It sometimes happens that a thing is prayed for which is impossible now, but will be possible at a future time; as if there be an incapacity from age, which time will remove; or from incompleteness of interest or estate, which certain or even * probable events will cure; in such cases equity may not refuse absolutely to do what is requested, but may delay the decree until the obstacles to the performance are removed, and, in the mean time, make any necessary provisions by a temporary decree, (w)

A court of chancery has no power to enforce specific performance against a feme covert, in personam; yet, if she has separate property within its jurisdiction, that may be made to answer for her contract; but, in all cases, the court must proceed in rem against the property, (x)1 For a feme covert is not competent to enter into contracts, so as to give a personal remedy against her; and, although she may become entitled to property for her separate use, she is no more capable of contracting than before; a personal contract would be within the incapacity under which a, feme covert labors, though she may pledge her separate property, and make it answerable for her engagements, (y)1

(u) But the court will not grant specific performance of the agreement with a variation. In the language of Lord Langdale, M R., in Nurse v. Seymour, 13 Bear. 269: "You may hare an agreement specifically performed, hut you cannot have it quasi specifically performed, or specifically performed with a variation."

(v) Section 6, p. et seq.

(w) See Clay v. Rufford, 5 De G. & S. 768,19 Eng. L. & Eq. 360.

(x) Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Mylne & C. 105; Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Madd. 258; Martin v. Dwelly, 6 wend. 9; Knowles v. McCamly, 10 Paige, 342. And see Martin v. Mitchell, 2 Jacob & W. 424; Berry v. Cox, 8 Gill, 466. See Raymond v. Frit-chard, 24 Ind. 318; Moseby v. Partee, 5 Heiskell, 26; Stidham v. Matthews, 29 Ark. 650.

1 As to a wife's ratification of her husband's unauthorised sale of land, see Ladd v. Hildebrandt, 27 Wis. 135. But a wife will not be allowed to retain land bought by her for which she refuses to pay the purchase-money. Staton v. Kew, 49 Miss. 307. Specific performance will not be granted indirectly by the giving of exemplary damages against the husband. Burk v. Serrill, 80 Pa. 413. - K.

There has been much diversity of opinion in England whether specific performance should be decreed when a husband covenants that his wife shall do or permit some act which will convey away her estate or bar her right. A Master of the Rolls (z) said, in 1733, "There are a hundred precedents for it." But the course of adjudication was certainly not uniform. Lord Cowper strongly objected to it, (a) and Lord Eldon, whose conservatism led him to obey the precedents, declared that, if it were a "res integra" he should hesitate, and stated the objections to the doctrine, or rather practice, clearly and forcibly, (b) We * believe that the question has seldom come before the equity courts of this country. But we should think the objections to a decree of specific performance in such a case are so obvious and powerful, that no court would grant it unless very peculiar circumstances lessened the force of these objections. A decree may issue in such a case against the husband, perhaps requiring him to do what he can, with an allowance, indemnity, or security for what he cannot do; and this has been dona (c) 2

(y) Lord Cottenham (when Master of the Rolls), 1 Mylne & C 111, 112; Francis v. Wigzell, ubi supra. Where a married woman, having separate property, and living apart from her husband, entered into an agreement to take a lease, it was held, that she was bound by the contract to the extent of her separate property, and might be compelled to pay the rent. Gaston v. Frankum, 2 De G. & S. 561. And see Stead v. Nelson, 2 Bear. 245. As to the enforcement of a contract with a married woman, for the purchase of her separate property, see Harris v. Mott, 14 Beav. 169.

(z) Sir Joseph Jekyll, in Hall v. Hardy, 3 P. Wms. 189.

(a) Otread v. Round, 4 Vin. Ab. Baron & Feme (H. b.), pl. 4.

(b) Emery v. Wase, 8 Ves. 514; Martin v. Mitchell, 2 Jac. & W. 425, 426. See opinion of Alexander, C. B., Frederick v. Cox well, 3 Younge & J. 517. But see the judgment of Wigram, V. C, Downs v. Collius, 6 Hare, 437.

(c) Where a vendor's wife refused to release her dower, he was decreed to convey his own interest, with an indemnity against the claim of dower. Williamson, Ch., Paul v Young, New Jersey, 1855, 4 Amer. Law Reg. 412, 2 Stockt Ch. 401, affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, nom. Young v. Paul, 2 Stockt. Cn. 414.

1 Thus equity will not enforce the conveyance of a married woman, which the husband signs, but in which he is not named as grantor, as required by statute, although the purchase-money has been paid and possession taken and continued by the purchaser thereunder for five years. Blythe v. Dargin, 68 Ala. 370. The executory contract of husband and wife to convey her land cannot be specifically enforced against either or both of them, Parks v. Barrowman. 83 Ind. 561; Bradley v. Johnson, 9 Stewart, 66; nor ratified by or enforced against her after his death, Long v. Brown, 66 Ind. 160. But where a husband, having the use of the wife's land, contracts to convey it, with her approbation, to a person with knowledge of her ownership, and the husband and wife join in the deed and tender it to the purchaser, who for no good reason declines to accept it, specific performance on their joining in a bill and tendering the deed in court will be decreed. Chrisman v. Partee, 38 Ark. 31. - K.

2 Where husband and wife agree to convey his land and she refuse to join, specific performance may be decreed against him, conditioned, if she persist in her refusal,

It is hardly necessary to say, that equity will not enforce a contract tainted with fraud on the part of the party applicant, (d) or one growing out of or tending to an immoral or illegal purpose or act (dd) Here equity can hardly be said to follow the law, because it goes further. For it requires perfect good faith; and will refuse specific performance of a contract, if it were obtained by means of misrepresentation or indirection, which would not be sufficient to avoid the contract at law. (e) As if the plaintiff had * induced the defendant to enter into a written contract, by his promise to alter it materially afterwards, or substantially qualify its operation. (f) So, if he had orally waived a written contract under circumstances which would not amount to a legal waiver, (g)