; 2 Duer, Ins. 667, note vi.; 1 Arnould Ins. 603; 1 Phillips, Ins. § 553. But the view has been taken, that all statements respecting future events, are mere representations of intention, and will not defeat the policy, unless made fraudulently. Alston v. Mechanics Ins. Co. 4 Hill, 820. See also Rice v. New England Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 439; Bryant v. Ocean Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 200; Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co. 2 Gill & J. 186. It is also difficult to determine whether a statement respecting a future event is to be regarded merely as a representation as to an expectation or intention, or as an absolute agreement. See Benham v. United Ins. Co. 7 Exch. 744; Bowden v. Vaughan, 10 East, 415; Frisbie v. Fayette Ins. Co. 27 Penn. St. 826; Billings v. Tolland Co. Ins. Co. 20 Conn. 189; Stokes v. Cox, 1 H. & N. 683; Loud v. Citizens Ins. Co. 2 Gray, 221; Crocker v. Peoples Ins. Co. 8 Cush. 79; Jones Manuf. Co. v. Manuf. Ins. Co. 8 Cush.

82; Williams v. New England Mut. Ins. Co. 81 Maine. 219.

(v) See Lynch v. Hamilton, 8 Taunt. 44; Walden v. La. Ins. Co. 12 La. 184; Durrell v. Bederley, Holt, N. P. 283; Seaman v. Fonereau, 2 Stra. 1188; Burr v. Foster, 2 Dane, Ab. 122; Willes v. Glover, 4 B. & P. 14. But see Bell v. Bell, 2 Camp. 476; Ruggles v. General Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 88.

(w) Coulon v. Bowne, 1 Caines, 288; Thomson v. Buchanan, 4 Brown, P. C. 482; Vallance v. Dewar, 1 Camp. 603; Buck v. Chesapeake Ins. Co. 1 Pet. 161; Hurtin v. Phoenix Ins Co. 1 Wash. C. C. 400; Moxon v. Atkins, 8 Camp. 200; Stewart v. Bell, 6 B. & Ald. 288.

(x) Carter v. Boehm, 8 Burr. 1906.

(y) Vasse v. Ball, 2 Dall. 275.

(z) De Wolf v. New York Ins. Co. 20 Johns. 214. See 2 Duer, Ins. 573.

(a) Feise v. Parkinson, 4 Taunt. 640; Pawson v. Watson, 2 Cowp. 786. But the rule is otherwise if the policies are independent. Elting v. Scott, 2 Johns. 157; Williams v. New England Ins. Co. 81 Maine, 219.

(b) See Dawson v. Atty, 7 East, 367 ; Edwards v. Footner, 1 Camp. 530.

(c) The insurers were held liable unmade under such concealment, if not because the master's knowledge is the knowledge of his principal, then because the contract was founded on an essential misunderstanding of both parties. (d)

Neither has it been quite certain how the policy is affected by the misrepresentation or concealment of an agent, who effects the policy, when the principal himself is wholly innocent. It seems, however, now settled that the insurers are thereby discharged. (e)

A similar question exists, how far an insurance company is bound by the knowledge of any member or officer of the company. But the answer to this question must always depend on the authority or agency which the member or officer possesses, by usage, by office, or by direct instructions. (f)

* If the insured when he states a fact gives truly his au thority for it, and the insurers can judge of that fact and that authority as well as he can, though the authority is insufficient and the statement founded thereon erroneous, it is not a misrepresentation. (g)

As the misrepresentation must be of a fact material to that contract, it is obvious that this materiality must be determined by the circumstances of each case; as, for example, the national character of the property, (h) or the nature of it, or the interest of the assured in it, (i) or the time of sailing, (j) or the place of the ship at a certain time, or the age or construction of the ship.1 The one principle which is certain and established, and answers all these questions, is, that everything should be stated, and stated truly, which the insured knows, and which insurers, acting as reader such circumstances in Ruggles v. Gen. Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 74, 12 Wheat 406.

(d) The decision in the case cited in the preceding note is doubted by Mr. Duer and Mr. Phillips. 2 Duer, Ins. 415, and note xi. to ch. xiv. 1 Phillips, Ins. § 549. See also Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T. R. 12.

(e) Sawyer v. Coasters Ins. Co. 6 Gray, 221; Stewart v. Dunlop, 4 Brown, P. C. 488, note; Carpenter v. Am. Ins. Co. 1 Story, 68. See a strong case in Proudfoot v. Montefiore, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 511.

(f) See Himely v. S. Car. Ins. Co. 8 Const. R. 164.

(g) Tidmarsh v. Washington Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 448.

(h) Campbell v. Innes, 4 B. & Ald.

423; Francis v. Ocean Ins. Co. 6 Cow 404; Murray v. United Ins. Co. 2 Johns. Cas. 168.

(i) Generally the nature of the interest of the insured need not be stated. Oliver v. Greene. 8 Mass. 183; Finney v. Warren Ins. Co. 1 Met. 16; Taylor v. Wilson, 15 East, 824; Russel v. Union Ins. Co. 1 Wash. C. C. 409.

(j) This is generally material, M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co. 1 Pet. 188; Anderson v. Thornton, 8 Exch. 425; Baxter v. New England Ins. Co. 8 Mason, 96; Elkin v. Janson, 13 M. & W. 655. But if the time would not affect the premium it need not be disclosed. Littledale v. Dixon, 4 B. & P. 161; Foley v. Moline. 5 Taunt 430; Williams v. Dela field, 2 Caines, 829.

1 See Ionides v. Pacific Ins. Co. L. R. 6 Q. B. 674.

sonable men, should consider, either in determining whether they would insure at all or what premium they should ask. (k) 1 Nor will it be enough that the insurers might have learned the truth otherwise, if they did not know it, and the insured did and concealed it. (kk)

Every representation or statement will be construed by the fair and obvious meaning of the words, (l) and rational inferences from them; and will include all facts, however distinct, which are yet necessarily connected with the statement. (m)

It is an important difference between a warranty and a representation, that while a warranty must be literally and accurately complied with, a substantial compliance with a representation is sufficient; (n) and a literal compliance, if it be not substantial, is not sufficient. (o)