(see Brandram v. Wharton, 1 B. & ALd. 463; Atkins v. Tredgold, 2 B. & C. 23}, has maintained its ground in England, and is now regarded there as sound law. See Perham c. Raynal, 2 Bing. 306; Burleigh v. Stott, 8 B. & C. 36; Pease v. Hirst, 10 id. 122; Wyatt v. Hodson, 8 Bing. 309; Manderston v Robertson, 4 Man. & R. 440; Channell v. Ditchburn, 5 M. & W. 494. In this last case it was held, that payment of interest, by one of the makers of a joint and several promissory note, though made more than six years after it became due, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations, as against the other maker. And Parke, B., said: "The question in this case was, whether payment of interest by one of two makers of a promissory note, made after the lapse of six years from the time when the note became due, took the case out of the statute of limitations with regard to the other comaker. Mr. Piatt relied upon the cases of Atkins v. Tredgold, and Slater v. Law-son, as making a distinction, and throwing a doubt upon the old case of Whitcomb v. Whiting, which decided that one of two joint makers of a promissory note might, by acknowledgment or part payment, take the case out of the statute, as against the other. After those two cases, undoubtedly some degree of doubt might fairly exist as to the propriety of the decision in Whitcomb v Whiting; and it does seem a strange thing to say, that where a person has entered into a joint and several promissory note with another person, he thereby makes that other his agent, with authority, by acknowledgment or payment of interest, to enter into a new contract for him. But since the decisions in Atkins v. Tredgold, and Slater v. Lawson, the Court of King's Bench have twice decided, that payment by one of two joint makers of a promissory note, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute, as against the other. The first of these cases was that of Burleigh v. Stott, where the defendant was sued as the joint and several maker of a promissory note; and there the court house, 22 Me. 497 [now changed by statute]; County of Vernon v. Stewart, 64 Mo. 408; Casebolt v. Ackerman, 46 N.J. L. 169; Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76; Hollister v. York, 59 Vt 1 In some of these cases weight is given to the fact that the promise or payment was made before the statutory period had expired. But quite generally one joint debtor is held to have no power to bind his co-debtors in this way. In re Wolmershausen, 62 L. T. 541; United States v. Wilder, 13 Wall. 254; Knight v. Clements, 45 Ala. 89; Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339; Bottles v Miller, 112 Ind. 584; Steele v. Souder, 20 Kan. 39; Schindel c. Gates, 46 Md. 604; Probate Judge v. Stevenson, 55 Mich. 320; Willoughby v. Irish, 35 Minn. 63; Briscoe v Anketell, 28 Miss. 361; Mayberrv v. Willoughbv, 5 Neb. 368; Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 219; Mc-Muller v. Rafferty, 89 N. Y. 456,459; Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21; Bush v. Stowell, 71 Pa. 208; Walters v. Kraft, 23 S. C. 578; Muse v. Donelson, 2 Humph. 166.

Partners, however, are distinguished from ordinary joint debtors in that they have authority to act for each other in firm matters. Therefore, during the continuance of the partnership one partner may bind the firm by a new promise or part payment. Watson v. Woodman, L. R. 20 Eq. 721, 730; Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339,354; Abrahams v. Mvers, 40 Md. 499; Faulkner v. Bailev, 123 Mass. 588, 589 Tappan v. Kimball, 30 N. ft. 136; Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76; Carlton v Coffin, 28 Vt 504.

After dissolution a partner is generally held no longer to have this power. Watson v. Woodman, L. R. 20 Eq. 721; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501; Kallenbach v. Dickinson, 100 111. 427 *, Ide v. Ingraham, 5 Gray, 106,108; Van Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523; Wilson v. Waugh, 101 Pa. 233 (except in case of a liquidating partner); Folk v. Russell, 7 Baxter, 591.

But if a creditor is ignorant of the dissolution, a new promise or part payment binds the firm. Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339; Buxton v.'Edwards, 134 Mass 567; Gates v. Fisk, 45 Mich. 522; Tappan v. Kimball, 30 N. H. 136; Myers v. Standart, 11 Ohio St. 29.

It is also held that such promise or payment, if made before the term of limitation has expired, is binding in any event. Burr v. Williams, 20 Ark. 171; Beardsley v. Hall, 36 Conn. 270; Carroll v. Gayarre, 15 La. An. 671; Schindel v Gates, 46 Md. 604; Casebolt v Ackerman, 46 N. J. L. 169. And in Mix v. Shattuck. 50 Vt 421, it was held that even after the statutory limitation a partner could bind the firm to a creditor who knew of the dissolution, and the same result might be reached in other jurisdictions where an ordinary joint debtor has power to bind his co-debtor in this way.

