(p) Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 202j Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 64; Curtin v. Patton, 11 S & R.307; Harmer v. Killing, 5 Esp. 102; Brooke v. Gaily, 2 Atk. 34;

1 It has been held, however, in some cases, that knowledge of the legal validity of the defence of infancy is not necessary to make a ratification binding. Clark v Van Court, 100 Ind 113; Ring v. Jamison, 66 Mo. 424; Anderson v. Soward, 40 Ohio St. 325.

The mere fact that an infant does not disaffirm a contract after he is of full age is not, necessarily, of itself a confirma-tion, (t) *but this fact may be made significant by circumstances; thus, if coupled with a continued possession and use of the property, or a refusal to redeliver the same, and an assertion of ownership, it may frequently raise, by implication of law, such confirmation, and a promise to pay for the property, especially if either this intention and promise to pay must be presumed, or else a fraud. Indeed any act of ownership, after full age, should have this effect; but it must be unequivocal.

The purchases of an infant may be far more easily ratified than his conveyances of real estate. To affirm the latter some positive act seems to be necessary, and mere acquiescence, or failure to disaffirm, although continued beyond a reasonable time, has been adjudged not sufficient to bind the minor. (u) But it is held in

Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428; Sims v. Everharclt, 102 U. S. 300, 312; Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 512; Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357, 363.

(q) Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479; Bigelow v. Grannis, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 120; Hoit v. Underhill, 9 N. H. 439.

(r) Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 48; Cole v. Saxby, 3 Esp. 159. See also Davis v. Smith, 4 Esp. 36; Besford v Saunders, 2 H. Bl. 116; Everson v. Carpenter, 17 Wend. 419.

(s) Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 824; Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 202; Freeman v. Nichols, 138 Mass. 313; Hyer v. Hyatt, 3 Cranch, C. C. 276; Thing v. Libbey, 16 Me. 55; Merriam v. Wilkins, 6 N. H. 432 (overruling the earlier case of Wright v. Steele, 2 N. H. 51); Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374; Goodridge v. Ross, 6 Met. 487.

(t) Bennett's note to Dublin & Wick-low Railway Co. v. Black, 16 E. L. & E. 558. But see post, notes (u) and (y). As to the necessity for a positive act of confirmation, see Ferguson v. Bell, 17 Mo. 347; Dunlap v. Hales, 2 Jones (N. C), 381. Also Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. 122.

(u) In Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns.

539. an infant conveyed land to A, in fee in the military tract, in 1784. Afterwards in 1796, and ten years after he became of age, he conveyed the same premises to B. A claimed that the first deed was only voidable, and not void, and that there had been an acquiescence for so long a time after the infant arrived at full age, that it amounted to a confirmation of the first conveyance, before the second was executed. But the court held otherwise. So in Jackson v. Burchin, 14 Johns. 124, an infant, in 1784, and while between nineteen and twenty years of age, conveyed wild and unoccupied land in fee, and in 1795 executed another conveyance of the same premises, not having in the mean time after his arrival at full age made any entry on the premises. It was also proved that the infant, after he came of age, had stated to others that he had sold his land to [the first grantee]. The defendant also offered to prove that the infant, after he became of full age, declined to sell the premises on one occasion, because he had previously sold it, but this was overruled. Spencer, J., in delivering the opinion, observed, " I perceive no evidence of the affirmance of the first

1 As it is now generally admitted that the action is brought on the original promise, it would seem that the effect of a ratification is simply to meet the defence of infancy, and should therefore be sufficient though made after action brought. Best v. Givens, 3 B. Mon. 72; Slator v. Trimble, 14 Ir. C. L. 342, 353,

New York that a continuance of possession and acts of ownership after coming of age, ratify the contract. (uu) It has been held in England that an infant's bond * could not be rati- fled but by an instrument of equal solemnity. But this has been doubted for strong and we think sufficient reasons. | v) Whether his verbal declarations can, in any event, ratify his instrument under seal, may not be certain; but it is quite certain that if, in an instrument under seal, a person recites or refers to a former instrument also under seal, made while he was a minor, this is a ratification of the first. (w) Thus, the grant of lands received during infancy, by way of exchange for other lands, has been held to be a confirmation of the original conveyance And if a minor receives and retains the proceeds of a sale of real estate, he is estopped from denying the validity of the sale .(xx) In some cases it has been urged, that even a silent acquiescence deed by the infant after he came of age." These cases were commented upon in Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 120, and the court incline to the same general doctrine So in Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58, Mr. Justice Story observed: " To assume, as a matter of law, that a voluntary and deliberate recognition by a person, after his arrival at age, of an actual conveyance of his right, during his non-age, amounts to a confirmation of such conveyance; or to assume that a mere acquiescence in the same conveyance, without objection, for several months after his arrival at age, is also a confirmation of it, are not maintainable. The mere recognition of the fact that a conveyance has been made, is not, per se, proof of a confirmation of it." In Lessee of Drake v. Ramsay, 5 Hamm. 251, the court remarked: " In our opinion lapse of time may frequently furnish evidence of acquiescence, and thus confirm the title [of the first purchaser]; but of itself it does not take away the right to avoid until the Statute of Limitations takes effect." The same doctrine was afterwards affirmed in Cresinger v. Lessee of Welch, 15 Ohio, 193. In the very able case of Doe v. Abernathy, 7 Blackf. 442, it appeared that a female infant, residing in Pennsylvania, executed there a deed of bargain and sale for land situate in that State. She afterwards married, but whether before or after her majority did not appear, nor did it appear where, after the execution of the deed, she and her husband had resided, nor that her husband had acquiesced in the deed after he knew of it. Held, that the lapse of about five years after the wife's majority, without any attempt to disaffirm the conveyance, did not, under the circumstances, prevent the husband and wife from disaffirming it. In Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 523, Shep-ley, J., thus lays down the law on this subject: "When a person has made a conveyance of real estate during his infancy, and would affirm or disaffirm it after he becomes of age, in such case the mere acquiescence for years to disaffirm it affords do proof of a ratification. There must be some positive and clear act performed for that purpose." This point was discussed in Hoyle v. Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. 320, where it was held that some act of affirmance was clearly necessary, and that if declarations were sufficient they must be clear and unequivocal, and made with a view to ratification. In Houser v. Reynolds, l Hayw. 143, such declarations were held sufficient. See. however, Glamorgan v. Lane, 9 Mo. 446, and note (y) below.