(v) Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243. In Righy v. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240, an action on the case was brought for an injury to the plaintiff, from the negligent driving of the defendant's omnibus. Pollock, C. B., in giving the opinion of the court, said: " I am disposed not quite to acquiesce to the full extent in the proposition, that a person is responsible for all the Possible consequences of his negligence, wish to guard against laying down the proposition so universally; but of this I am quite clear, that every person who does wrong, is at least responsible for all the mischievous consequences that may reasonably be expected! to result, under ordinary circumstances, from such mis-conduct" This rale appears where contracts are broken, without fraud or malice. Pothier on Obligations (by Evans), part 1, c 2, art. Ill, p. 90. See Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 410.

(vv) See ante, vol. ii. p. * 231.

(w) In Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strobh. 548, Wardlaw, J., said "Every incident will, when carefully examined, be fooud to be the result of combined cause*, and to be itself one of various causes which produce other events. Accident or design may disturb the ordinary action of causes, and produce unlooked for results. k is easy to imagine some act of trivial misconduct or slight negligence, which shall do no direct harm, but set in motion some second agent that shall move a third, and so ou until the most disastrous consequences shall ensue- The first wrongdoer, unfortunate rather than seriously blamable, cannot be made answerable for all these consequences. He shall not answer for those which the party grieved has contributed by his own blamable negligence or wrong to proJuce, or for any which such party, by proper diligence, might have prevented. (Com. Dig. Action on the Case, Ul, B 4; 11 East, 60; 2 Taunt. 314; 7 Pick. 282.) But this is a very insufficient restriction; outside of it would often be found a long chain of consequence upon consequence Only the proximate consequence shall be answered for. (2 Greenleaf's Ev. § 210, and cases there cited.) The difficulty is to determine what shall come within this designation. The next consequence only is not meant, whether we intend thereby the direct and immediate result of the injurious act, or the first consequence of that result. What either of these would be pronounced to be, would often depend upon the power of the microscope with which we should regard the affair." The general character of the adjudications upon the subject may be gathered from the following cases. In Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48, Peake, 194, a perfumer employed by the plaintiff was libelled by the defendant, and in consequence refused to appear upon the stage. It was alleged as special damage that the oratorios had been more thinly attended on that account. It was held, that the injury was too remote; and, per Lord Ken yon .- "If ______ »

1 Where a water company, organized for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants of a city with water, contracted with the city to supply the city hydrants with water, and by their neglect to do so the fire department of the city was not able to extinguish a fire occurring in the city, it was held that the water company was not liable in damages to the owner of the property burned for the neglect to supply the water. Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co 46 Conn 24. In Hobbs v. London, etc. R. Co. L. R. 10 Q. B. 111, damages were recovered for personal inconvenience suffered in consequence of being obliged to walk home on a wet night from a station other than that to which the plaintiff was ticketed; but not for illness and expenses consequent upon it, as being too remote. " To entitle a person to damages by reason of a breach of contract, the injury for which compensation is asked should be one that may be fairlv taken to have been contemplated by the parties as the possible result of the breach of contract." Per Cockburn, C. J. A. sold B carriage springs, warranting them to be of the best of steel Held, that a warranty was implied that the springs were fit for the particular purpose intended, and that A. could recover the expense of taking out those springs proving defective and inserting others in their place, such expense not being regarded as uncertain or remote. Thorns c. Dingley, 70 Me. 100. McMahon v Field, 7 Q. B. D 591, held that the depreciation in the value of horses due to catching cold from exposure in consequence of the defendant's breaking his agreement to provide a stable for them, was not too remote. A collector of telegraphic messages for transmission, to whom was entrusted a message in cipher, which he negligently omitted to send, whereby the sender lost a sum of money which he would have earned if the message had been sent, is liable for nominal damages only and not for such sum. Sanders v. Stuart, 1 C. P. D. 326. In an action for breach of a promise of marriage, where seduction was alleged, the plaintiffs loss of time and her expenses of medical and other attendance was held too remote to be estimated as damages. Giese v. Schultz, 53 Wis. 462. See Jones v. Oilman, 91 Pa. 310.

A shipper made a contract with the defendant, a carrier, for the delivery of apples to a connecting carrier at a certain time The contract was made in this way for the purpose of avoiding the danger of the apples freezing on the connecting line. Because of the negligent delay in delivery the apples were frozen while in the possession of the connecting carrier. It was held that the defendant was liable. Fox v. Boston, 4c. R R Co., 148 Mass. 220. Failure to furnish ice for the plaintiff's icebox as agreed was held to render the defendant liable for meat spoiled thereby. Hammer v. Schoenfelder, 47 Wis. 455.

