(mm) It was also held in a recent case in New York. Ingallsbee v. Wood, 88 N. Y. 677.

(n) Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866; s. c. nom. York v. Grindstone, 1 Salk.888.

(o) In the case of Gelley v. Clerk, Cro. J. 188, it appeared that the plaintiff, being a guest at the house of the defendant, who was an innkeeper at Uxbridge, went from thence to London, and left his goods with the defendant, saying that he would return within two or three days. He returned, accordingly, within the three days, and in the mean time his goods had been stolen. Upon these facts, Foster, Serjeant, for the plaintiff, contended that the innkeeper should be charged. "For when the plaintiff was a guest, and left his goods for so short a time, and promised to return so soon, and returned accordingly, he is all that time accounted as a guest, and shall be said to be a guest, to charge the defendant as an innkeeper, according to the custom of the realm. And it was adjudged in the case of Sir Edwyn Sands, where he came to an inn and lodged, and went out thereof in the morning and left his cloak-bag there, intending to return at night, and at night returned accordingly, and in the interim his cloak-bag was stolen, that he might have his remedy by an action grounded upon the common custom: so here," etc. Sed non allocatur; for per Williams, J.: "If one comes to an inn and leaves his goods and horses, and goes into the town, and after returns, and in the interim his goods are stolen, no doubt but he is a guest, and shall have remedy, and so was Sir Edwyn Sands's case; for his absence in part of the day is not material, but he is always reputed as a guest. So where one leaves his horse at an inn, to stand there by agreement at livery, although neither himself nor any of his servants lodge there, he is reputed a guest for that purpose, and the innkeeper hath a valuable consideration; and if that horse be stolen, he is chargeable with an action upon the custom of the realm. But, as in the case at the bar, where he leaves goods to keep, whereof the defendant is not to have any benefit, and goes from thence for two or three days, although he saith he will return, yet he is at his liberty, and therefore he is not a guest during that time." The distinctions taken in this case have been recognized substantially in several subsequent cases. See Grinnell v. Cook, 8 Hill (N. T.),486; McDonald v. Edgerton, 6 Barb. 560; Towson 9. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. & J. 47. See, however, ante, p. * 163, note (m), that what Williams, J., says in regard to leaving a horse at an inn, must be confined to those cases where the owner is himself a guest at the time of so leaving the horse. In Wintermute v. Clarke, 6 Sandf. 242, the plaintiff's son went to the tavern of the defendant with his baggage, which he left there. The next morning he paid his bill for his lodging, leaving, as was contended, his trunk at the inn. Upon the testimony the judge charged the jury, that if they believed the trunk had been taken away by any other person than the plaintiff's son, even after the plaintiff had paid his bill, the defendant was liable. The verdict of the Jury for the plaintiff was set aside, and a new trial granted, on the ground that after a guest pays his bill, and leaves the house, it is at his own peril that he leaves his property behind him, and that the inn

Innkeepers are liable only for goods brought within the inn, or otherwise placed distinctly within their custody, in some customary and reasonable way. (p ) Where a horse or carriage is put in an open shed, or the horse put for the night into a pasture by the innkeeper, without the consent of the owner, he is still liable; (q) but it is otherwise if it is done with the owner's consent, or by his direction; (r) and where this is usually done, and the owner knows the custom, and gives no particular direction, it might be presumed that he consented, and took the risk upon himself. (s) keeper has a right to believe that he takes it with him, and is therefore no longer responsible for it, unless it is specially committed to his charge, and then only as an ordinary bailee. See also McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 816, n.

(p) Simon v. Miller, 7 La. An. 360; Albin v. Presby, 8 N. H. 408, cited post, note (s). But in Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns. 175, where a sleigh loaded with bags of wheat and barley, was put by the guest into an outhouse appurtenant to the inn, where loads of that description were usually received, and the grain was stolen during the night, the innkeeper was held responsible for the loss, the court holding that the grain was infra hospitium.

(q) Calye's case, 8 Rep. 32; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend. 282; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280. And where an innkeeper on the day of a fair, upon being asked by a traveller, then driving a gig of which he was owner, "whether he had room for the horse?" put the horse into the stable of the inn, received the traveller with some goods into the inn, and placed the gig in the open street without the inn-yard, where he was accustomed to place the carriages of his guests on fair days; and the gig was stolen from thence; the court held, that the innkeeper was answerable. Jones v. Tyler, 1 A. & £. 522; s. c. 8 Nev. ft M. 576.

(r) Calye's case, 8 Rep. 82. In Haw-ley v. Smith, 25 Wend. 642, it appeared that the defendant was an innkeeper, and that the plaintiff stopped at his house with a drove of 700 sheep, which, with his knowledge, were turned out to pasture. On the following day several of the sheep died, and others sickened, in consequence of having eaten laurel, which they found in the pasture. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff, upon these facts, under the direction of the Judge, the Supreme Court granted a new trial for a misdirection. And Nelson, C. J., said: "I am of opinion this case falls within an exception laid down in Calye's case, 8 Rep. 82, to the general rule in respect to the liability of an innkeeper, which has been followed ever since. It was there resolved, that if the guest deliver his horse to the hostler, and request that he be put to pasture, which is accordingly done, and the horse is stolen, the innkeeper is not responsible, not being, in the common-law sense of the term, infra hospitium. He is not to be regarded as an insurer of goods without the inn, that is for goods not within the curtilage. The sheep were put to pasture under the direction of the guest, which fact should have been regarded by the learned judge as bringing the case within the above exception. It would then have turned upon the question of negligence, which should have been put to the jury upon the facts disclosed."