(b) It is well settled that a widow is entitled to dower out of any improvements that may have been made by the heir previous to the assignment. Co. Litt. 32, a; 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, 246, 347; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218; Powell v. M. & B. Manuf. Co. 3 Mason, 346, 365; but not out of any imher dower in the increased value of the land, caused by the general growth and prosperity of the country, (c)

Srovements made by the alienee of her eceased husband. Gore v. Brazier, 3 Mass. 544; Ayer v. Spring, 9 id. 8, 10 id. 80; Stearns v Swift, 8 Pick. 532; Wool-dridge v. Wilkins, 3 How. Miss. 360; Humphrey v. Phinney, 2 Johns. 484; Wilson v. Oatman, 2 Blackf. 223; Ma-hony v. Yonng, 3 Dana, 588; Leggett v. Steele, 4 Wash. C. C. 305; Harney v. Frowner, 9 Ala. 901; 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, 346. If the land is impaired in value, between the time of the husband's death and the assignment by the heir, the widow is only entitled to dower out of its value at the time of the' assignment. Co. Litt. 32, a; Hale v. James, 6 Johns. Ch. 258, 260, per Chancellor Kent,- Powell o. M. & B. Man. Co. 3 Mason, 347, 368, per Story, J. But if the alienee has impaired the value of the premises, the widow seems to be entitled to dower, according to the value at the time of the alienation. Hale v. James, 6 Johns. Ch. 258.

Where an action is brought for wrongful interference with real estate, or with the occupation or enjoyment of it, and the action not only sounds in tort, but is for actual injury, there it seems quite settled, and illustrated by a variety of cases in this country, that compensation may be recovered by way of damages for all the direct and natural consequences of the injury, (d)

* If the action be brought on the common covenants of a deed, the rules in respect to compensation seem to differ, according as it is one or another of these covenants which has been broken. The covenants that the grantor is lawfully seised, and that he has good right to convey (which has been held the same with the covenant of seisin),(e) and that the premises are free from incumbrances, are broken as soon as the deed is executed, if the grantor has no seisin, or the land be incumbered. (f) And if an action is brought on the covenant that the grantor is lawfully seised, although the plaintiff may prevail, by proving the actual breach of the covenant, as that the grantor had no seisin, he will have, it is said, as damages, only the price he has paid, and interest; on the ground that he has lost no land, because if this covenant were broken when the deed was given, it follows that no land ever passed to him. (g) And, if it is made to appear that the plaintiff has lost less than the value of the land, as if he had made his title good by a purchase at a low price of an outstanding title, he will recover less, (h) If the grantor has acquired a title which will enure to the grantee by way of estoppel, the damages will be only nominal, (i) But it has been also held, that a release of land without warranty, by the grantee to a third person, will not prevent the grantee's recovery of full damages. (j)

(c) This distinction between the increase in value arising from extrinsic causes, and that arising from improvements made by the alienee of the husband, appears to have been first taken by Parsons, C. J., in Gore w. Brazier, 3 Mass. 523, 544. It was adopted in Thompson v. Marrow, 5 S. & R. 289, and, after much consideration, by Story, J., in Powell v. M. & B. Manuf. Co. 3 Mason, 347, 365, and is sanctioned by Chancellor Kent, 4 Kent, Com. 68. See also Shirtz p. Shirts, 5 Watts. 255, Dnnseth p. The Bank of U. S. 6 Ohio, 76.' But it has been held otherwise in Tod v. Baylor, 4 Leigh, 498, and in New York, under a statute. Walker r. Schuyler, 10 Wend. 480; Humphrey v. Phinuey, 2 Johns. 484; Dorchester r Coventry, II Johns. 510; Shaw p. White, 13 Johns. 179. See Rannels p. Washington Univ. 96 Mo. 226.

(d) The general principles, in regard to the immediate and remote consequences of an unlawful act, apply to this class of cases. See ante, p. * 181, note (w). In White r. Moseley, 8 Pick. 356, in an action of trespass auare clausum fregit, for entering the plaintiff's close and destroying a mill-dam. the plaintiff recovered for " die interruption to the use of the mill, and the diminution of the plaintiff's profits on that account.' See Dickinson v. Boyle, 17 Pick. 78. In Barnum v. Van-dusen, 16 Conn. 200, where the defendant's sheep entered upon the plaintiff's land, and communicated an infectious disease to his sheep, it was held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, in an action of trespass, for the loss of the sheep, and for the trouble and expense in taking care of them. See Anderson p. Buckton, Stra. 192. In Johnson v. Courts, 3 Harris & McH. 510, where the defendant entered upon the plaintiffs land and with clubs drove away eight negroes, it was held, in action of trespass ouare clausum fregit, that the plaintiff could recover for injuries to his crops, consequent upon the driving away of his negroes. In an action for entering upon the plaintiff's close, damages may be recovered for debauching the plaintiffs daughter and servant. See Bennett p. Allcott, 2 T. R. 166; Ream p. Rank, 3 8. & R. 215. See Watson p. Pittsburg & Cleveland R. R. Co. 37 Pa. 469, as to liability of a railroad company for consequential damages to land bv the construction of its road, where the charter makes no provision.

(e) Willard p. Twitchell, 1 N. H. 177, 498; Rickert p. Snyder, 9 Wend. 416,421. But the covenants are not in all respects svnonymous, as a party may have a good right to convey, and yet not be seised of a legal estate. Rawle on Covenants for Title, 127.

(f) See ante, vol. 1. p. * 231.

The covenants that the grantee shall have quiet enjoyment, and that the grantor will warrant and defend against all lawful * claims, are, in general, broken only by actual ouster, (k) and then such damages will be recovered, according to the rule laid down in one of the earliest cases on this subject, as shall give to the injured party full and adequate compensation. (I)