(l) See ante, p. * 667, n. (e). This intention, of course, is to be ascertained, in all cases, except that of latent ambiguity proper, by a development of the circumstances under which the instrument was made. It cannot be ascertained by bringing forward proof of declarations or conversations which took place at the time the instrument was made, or before, or afterwards. After considerable confusion, caused by some anomalous early cases, the law upon this point, especially in reference to wills, is clearly settled in England. In Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wms. 140, it was permitted to be shown that Gertrude Yardley was the person intended to be designated by a testator by the name of Catharine Earnley [see the case stated ante, p. * 660, n. (d).] In Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 671, there was a devise as follows: "Item. I devise to my granddaughter, Mary Thomas, of Llechloyd in Merthyr parish," etc. The testator had a granddaughter of the name of Elinor Evans, living at the place the * meaning of the parties expressed in the instrument, if it be a meaning which may be distinctly derived from a mentioned in the will, and a great-granddaughter, Mary Thomas, who lived at a place some miles distant from Merthyr parish. It was held by Lord Kenyan, that evidence of declarations made by the testator at the time the will was made, would have been admissible to show whom the testator meant by the inaccurate description. See also Hampshire v. Peirce, 2 Yes. 216; Strode v. Russell, 2 Vern. 623; Price v. Page, 4 Ves. 680; Still v. Hoste, 6 Madd. & G. 192; Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2 Vera. 593. So far as these cases sanction the doctrine that evidence of intention is admissible in cases not falling under the rule as to latent ambiguity, as defined ante, p. *557, n. (e), they are overruled by the cases of Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244, and Doe d. Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, 5M. & W. 363. In Miller v. Travers, there was a devise of all the testator's estates in the county of Limerick and city of Limerick. At the time of making the will, the testator had no estate in the county of Limerick. He had a small estate in the city of Limerick, inadequate to meet the charges in the will, and considerable estates situate in the county of Clare. It was held, that it could not be shown by parol evidence that the words "county of Limerick" were inserted by mistake, instead of the words "countv of Clare;" and that the testator intended to devise his estate in the county of Clare. See the very able review of the cases by Tindal, C J. In Doe d. Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, a testator devised lands to his son John Hiscocks for life; and from his decease, to his grandson John Hiscocks, eldest son of the said John Hiscocks. At the time of making the will, the testator's son John Hiscocks had been twice married; by his first wife he had one son Simon; by his second wife an eldest son John, and other younger children, sons and daughters. Held, that evidence of the instructions given by the testator for his will, and of his declarations, was not admissible to show which of these two grandsons was intended by the description in the will. Lord Abinger, after stating the facts, and noticing the question raised, said: "It must be admitted that it is not possible altogether to reconcile the different cases that have been decided on this subject; which makes it the more expedient to investigate the principles upon which any evidence to explain the will of a testator ought to be received. The object in all cases is to discover the intention of the testator. The first and most obvious mode of doing this is to read his will as he has written it, and collect his intention from his words. But as his words refer to facts and circumstances respecting his property and his family, and others whom he names or describes in his will, it is evident that the meaning and application of his words cannot be ascertained without evidence of all those facts and circumstances. To understand the meaning of any writer, we must first be apprised of the persons and circumstances that are the subjects of his allusions or statements; and if these are not fully disclosed in his work, we must look for illustration to the history of the times in which he wrote, and to the works of contemporaneous authors. All the facts and circumstances, therefore, respecting persons or property, to which the will relates, are undoubtedly legitimate, and often necessary evidence, to enable us to understand the meaning and application of his words. Again, - the testator may have habitually called certain persons or things by peculiar names, by which they were not commonly known. If these names should occur in his will, they could only be explained and construed by the aid of evidence to show the sense in which he used them, in like manner as if his will were written in cipher, or in a foreign language. The habits of the testator in these particulars must be receivable as evidence to explain the meaning of his will. But there is another mode of obtaining the intention of the testator, which is by evidence of his declarations, of the instructions given for his will, and other circumstances of the like nature, which are not adduced for explaining the words or meaning of the will, but either to supply some deficiency, or remove some obscurity, or to give some effect to expressions that are unmeaning or ambiguous. Now, there is but one case in which it appears to us that this sort of evidence of intention can properly be admitted, and that is, where the meaning of the testator's words is neither ambiguous nor obscure, and where the devise is on the face of it perfect and intelligible, but from some of the circumstances admitted in proof, an ambiguity arises as to which of the two or more things, or which of the two or more persons (each answering the words in the will), the testator intended to express. Thus, if a testator devise his manor of S. to A. B., and has two manors fair and rational interpretation of the words actually used. But if it be * incompatible with such interpretation, the instrument will then be void for uncertainty, or incurable inaccuracy.

A contract may be enforced in its plain and natural, or in its legal meaning, although evidence be offered tending to show that the intention of the parties differed absolutely from their language, unless the transaction be void from fraud, illegality, incapacity, or in some similar way.

Lastly, no contract will be enforced, as a contract, if it have no plain and natural or legal meaning, by itself: and if admissible, extrinsic evidence can only show that the intention of the parties was one which their words do not express. But the supposed contract being set aside for such reasons as these, the parties will be remitted to their original rights and obligations.