(n) Thus, in Dickinson v. Hatfield, 1 Moody & R. 141, Lord Tenterden ruled that a promise to pay " the balance due, is sufficient to take a case out of the statute of limitations, although no mention is made of the amount of the balance." And see, to the same effect, Lechmere v. Fletcher, 1 Cromp. & M. 623, Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. 883; Waller v. Lacy, 1 Man. & G. 54; Gardner v. M'Mahon, 3 Q. B. 561; Williams v. Griffith, 3 Exch. 335; Hazlebaker v. Reeves, 12 Pa. 264; Davis v. Steiner, 14 id. 275; Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 21 Me. 433.

(o) Cheslvn v. Dalby, 4 Young ft G. 238; Spong v. Wright, 9 M. & W. 629; Barnard v. Bartholomew, 22 Pick. 291. See also cases cited in preceding note. But see Kittredge v. Brown, 9 N. H. 377.

(p) Colledge v. Horn, 3 Bing. 119; Gardner v. M Mahou, 3 Q B. 561. See Collis v. Stack, 1H.&N. 605.

(q) Moore v. Hyman, 13 Ired. 272} Shaw v. Allen, 1 Bus bee, 58; Mc Bride v. Gray, id. 420; Robbins v. Farley, 2 Strobh. 348; Harbold v. Kuntz, 16 Pa. 210, Shit-ler v. Bremer, 23 id. 413, Zacharias v. Zacharias, id. 452, Buckingham v. Smith, 23 Conn 453.

(r) Barnard v. Bartholomew, 22 Pick. 291; Dawson v. King. 20 Md. 442.

(s) Id.; Stafford v Bryan, 3 Wend. 532; Arey v. Stephenson, 11 Ired. 86; Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21; Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cowen, 674; Suter v. Sheeler, 22 Pa. 308. But if only one debt is shown to exist, the acknowledgment will be presumed to refer to that. Woodbridge v Allen, 12 Met. 470, Guy v Tarns, 6 Gill, 82.

(t) Bloodgood v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. 427; Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch 266; Car-rington v. Manning, 13 Ala. 611; Braxton v. Wood, 4 Gratt. 25; Murray v Mechanics' Bank, 4 Edw. Ch. 567; Walker v. Campbell, 1 Hawks, 304; Freake v Cranefeldt, 3 Mylne & C. 499; Evans v. Tweedy, 1 Beav. 55.

(u) Rackham v. Marriott, 1 H. & N. 234; Sidwell v. Mason, 2 H. & N. 306.

1 A promise in the following language has been held too indefinite to remove the bar of the statute. " If you need or want more, call for it without hesitation and you shall have it." Chapman v Barnes, 93 Ala. 433 And it was said by the court in Miller v. Baschore, 83 Pa. 356, 358. "There most be a clear and definite acknowledgment of the debt, a specification of the amount due, or a reference to something by which such amount

* As the acknowledgment must be such as to be equivalent to a promise, if it be in other respects full and complete, but is expressly guarded and qualified by the maker so that it negatives a promise, or cannot be construed into a promise, it is not sufficient, (v)l As if the debtor says, "I know that I owe the money, but I have a legal defence, and will not pay it,' this is not enough to prevent the operation of the statute; (w) and therefore we say that the acknowledgment must be not only of the debt, but of a legal liability to pay the debt. It is true that the naked acknowledgment of the debt implies, and, as it were, contains, an acknowledgment of legal liability; but there is no room for this implication, where this liability is denied, and excluded; because the statute is not one of presumption, but of repose.2 Therefore, also, the acknowledgment may be condi(v) In Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 609, Lord Tenterden said: "Upon a general acknowledgment, where nothing is said to prevent it, a general promise to pay may and ought to be implied; but where the party guards his acknowledgment, and accompanies it with an express declaration to prevent any such implication, why shall not the rule 'expressum facit cessare taciturn ' apply ?" And see Mitchell r. Sell-man, 5 Md 376, and the cases cited ante, p * 65, n. (f.)

(w) A'Court v Cross, 3 Bing. 329. In this case the defendant, being arrested on a debt more than six years old, said: "I know that I owe the money, but the bill I gave is on a threepenny receipt stamp, and I will never pay it; " and this was held not such an acknowledgment as would revive the debt against a plea of the statute of limitations. And Best,

C. J., said: "There are many cases from which it may be collected, that if there be anything said at the time of the acknowledgment to repel the inference of a promise, the acknowledgment will not take a case out of the statute of limitations." So in Danforth v. Culver, 11 Johns. 146, which was an action on a promissory note, to which the statute of limitations was pleaded, it appeared, that within a year of the trial, and after the commencement of the suit, the defend ant, on being shown the note, admitted that he had executed it, but said it was outlawed, and that he meant to avail himself of the statute of limitations, and this was held not to be sufficient evidence of a promise to pay within six years. And see Douglass v. Elkius, 8 Foster, 26; Foster v. Smith, 52 Conn. 449, 451 can be definitely and certainly ascertained, and an unequivocal promise to pay. See also Fletcher v. Gillan, 62 Miss. 8; Landis v. Roth, 109 Pa. 624; Wells r. Wilson, 140 Pa, 645. But in Schmidt v. Pfau, 114 111. 494, 504, the words "we owe yon for three years' salary '* were held sufficient though the amount of the salary had never been determined.

1 A promise in a letter, "As soon as we can get our affairs arranged we will see you are paid," Chasemore v. Turner, L R 10 Q. B. 500; a request in a letter, " I shall be obliged to you to send in your account," and " I again beg of yon to send in your account," Quincey v. Sharpe, 1 Ex. D. 72; and a promise, "If you will call in two weeks 1 will pay you something on the debt, I cannot tell how much," Blakeman v. Fonda, 41 Conn 561, have each been held a sufficient acknowledgment to take the case out of statute of limitations. But a promise in a letter, "I shall be glad, as soon as my position becomes somewhat better, to begin again and continue with my instalments," Meyerhoff v. Froehlich, 3 C. P. D. 333: 4 C. P. D. 63; and "I think' I see my way clear to pay you," "I am in hopes another two years will enable me from my present income to clear off all pressing debts," "Rest assured that not a day of pecuniary freedom will pass over my head without your hearing from me," Pierce v. Seymour, 52 Wis. 272, have been held insufficient - K.