Usage may have great influence in determining this point. Thus, in many cases, a log-line and a quadrant may be enough. But in other cases, it might be necessary that the ship should * have a chronometer, a sextant, and a master competent to make a proper use of these instruments. So there must be proper charts on board; but what charts are proper and necessary must be determined by the circumstances of each case. (c)

Seaworthiness is a condition precedent; that is, unless the vessel be seaworthy the policy does not attach. (d) But by a rule somewhat peculiar, the insured is not in general bound to prove that this condition was fulfilled, until the insurers offer some proof of unseaworthiness. (e)1 This the insurers may do, by showing

(z) M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co. 1 Pet. 184; Abitbol v. Bristow, 6 Taunt 464; Cruder v. Phil. Ins. Co. 2 Wash. C. C. 262; Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 232.

(a) The term seaworthiness, as applied to steam-vessels, means not only that the hull shall be stanch, tight, and strong, but that the machinery shall be properly constructed, and of sufficient power to perform the contemplated voyage. Myers v. Girard Ins. Co. 26 Penn. State, 102. See, as to floating docks, Marcy v. Sun Ins. Co. 11 La. An. 748.

(b) See Cobb v. New England Ins. Co. 6 Gray, 192; Knill v. Hooper, 2 H. & N.

277; Alexander v. Pratt, 1 Arnould, Ins. 660; Small v. Gibson, 16 Q. B. 141; Brown v. Girard, 4 Yeates, 115; Bell v. Reed, 4 Binn. 127.

(c) In all such cases the question is one of fact for the jury. Chase v. Eagle Ins. Co. 5 Pick. 51; Bell v. Reed, 4 Binn. 127; Clifford v. Hunter, Moody & M. 108; Gillespie v. Forsyth, 2 Law Rep. 257; M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co. 1 Pet. 184.

(d) Tidmarsh v. Washington Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 480; Small v. Gibson, 16 Q. B. 128; Wallace v. De Pau, 2 Bay, 508, 1 Brer. 252; and cases passim.

(e) It has been held in some cases, that the loss occurred without any exposure to extraordinary peril; (f) but if a vessel has encountered an extraordinary peril, and the insurer resists a claim for loss, on the ground of unseaworthiness, he must prove this; (g) and so if the vessel sails and is never heard from. (h)

1 See Pickup v. Thames Ins. Co. 8 Q. B. D. 594, as to the shifting of proof from the insurer to the insured.

If a vessel becomes unseaworthy, and afterwards leaves an intermediate port in that condition, although she might have been repaired there, and is lost in consequence of that neglect on the part of the captain to repair her, the underwriters are not held liable in this country. (i) In England, however, the law seems now to be, that if the ship was seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage, subsequent unseaworthiness, from whatever cause, except the wilful and wrongful act of the assured himself, will not relieve the underwriter from liability * for a loss which is the proximate effect of a peril insured against. (j)

It is, however, an unquestionable rule of insurance law, that it is the duty of the master to repair unseaworthiness in the first port of repair which he reaches after the injury. The disregard of this duty is undoubtedly a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. Still this breach does not operate altogether like a breach of this warranty at the beginning. It does not destroy the liability of the insurers, but only suspends it. It seems to be settled, for example, that if a ship loses her spars at sea, or a part of her crew, and reaches a port where they could be supplied, and leaves it without supplying them, but then proceeds to another port and there supplies them, the liability of the insurers continues until she reaches the first port where her wants can be supplied, and that as the seaworthiness of the vessel is a condition precedent to the right of the assured to recover, it lies upon him to establish that fact. Tidmarsh v. Wash. Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 439; Craig v. U. S. Ins. Co. Pet C. C. 410; Moses v. Son Ins. Co. 1 Drier, 160. But the rale generally followed at the present day is, that seaworthiness is assumed as a fact in the absence of fraud, and the assured is not called upon to prove it in limine. Deshon v. Merchants Ins. Co. 11 Met 807; Taylor v. Lowell, 3 Mass. 331; Paddock v. Franklin Ins Co. 11 Pick. 227; Parker v. Potts, 8 Dow, 23; Bullard v. Roger Williams Ins. Co. 1 Curtis, C. C. 148; Snethen v. Memphis Ins. Co. 8 La. An. 474; Dupeyre v. Western Ins Co. 2 Bob. La. 467.

(f) Watson v. Clark, 1 Dow, 844;

Parker v. Potts, 8 Dow, 28; Wright v. Orient Ins. Co. 6 Bosw. 269; Deshon v. Merchants Ins. Co. 11 Met. 207; Myers v. Girard Ins. Co. 26 Penn. State, 102, Bullard v. Roger Williams Ins. Co. 1 Curtis, C. C. 148; Walsh v. Washington Ins. Co. 82 N. Y. 427.

(g) Barnewall v. Church, 1 Caines, 217.

(h) Deshon v. Merchants Ins. Co. 11 Met. 207.

(i) Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227; Hazard v. New England Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 280. 8 Pet. 557; Deblois v. Ocean Ins. Co. 16 Pick. 308; Copeland v. New England Ins. Co. 2 Met. 482.

(j) Shee's Marshall on Ins. 122; Dixon v. Sadler, 6 M. & W. 405; Redman v. Wilson, 14 id. 476.

is then suspended until they are supplied, and then revives after they are supplied.

Whether the suspension of the liability is complete, or only in reference to the wants not supplied, or, in other words, whether, if a loss happens during this suspension from any cause, the insurers would be discharged; or would be discharged only if the loss can be attributed in some degree to those wants, may not be certain. We should say, however, that the prevailing rule is, that the insurers would be liable even during the period of suspension, for a loss which cannot be attributed at all to the wants which caused the suspension. (k) In questions of this kind, as in most of those of seaworthiness, whether relating to the ship, her provisions, crew, or pilot, usage and the nature of the voyage would have much influence.

The seaworthiness required when she leaves an intermediate port, may not be so perfect as that required before she proceeds on her voyage. The only rule must be that she should be made as seaworthy as she could be made, by a reasonable use of the means within reach.

So if the insurance is to attach while the vessel is at sea, or in a distant port, the seaworthiness must be that proper to the time and place. (l)

A similar question exists as to the warranty on time policies; and it may be still involved in some uncertainty. We think, however, the rule must be, that when she sails on her first voyage, she must be or have been completely seaworthy in the ordinary sense; and thereafter kept and made seaworthy, by the reasonable use of all available means, and that the insurers are not liable for a loss caused by a want of repairs which could have been made by the proper use of such means. But if the insurance is to attach to a ship at a distance, and after a part of her voyage has been made, the seaworthiness required is not the same with that required at the beginning of the voyage, but is qualified by a reasonable consideration of the circumstances, and of the nature of the contract. (m) l

(k) Capen v. Washington Ins. Co. 12 Cush. 517; Starbuck v. New England Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 198; Chase v. Eagle Ins. Co. 6 Pick. 51; Am. Ins. Co. v. Ogden, 15 Wend. 582, 20 id. 287; Peters v.

Phoenix Ins. Co. 3 S. & R. 26; Hazard v. New England Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 218, 230.

(l) See Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227.

(m) In England, it is now settled that

1 Dudgeon v. Pembroke, 2 App. Cas. 284, decided that in a time policy the law, in the absence of special stipulations in the contract, does not imply any warranty that the