(f) This is the rule in Connecticut from usage. Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659.

(g) There can be no doubt that a tender of a debt due at a certain day, before such day, without tendering also interest up to the day of maturity, is bad, where the debt is drawing interest. Tillou v. Britton, 4 Halst. 120; Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 267, per Parker, C. J. It is not so clear that if a debt is not drawing interest, tender of the debt before the day it is due and payable, is not good; and one case has expressly held it valid. M'Hard v. Whetcroft, 3 Harris & McH. 85.

(h) Sucklinge v. Coney, Noy, 74. This case is stated in the book as follows: "Upon a special verdict, upon payment for a redemption of mortgage, the mortgagor comes at the day and place of payment, and said to the said mortgagee, 'Here, I am ready to pay you the .£200,' which was of due money, and yet held it all the time upon his arm in bags; and adjudged no tender, for it might be counters or base coin for anything that appeared." And Mr. Justice Anderson said: "It is no good tender to say, 1 am ready," etc. So in Comyns's Digest, Pleader (2 W.) 28, it is said, " If issue be upon the tender, there must be an actual offer. The tender alleged must be legal, and therefore it is not sufficient to say paratus fuit solvere, without saying, et obtulit." See also Thomas v. Evans, 10 East, 101; Dickenson v. Shee, 4 Esp. 68; Kraus v. Arnold, 7 J. B. Moore, 59; Leatherdale v. Sweepetone, 3 C. & P. 342; Finch v. Brook, 1 Scott, 70; Glasscott v. Day, 5 Esp. 48; Brown v. Gilmore, 8 Greenl. 107. It is at all events essential, that the debtor have the money ready to deliver. It is not sufficient that a third person on the spot has the money which he would lend the debtor, unless he actually consents to lend it. Sargent v. Graham, 5 N. H. 440; Fuller v. Little, 7 N. H. 535. The rule is thus laid down in Bakeman v. Pooler, 15 Wend. 637: To prove a plea of tender, it must appear that there was a production and manual offer of

1 A tender of the sum due on a note, with a demand for the collateral security, made at the time the note is expressed to be due, both parties treating the debt as due, and the payee refusing the tender unless additional unsecured claims were paid, is a valid tender so as to sustain an action for conversion of the security, although the days of grace had not expired. Wyckoff v. Anthony, 90 N. Y. 442.

* or impliedly waives this production; (i) and he does this by declaring that he will not receive it. (ii) And it has been held that if the creditor refuses to take, touch, or count money tendered to him of a certain amount, if he afterwards take the ground that it was less in amount, he must prove this. (ij) And it seems that the creditor may not only waive the actual production of the money, but the actual possession of it in hand by the debtor. But it has been held, in one case, that if a debtor has offered to pay, and is about producing the money, and is prevented by the creditor's leaving him, this is not a tender. (j) The debtor is not bound to count out the money, if he has it and offers it.(k) the money, unless the same he dispensed with by some positive act or declaration on the part of the creditor; it is not enough that the party has the money in his pocket, and says to the creditor that he has it ready for him, and asks him to take it, without showing the money. A tender of the creditor's own overdue notes is equivalent to a tender in cash. Foley v. Mason, 6 Md. 37.

(i) The decisions are nice, and perhaps not altogether harmonious upon the point of what constitutes a waiver of the production and offer of the money, so as to render a tender valid. In Reed v. Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86, the agent of the debtor pulled out his pocket-book, and told the plaintiff if he would go to a neighboring public house he would pay the debt. The agent had the necessary amount in his pocket-book, but no money was produced. The creditor refused to take the amount. Yet this was held a good tender. On the other hand, in Finch v. Brook, 1 Scott, 70, the defendant's attorney called at the plaintiff's shop to pay him the debt, having the money in his pocket for that purpose, and mentioned the precise sum, and at the same time put his hand into his pocket for the purpose of taking out the money, but did not actually produce it, the plaintiff saying he could not take it. And, semble, that this was a sufficient tender, the plaintiff having dispensed with the actual production of the money; but quaere whether such dispensation ought not to have been specially pleaded. And in Breed v. Hurd, 6 Pick. 356, a witness told the plaintiff that the defendant had left money with him to pay the plaintiff's bill, and that if the defendant would make it right, by deducting a certain sum, he would pay it, at the same time making a motion with his hand towards his desk, at which he was then standing; and he swore that he believed, but did not know, that there was money enough in his desk, but, if there was not, he would have obtained it in five minutes, if the plaintiff would have made the deduction; but the plaintiff replied that he would deduct nothing. Held, that this was not a tender. And, per Curiam, "To our surprise there are cases very nearly like this, where the offer was held to be a valid tender, as in Harding v. Davies, 2 Car. & P. 77, where a woman stated 'that she had the money up stairs.' Here the witness said he could get the money in five minutes. We all think this was not a tender. The party must have the money about him, wherewith to make the tender, though it is not necessary to count it. We think there was not a tender here, even on the broad cases in England." See Strong v. Blake, 46 Barb. 227.

(ii) Rudolph v. Wagner, 36 Ala. 698.

(ij) Brewers v. Fleming, 51 Penn. 102.

(j) Leatherdale v. Sweepstone, 3 C.

6 P. 342. In this case, in order to prove the tender a witness was called, who stated that he heard the defendant offer to pay the plaintiff the amount of his demand, deducting 14s. O 3/4d., which balance was the sum stated in the plea; that the defendant then put his hand into his pocket, but before he could take out the money the plaintiff left the room, and the money was therefore not produced till the plaintiff had gone. Lord Tenterden held this no tender. But this was only a Nisi Prius case, and may perhaps be questionable. For if a tender be designedly avoided by the creditor, he ought not to object that no tender was made. Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick. 25; Southworth v. Smith,