(x) See ante, p. * 125, note (b).

(y) Johnson v. The Schooner McDon-ough, Gilpin, 101; Lewis, ex parte, 2 Gal-lison, 488.

(z) Rex v. Humphrey, 1 McClel. & Y. 173.

(a) 1 Ld. Raym. 646 ; s. c. 12 Mod. 472.

(b) Whitfield v. Le Despencer, Cowp. 754; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts, 453; Supervisors of Albany Co. v. Dorr, 25 Wend. 440, per Nelson, C. J.; Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 682; Martin v. The Mayor, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 545, per Cowen, J. See also Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch, 242. And in Cornwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio, 523, the same rule was applied to a mail contractor. Therefore, where money transmitted by mail was lost by the carelessness of the contractors' agents who carried the mail, the court held, that the contractors were not liable. The case of Hutchins v. Brackett,2 Foster (N.H.), 252, is to the same effect.

1 Keenan v. Southworth, 110 Mass. 474.

the postmaster-general, this should make him responsible; and if it could be shown that the servant was appointed or retained from unworthy motives after such knowledge, the postmaster-general ought certainly to be held liable. (c) His deputies are not liable except for loss caused by their own fault or negligence; but for this it is clear that they are liable. (d) * This negligence may be in appointing unfit persons to subordinate offices, or in not using due precautions to secure their good conduct; for each deputy postmaster is bound to exercise due care in such appointments, and due watchfulness over the conduct of his subordinates. (e) And it would seem that the postmaster-general should be held to some measure of the same obligation.

The persons employed as deputies, or in the post-offices, are answerable for any injury sustained by their misconduct or neglect of duty. This has been applied to their refusal to deliver a newspaper. (f)

Innkeepers. An inn has been judicially defined as "a house where the traveller is furnished with every thing which he has occasion for whilst upon his way." (g) There need not be a sign to make it an inn. (h) But a mere coffee-house, (i) or eating-room, or boarding-house, (j ) is not an inn. (k)

(c) See the authorities cited infra, note (e).

(d) Whitfield v. Le Despencer, Cowp. 754; Rowning v. Goodchild, 3 Wils 443; Maxwell v. Mcllvoy, 2 Bibb, 211; Christy v. Smith, 23 Vt. 663. So also Bolan v. Williamson, 2 Bay, 651; s. c. 1 Brevard, 181.

(e) Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts, 453; Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632; Christy v. Smith, 23 Vt. 663. And in Bishop v. Williamson, 2 Fairf. 495, this rule was applied to a case where a deputy postmaster had employed an assistant without having an oath administered to him, as was required by the statute of the United States. Accordingly, where such assistant wrongfully refused to deliver a letter to the plaintiff, his employer was held liable in damages. See also Bolan v. Williamson, 1 Brevard, 181.

(f) Teal v. Felton, 3 Barb. 512; s. c. 1 Comst. 537; s. c. 12 How. 284. See also Strong v. Campbell, 11 Barb. 136.

(g) Per Bayley, J., in Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Ald. 283, 286.

(h) Bac. Abr. tit. Inns and Innkeepers

(B). "A sign is not essential to an inn, but is an evidence of it." Per Holt, C. J., in Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 254.

(i) Doe v. Laming, 4 Camp. 78.

(j) This was directly held by Erie, J., in Dansey v. Richardson, 20 Law Times, 213, 25 E. L. & E. 76, 3 E. & B. 144.

(k) So one who entertains strangers occasionally, although he receives compensation for it, is not an innkeeper, State v. Mathews, 2 Dev. & B. 424; Lyon v. Smith, 1 Morris (la.), 184. So it has been held, that a housekeeper at Tun-bridge or Epsom, or other watering-place, who lets lodgings, and furnishes meat and drink, and provides stable-room for the company who resort there for health or pleasure, is not an innkeeper. Park-house v. Forster, 5 Mod. 427; s. c. nom, Parkhurst v. Foster, Carth. 417; s. c. 1 Salk. 387. And Lord Holt said, the case was so plain that there was no occasion for giving reasons. See also Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296. But in Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Ald. 283, it was held, that a house of public entertainment in London, where beds, provisions, etc., were furnished for all persons paying for the

Public policy imposes upon an innkeeper a severe liability. The later, and, on the whole, prevailing authorities, make him an insurer of the property committed to his care, against every thing but the act of God, or the public enemy, or the neglect or fraud of the owner of the property. (l) 1 There seems to be some disposition, however, to regard this rule of law as too severe, and as needing modification. In two recent and well-considered cases a different rule was adopted. (ll) In a same, but which was merely called a tavern and coffee-house, and was not frequented by stage-coaches and wagons from the country, and which had no stables belonging to it, was to be considered as an inn, and the owner was subject to the liabilities of innkeepers, and had a lien on the goods of his guests for the payment of his bill, and that too even where the guest did not appear to have been a traveller, but one who had previously resided in furnished lodgings in London. In Wintermute v. Clarke, 6 Sandf. 247, the court say, that in order to charge a party as an innkeeper it is not necessary to prove that it was only for the reception of travellers that his house was kept open, it being sufficient to prove that all who came were received as guests without any previous agreement as to the time or terms of their stay. A public house of entertainment for all who choose to visit it is the true definition of an inn. See Krohn v. 8weeny, 2 Daly, 200.

(l) Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280, per Wilde, J.; Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. C. 9, per Bayley, J.; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend. 282, per Nelson, C. J.; Grin-nell v. Cook, 8 Hill (N. Y.), 486, per Bron-son, J.; Manning v. Wells, 9 Humph. 746; Thickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. 685; Ma-teer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221; Hulett v. Swift, 42 Barb. 230; Burrows v. Trieber, 21 Md. 820; Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478. This last was an action on the case against the defendant, who was an innkeeper, for an injury to the plaintiff's horse, while at the defendant's stable. The horse was placed at the stable in the evening, and the next morning one of his hind legs was found to have been broken above the gambrel joint The evidence tended to show that he was treated with care and faithfulness; that he was placed in a safe and suitable stall, with sufficient and suitable bedding; and that the injury happened without the fault of any one. The learned judge, before whom the cause was tried, instructed the jury, that the rule of law applicable to common carriers was not applicable to innholders; that the law, in case of injury to goods or property while in the custody of the innkeeper, presumed it to have happened through his negligence or fault, and would hold him responsible for it, unless he could prove that he was guilty of no fault; and that if the defendant had proved that he was not in fault, the action could not be maintained. The case was carried up to the Supreme Court on exception to these instructions, and that court, after an elaborate examination of the authorities, held the instructions to be incorrect; and declared the rule of law to be that an innkeeper is bound to keep the goods and chattels of his guests so that they shall be actually safe; inevitable accidents, the acts of public enemies, the owners of the goods and their servants, excepted; and that proof that there was no negligence in the innkeeper or his servants, was not sufficient for his immunity.