1 Where all the items of an open unliquidated account are on one side, the last item which is alone within the statute of limitations, will not take the whole out of the statute. Phelps v. Hubbard, 59 111 79. Raux v. Brand, 90 N. Y. 309, decided that if payments of cash are made to be generally applied to a mutual open account, the statute of limitations has no application. Where a balance has been struck on a mutual account, it was held that the failure to sue for the real balance for more than six years after the date of an item, omitted by mistake, would bar recovery. Lancey v. "Maine Central R. Co. 72 Me. 34.- K.

* decisions are inconsistent with the views which now prevail in regard to new promises and acknowledgments; and we doubt * whether they would be followed in any jurisdiction where the question is still open.1 consequence, any admission that the debt was unpaid rebutted the presumptiou, and took the case out of the statute. Granting the premises, the conclusion followed well enough. But even upon that view of the statute, the position is wholly untenable, that an item of credit constitutes an admission of another pre-existing debt upon the other side, and an admission, moreover, that it has not been paid. Aside from the statute of limitations, such doctrine of admission would receive no countenance whatever. No jurist would ever argue, that because he had proved one. item of account, it was any evidence from which a jury might infer and find other distinct and independent items. Still less would it be contended, that an account, proved by the plaintiff, was an admission which furnished evidence in favor of another account of independent items, offered by the defendant, or that it was of any weight to prove the defendant's account, even in connection with other evidence. And if it furnishes no evidence of admission, in such case, it can raise no fair admission as against the statute. No admission, then, of any account upon the other side, can be fairly inferred from the act of making a charge on account against any individual. It is no admission of an unsettled account, beyond the very charge itself. It does not imply that the party giving the credit has any other item of claim against the party charged. Still less does it imply that the party against whom the charge is made, has an account to balance it, in whole or in part. It is of itself a distinct and independent transaction; and it might with just as much propriety be said, that a party making a charge of an item of account, thereby admits that it is paid, in whole or in part, as to say that he thereby admits the existence of an unsettled account against himself. Nay, it would be safer for the individual to hold him, as making such an admission which could extend no further than in discharge of the demand which constituted the acknowledgment; whereas, holding the admission to extend to an unsettled account against himself, may subject him, in connection with fabricated evidence, or from a loss of vouchers or testimony, to the payment of pretended claims upon the other side, of an amount vastly beyond the small item, by the charge of which he has drawn down such consequences upon himself. We cannot deem it any objection to our reasoning upon this subject, that there may be cases where an account upon one side may be recovered, while one upon the other side of older date is barred. If it be so it will arise from the laches of the party. If articles upon one side are delivered in payment or a prior existing account upon the other, the delivery raises no cause of action. If not delivered in payment, each account is distinct and independent, as much so as promissory notes held upon the one side and the other; and there is as much reason why a party should not avail himself of an account, which is barred by the statute, in discharge of another account due from him, and to which he has no other defence, as there is that he should not avail himself of a promissory note which is barred, in the same way, or that he should not recover that, or any other demand which is barred, in an independent suit upon the demand itself. We have endeavored to examine this subject with all the care and attention which the impor1 It seems well settled that in the case of a mutual running account the statutory period is computed from the date of the last item. Ware v Manning, 86 Ala. 238; Kutz v. Fleischer, 67 Cal. 93; Gunn v. Gunn, 74 Ga. 555; Chambers v Chambers, 78 Ind. 400; Kelly v Jackson, 58 la. 629; Waffle p. Short, 25 Kan. 503; Green v. Disbrow, 79 N. Y. 1; Mauney v. Coit, 86 N. C. 463; Hannan v. Engelmann, 49 Wis. 278. In Maine it has been held that this rule does not apply when the last item of the account is more than six years after the next preceding item. Perry v. Chesley, 77 Me. 393.

The account must be mutual, that is consisting of items on both sides. Kutz v. Fleischer, 67 Cal. 93; Parker v. Schwartz, 136 Mass. 30; Mattern v. McDivitt, 113 Pa. 402; Chapman v Goodrich, 55 Vt. 354; Roots v Mason City, etc. Co. 27 W. Va. 483, 491; Dunn v. Fleming, 73 Wis. 545. And payments made on account do not satisfy this requirement. Perrill v. Nichols, 89 Ind. 444; Adams v. Carroll, 85 Pa. 209, and cases above cited.