(l) Blanchard v. Lilley, 9 East, 497; Philips v. Knightley, 1 Barnard. 468; Linsey v. Ashton, Godb. 255; Ingram v. Webb, 1 Rolle, 362. Or that plaintiff should enter a retraxit. 1 Roll. Abr. tit. Arb. (F.) pl. 7, (I.) pl. 18. Or that no suit should be brought by one party against the other on a certain bond. 1 Roll. Abr. tit. Arb. (0.) pl. 7. Or that all suits then pending between the parties should cease. Squire v. Grevell, 6 Mod. 33, Ld. Raym. 961,1 Salk. 74. Or that a chancery suit should be dismissed. Knight v. Burton, 6 Mod. 232, 1 Salk. 75. See Purdy v. Delavan, 1 Caines, 804, for an able statement of the law upon this point by Mr. Justice Kent.

(m) Collet v. Podwell, 2 Keble, 670; Kockill v. Witherell, 2 Keble, 838; 1 Roll. Abr. tit. Arb. (H.) pl. 8; Furser v. Prowd, Cro. Jac. 428. An award that one party should pay the other a particular debt, in case it was not collected from another source, is valid. Williams v. Williams, 11 Smedes & M. 393.

(n) Archer v. Williamson, 2 Harris & G. 62 ; Levezey v. Gorgas, 4 Dall. 71; Lingood v. Eade, 2 Atk. 501; Emery v. Emery, Cro. Eliz. 726; Manser v. Heaver, 3 B. & Ad. 295; Tandy v. Tandy, 9 Dowl. P. C. 1044, 5 Jur. 726. So an award that one party should put certain premises in good repair, to the satisfaction of a third party, has been held bad in toto. Tomlin v. Mayor, etc. of Fordwich, 5 A. & E. 147. So an award that A should beg B's pardon, in such form as B should appoint, is an improper delegation of authority. Glover v. Barrie, 1 Salk. 71, 2 Lutw. 1597.

(o) See Emery v. Wase, 5 Ves. 846; Anderson v. Wallace, 3 Clark & F. 26; Sharp v. Nowell, 6 C. B. 253; Hopcraft v. Hickman, 2 Simons & S. 130; Scale v. Fothergill, 8 Beav. 361; Church v. Roper, 1 Ch. Rep. 140; Lingood v. Eade, 2 Atk. 501; Cater v. Startute, Styles, 217 ; Furnis v. Hallom, Barnes, 166; Winter v. Garlick, 1 Salk. 75, 6 Mod. 195; Worral v. Akworth, 2 Keble, 331; Hunter v. Bennison, Hardres, 43; Galloway v. Webb, Hardin, 818. There is no impropriety in arbitrators employing an attorney to prepare their award. Nor is their necessarily any impropriety in employing an attorney of one of the parties for that purpose. Behren v. Bremer, C. B. 1864, 80 Eng L. & Eq. 490. But see Bayne v. Morris, 1 Wallace, 97.

* An award may open to any or all of these objections in part, without being necessarily void in the whole. So much of it as is thus faulty, is void; but if this can be severed distinctly from the residue, leaving a substantial, definite, and unobjectionable award behind, this may be done, and the award then will take effect. (p) It is therefore void in the whole because bad in part, only where this part cannot be severed from the residue, or where, if it be severed and amended, leaving the residue in force, one of the parties will be held to an obligation imposed upon him, but deprived of the advantage or recompense which it was intended that he should have. (q)

Generally, in the construction of awards, they are favored and enforced, wherever this can properly be done. If the intention of the arbitrators can be ascertained from the award with reasonable certainty, and this intention is open to no objection, a very liberal construction will be allowed as to form, or, rather, a very liberal indulgence as to matters of form and expression. (r)

If it be necessary to make a presumption on the one side or the other, to give full force and significance to an award, the * court will incline to make that presumption which gives effect to the award, rather than one which avoids it. (s)

(p) This is a perfectly well-settled doctrine in the law of arbitrament and award, - too well settled to need the citation of authorities. A few instances of the application of the principle are given by way of illustration. Thus, in an award that defendant should pay plaintiff a certain sum, and also the costs of arbitration, where the arbitrator had no power to award coats, that part is bad, but the rest is valid. Candler v. Fuller, Willes, 62; Fox v. Smith, 2 Wilson, 267; Addison v. Gray, 2 Wilson, 203; Gordon v. Tucker, 6 Greenl. 247. So, in an award directing a lease for life to one party, and a remainder over in fee to a third person, the last part was rejected, and the first supported. Bretton v. Prat, Cro. Eliz. 758. And so, where part of the sum awarded to one party was founded upon a claim illegal in its nature, the other portion being separable. Aubert v. Maze, 2 B. & P. 371. So, if an award directs one party to deliver up a deed not in his possession, or pay a sum of money, the last is good and the first bad, and the award is not invalid. Lee v. Elkins, 12 Mod. 585; Simmonds v. Swaine, 1 Taunt 549; and see Wharton v. King, 2 B. & Ad. 528; Thornton v. Carson, 7

Cranch, 596; Skillings v. Coolidge, 14 Mass. 43. See also Ebert v. Ebert, 6 Md. Ch. 353.

(q) If the void part of the award was apparently intended by the arbitrators as the consideration, in whole or in part, of that portion which is good, or if the void part manifestly affected the judgment of the arbitrators, in respect to other matters, the whole is clearly void. See Pope v. Brett, 2 Saund. 202, where part was void for uncertainty; Winch v. Sanders, Cro. Jac. 584, where part was void because the arbitrator had reserved to himself a future authority. See further Storke v. De Smeth, Willes, 66; Johnson v. Wilson, Willes, 248; Clement v. Durgin, 1 Greenl. 300.

(r) Spear v. Hooper, 22 Pick. 144; Rixford v. Nye, 30 Vt. 132; Kendrick v. Turbell, 26 id. 416; Ebert v. Ebert, 5 Md. Ch. 853. It is said in Tomlinson v. Hammond, that a party cannot complain of an award which was designed for his benefit, though it may be wanting in definiteness or certainty. 8 Iowa, 40.

(s) Armit v. Breame, 2 Ld. Raym. 1076; Booth v. Garnett, 2 Stra. 1082; Rose v. Spark, Aleyn, 51.

Thus, it has been laid down, almost as a rule, and certainly as a maxim,* that where the words of an award extend beyond those of the submission, it shall be understood that they are mere surplusage, because there is nothing between the parties more than was submitted; (t) and if the words of the award be less comprehensive than those of the submission, it shall be understood that what is omitted was not controverted, unless, in either case, the contrary is expressly shown. (u) And if the submission be in the most general terms, and the award equally so, covering "all demands and questions," etc., between the parties, yet either party may show that a particular demand either did not exist, or was not known to exist, when the submission was entered into, or that it was not brought before the notice of the arbitrators, or considered by them. (v) And equity will correct a mistake, if the facts before the court permit it. (vv) And generally an award will not be set aside for defects curable by amendment. (vw)