(w) Burleigh v. Stott, 8 B. & C. 36; Wyatt v. Hodson, 8 Bing. 309; Sigourney v. Drury, 14 Pick. 387. See Corlies v. Fleming, 1 Vroom, 349.

1 Where a debtor and surety go to the creditor together, and co-operate in making a payment, although the debtor alone handles the money, the creditor may consider it a joint payment to bind the surety within the statute, unless the surety notifies him to the contrary Mainzinger v. Mohr, 41 Mich. 685. Faulkner v. Bailey, 123 Mass. 588, held, that under the statute of that State a payment of interest on a promissory note by the principal did not take the debt out of the statute as against a surety. - K bound severally, as well as jointly, to pay the debt, and the action is brought * only against him who did not make differs from that decided in the Court of Appeals, take it without the principles decided, and without the statute of limitations * I think not. First: One point of difference is, that in this case partial payments, and not a promise or naked acknowledgment of the existence of the debt, are relied upon to take the case out of the statute. But partial payments are only available as facts, from which an admission of the existence of the entire debt aud a present liability to pay, may be inferred. As a fact by itself, a payment only proves the existence of the debt to the amount paid, but from that fact courts and juries have inferred a promise to pay the residue. In some cases it is said to be an unequivocal admission of the existence of a debt; and in the case of the payment of money as interest, it would be such an admission in respect to the principal sum. Again, it is said to be a more reliable circumstance than a naked promise, and the reason assigned is, that it is a deliberative act, less liable to misconstruction and misstatement than a verbal acknowledgment. So be it. It is nevertheless only reliable as evidence of a promise, or from which a promise may be implied. Any other evidence which establishes such promise would be equally efficacious, and most assuredly, a deliberate written acknowledgment of the existence of the debt and promise to pay, is of a high character as evidence of a partial payment to defeat the statute of limitations. In either case the question is as to the weight to be given to evidence, and if a new promise is satisfactorily proved in either method, the debt is renewed. The question still recurs, who is authorized to make such promise ? If one joint debtor could bind his co-debtors to a new contract, by implication, as by a payment of a part of a debt for which they were jointly liable, he could do it directly, by an express contract. The law will hardly be charged with the inconsistency of authorizing that to be done indirectly which cannot be done directly. If one debtor could bind his co-debtors by an unconditional promise, he could by a conditional promise, and a man might find himself a party to a contract, to the condition of which he would be a stranger. Second: Another fact relied upon to distinguish this case from Van Keuren v. Parmelee is, that the payments were made before the statute of limitations had attached to the debt, and while the liability of all confessedly existed. In some cases in Massachusetts, this, as well as the fact that the revival or continuance of the debt was affected by payment from which a promise was implied rather than by express promises, were commented upon by the court as important points. But I do not understand that the cases were decided upon the ground that these circumstances really introduced a new element or brought the cases within a different principle. The decisions, in truth, were based upon the authority of the decisions of the English courts, and prior decisions in the courts of that State. That a promise made while the statute of limitations is running, is to be construed and acted upon in the same manner as if made after the statute has attached, is decided in Dean v. Hewitt, 5 Wend. 257, and Tompkins v. Brown, 1 Denio, 247. If the promise is conditional, the condition must be performed before the liability attaches so as to authorize an action. It does not, as a recognition of the existence of the debt, revive it absolutely from the time of the conditional promise. And, in principle, I see not why a promise made before the statute has attached to a debt, should be obligatory when made by one of several joint debtors, when it would not be obligatory if made after the action was barred. The statute operates upon the remedy. The debt always exists. An action brought after the lapse of six years, upon a simple contract, must be upon the new promise, whether the promise was before or after the lapse of six years, express or implied, absolute or conditional. The same authority is required to make the promise before as after the six years had elapsed. Can it be said that one of several debtors can, on the last day of the sixth year, by a payment, small or large, or by a new promise, either express or implied, so affect the rights of his co-debtors as to continue their liability for another space of six years, without their knowledge or assent, or any authority from them, save that to be implied from the fact that they are at the time jointly liable upon the same contract, and yet that, on the very next day, without any act of the parties, such authority ceases to exist? If so, I am unable to discover upon what principle. And may the debt be thus revived, from six years to six years, through all time, or, if not, what limit is put to the authority" If any agency is created, it continues until revoked. The decision of the payment (x) Where there was a dissolution of the partnership, and a subsequent part payment of a partnership debt, by a partner to a creditor who did not know of the dissolution, it was held to take the case out of the statute.(y) Where there were several securities for a debt, on some of which the debtor was liable alone, and on others jointly, a payment by him " on account, " without • specification or appropriation, was held to revive them all. (z) And such payment, by a joint debtor has been held to revive the debt against the others, although the debtor made it in fraud, and in expectation of his bankruptcy.(a)