See Sugd. Law of Prop. 74 (in Law Lib. vol. 65), also ante, p. * 364, n. 1.

(a) Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444; Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. 182. Marshall, C. J., Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 158-161; Watts p. Waddle, 6 Pet 389; Watkins v. Hol man, 16 Pet. 25; White v. White, 7 Gill & J. 208; Stansbury v. Fringer, 11 id. 149. Where the defendant was the infant daughter and heir of the vendor, domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court,' though the land was situated in another State, Walworth, Ch., granted a decree which directed a conveyance by the infant, when she arrived at proper age, to enable her to transfer the legal title according to the law of the State where the land was; and authorized the plaintiff meanwhile, to take and retain possession of the land, if he could obtain possession thereof without suit; and a perpetual injunction was granted, restraining the defendant from disturbing the complainant in such possession, or from doing any act whereby the title should be transferred to any other person, or in any way impaired or incumbered. Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, 280.

(b) Hull v Peer, 27 111. 312.

(c) As to the distinction between the case where the apparent defect in the vendor's title is such an one as may be expected to be removed upon a reference consistently with the equity practice; and that where the court will not allow the plaintiff to make up a case in this way, but will only dismiss his bill without prejudice to a new bill, see Clay r. Rnfford, 5 De G. & S. 768, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 350.

(d) The right of the purchaser, in a

Certainly, no court would compel a party to take and pay for an estate of which only a substantially imperfect title could be .given, (e)1 It is, however, quite impossible to say, by a definite rule or standard, how good a title must be to satisfy a court of equity. (f)

On the one hand no reasonable court would require that a title should be so technically perfect, that no acute conveyancer could find a recondite and merely formal objection upon which the possibility of a doubt might rest, (g)2 In one sense, this would be an imperfection. But it would not be such an imperfection as should induce a court to refuse a decree for performance. On the other hand, if the character of the title were * doubtably be overthrown, this would not be good title enough; for the court would have no right to say that their conclusion or their opinion would bind the whole world, and prevent all assault upon the title. (h)1

« f ul, although the court were able to come to the conclusion that, on the whole, a title could be made that would not probrait against him for specific performance, to have the vendor's title proved, may be waived by acts in pais. As to what acts will be sufficient evidence of a waiver, see Simpson v. Sadd, 4 De 6., M. & G. 665,31 Eng. L. & Eq. 885; Fleetwood v. Green, 15 Ves. 594. Bat it has been held, that a vendor cannot have the benefit of such waiver, unless the fact of waiver is expressly put in issue in the bill; it is not sufficient that facts are stated upon the bill amounting to evidence of waiver, but the fact of waiver must be directly alleged. Clive v. Beanmount, 1 De G. & S. 397; Gaston v. Frank una, 2 id. 561. If a purchaser apply for specific performance, and in his bill insist that the defendant cannot make a good title, the court cannot pass upon the title; for the plaintiff, by his own allegation of the defendant's want of title, shows that there cannot be that degree of specific performance which he seeks. Nicloson v'. Wordsworth, 2 Swanst. 365. " When, on a bill by a vendee for specific performance, it appears that the defendant cannot make a good title, there is no further question in the cause than who is to pay the costs." Lord Eldon, 2 Swanst. 369. As to the costs of an issue ordered at the instance of the purchaser, and finally decided in favor of the vendor, see Grove v. Bastard, 1 De G., M. & G. 69.

(e) Blatchford v. Kirkpatrick, 6 Beav. 232. Even after the defendant has waived an inquiry into the title, if it come out collaterally that it is imperfect, the court will not compel him to accept it. Warren v. Richardson, Younge, 1. And see Deverell v. Bolton, 18 Ves. 514, where Lord Eldon held, that an approval of the title by counsel of the vendee, upon an abstract being laid before him, could not be taken as a conclusive waiver of reasonable objections to the title. But if the vendor stipulate expressly to convey only such title as he has, the vendee cannot take the objection that it is defective. Freme v. Wright, 4 Madd. 364. And see Ten Broeck v. Livingston, 1 Johns. Ch. 357; Winne v. Reynolds, 6 Paige, 407; McKay v. Carrington 1 McLean, 50; Nicol v. Carr, 35 Pa. 381; Young v. Rath-bone, 1 Green, 224; Freely v. Barnhart, 51 Pa. 279.

(f) But the vendor must show a title, not a covenant for title; and this whether the interest contracted for be freehold or leasehold. Fildes v. Hooker, 2 Meriv. 424; Purvis v. Rayer, 9 Price, 488, where the point was first settled that the vendor of a leasehold estate must show the title of his lessor. And see Deverell v. Bolton, 18 Ves. 505.

(g) That the land is subject to a reservation of mines and minerals and water privileges, none of which, in point of fact, the land contains, has been held to constitute no valid ground of objection to the title. Winne v. Reynolds, 6 Paige, 407.

1 A purchaser of land cannot be compelled to take it where the seller has only a bond for a title, with a lien for unpaid purchase-money outstanding. Christian v. Clark, 10 Lea, 630. - K.

2 The possible existence of unrecorded deeds is not such a defect in a title as should lead a court of equity to deny specific performance of a contract for the sale of land if there is no evidence of such deeds. Dow v. Whitney, 147 Mass. 1.

We know not what better we can say, than that every' purchaser of land has a right to demand a title which shall put him in all reasonable security, and which shall protect him from anxiety, lest annoying if not successful suits be brought against him, and possibly take from him or his representatives land upon which money was invested. He should have a title which shall enable him not only to hold his land, but to hold it in peace; and, if he wishes to sell it, to be reasonably sure that no flaw or doubt will come up to disturb its marketable value, (i)2