In a recent English case in an action for fraudulently representing that a cow was free from infectious disease, the plaintiff this action is to be maintained, I know not to what extent the rule may he carried. For aught I can see to the contrary, it may equally be supported against every man who circulates the glass too freely, and intoxicates an actor, by which he is rendered incapable of performing his part on the stage. If any injury has happened, it was occasioned entirely by the vain fears or caprice of the actress." See also Moore a Adam, 2 Chitty, 198; Boyle v. Brandon, 13 M. & W. 738; Lincoln v. The S. U.R.R Co. 23 Wend. 425; Donnell v. Jones, 13 Ala. 490; Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 171; Denny r. New York Central R. R. Co. 13 Gray, 481. It was held, that an action for slanderous words, not in themselves actionable, could not be maintained on the ground that injury resulted from the repetition of these words by a third person. Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211; Stevens r. Hartwell, 11 Met. 542. In Vicars r. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1, the defendant asserted that his cordage had been cut by the plaintiff, in consequence of which the latter, who was hired for a time certain, was discharged from employment by his master. It has been held, that the defend-ant was not liable for damages caused by the discharge; and, per LordEllenborough: "The special damage must be the legal and natnral consequence of the words spoken, otherwise it did not sustain the declaration; and here it was an illegal consequence j a mere wrongful act of the master; for which the defendant was no more answerable, than if, in consequence of the words spoken, other persons had afterwards assembled, and seized the plaintiff and thrown him into a horse-pond, by Way of punishment for his sup posed transgression. And his lordship asked, whether any case can be mentioned of an action'of this sort, sustained by the tortious act of a third person." See also Morris v. Langdale, 2 B. & P. 284, 289 , Crain v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522; Kendall v Stone, 1 Seld. 14. But the decision in Vicars v Wilcocks has been questioned in 1 Stark. Slander, 205-207; Green r. Button, 2 Crorap. M. & R. 707; Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875, per Parke, B.; and in Keene r. Dilke, 4 Exch. 388, it was held, that, " if a sheriff wrongfully seizes goods which are afterwards taken from him by another wrong-doer, the owner of the good* may, in an action against the sheriff, recover as special damage the amount necessarily paid to the other wrongdoer, in order to get back the goods." But Alderson, B., distinguished the case from Vicars v. Wilcocks, by remarking, that " in Vicars v. Wilcocks there was no cause of action without special damage. Here it is only a question as to the amount of damages. See also Moody v. Baker, 5 Co wen, 351. In actions for a breach of warranty, this question has arisen. In Borradaile v. firunton, 8 Taunt. 535, 2 J. B. Moore, 582, the defendant sold the plaintiff a chain cable, warranted to last two years, as a substitute for a rope cable of sixteen inches. Within two years the cable broke and was lost, together with the anchor attached to it. It was held, in an action for breach of the warranty, that the value of both the cable and anchor could he recovered. In Hargous v. Ablon, 5 Hill, 472, the defendant sold cloth, warranting the invoice to be correct, it proved to be much overstated, and, in consequence, the duties on the cloth, when exported to a foreign market, were overpaid. It was held, in an action for breach of the warranty, that the excess of duties could not be recovered as damages. Cowen, J., said: " 1 he only question before us, therefore, relates to the amount of damages recoverable. The general rule would stop with awarding to the plaintiff so much only as would make good the difference between the price paid and the value which the article fell short in con* sequence of the warranty being broken. A warranty or promise concerning a thing being general, that is to say, not having reference to any purpose for which it is to be used out of the ordinary course, the law does not go beyond the general market in search Tor an indemnity against its breach. (See Blanchard r. Ely, 21 Wend. 342,347,348; Voorhees r. Earl, 2 Hill, 288, 292, a.) The exceptions will all be found to lie in the special nature of the promise or warranty itself, express or implied. 1 hus, in the case of Borradaile r. Brunton (2 J. B. Moore, 582), mentioned at the bar, and mainly relied on for the plaintiff, the warranty was, that a cable should last two years. It failed before, in consequence of which the anchor was lost. The plaintiff was allowed to re cover, not only for the cable, but the anchor; the court saying the loss of the last was consequential to the insufficiency of the cable. Where goods are purchased for a particular market, and that known to both parties, the damages have been governed by the price of that market. (Bridge v. Wain. 1 Stark. 504.) But where recovered the value of five other cows who caught the disease and died, (ww) And, in Illinois, one who had wrongfully removed a fence, was held liable not only for the injury to the fence, but for all damage to the plaintiff's crops, by cattle that had entered through the breach, (wx) And, in Minnesota, a seller of sheep which he knew to have an infectious disease, was held responsible for all the damage thereby caused, (wy)