(w) Clifford v. Turrell, 1 Younge & C. Cat. in Ch. 138; Bedell's case, 7 Rep. 133 a; Shaw v. Leavitt, 8 Sandf. Ch. 163, 173; Villers v. Beaumont, Dyer, 146 a; Doe d. Milburn v. Salkeld, Willes, 677.

(x) Pott v. Todhunter, 2 Collyer, 76.

(y) Datton v. Tilden, 13 Penn. St 46; Bell v. Bell, 12 Penn. St. 235; Kirkpatrick v. Smith, 10 Humph. 188; Cole v. Taylor, 2 N. J. 69; Fuller v. Crittenden, 9 Conn. 401; Straton v. Rastall, 2 T. R. 866; Ryan v. Rand, 6 Foster, 12.

(z) Where in a receipt money was acknowledged to have been received "for safe keeping," it was held, that no evidence was admissible to show that the money was not deposited for safe-keeping, but was in discharge of a debt. Tisloe v. Graeter, 1 Blackf. 353. See also Egleston v. Knickerbacker, 6 Barb. 458; Smith v. Brown, 3 Hawks, 680: May v. Babcock, 4 Ohio, 346: Stone v. Vance, 6 Ham. (Ohio) 246; Wood v. Perry, Wright (Ohio), 240; Graves v. Harwood, 9 Barb. 477; Wayland v. Mosely, 6 Ala. 480; O'Brien v. Gilchrist, 34 Me. 644.

(a) Goblet v. Beechey, 3 Sim. 24; Wigram on Wills, Appendix, No. 1; Masters v. Masters, 1 P. Wms. 426; Norman v. Morrell, 4 Ves. 769; Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & F. 511; Cabarga v. Seeger, 17 Penn. St 614. The court may always inform itself by means of books and treatises as to the meaning of the terms used in an instrument, especially where that instrument is ancient, or uses scientific terms. Per Tindal, C. J., in Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & F. 568; per Eyre, C. B., in Attorney-General v. Plate Glass Co. 1 Anst 89, 44. In Remon v. Hayward, 2 A. & E. 666, it is said, that a question arising at Nisi Prius, before Lord Denthat the testimony of the experts is so far a matter for the jury, that if it be contradictory and conflicting, or uncertain, it is to be weighed by them. But the legal effect of the words or phrases, when their meaning is ascertained by experts, belongs to the construction of the contract, and is for the court. (b)

1 Where the defendant wrote,"I want to buy, say 100 shares Union Pacific stock on margin," the plaintiff, in an action to recover a balance due, may show by experts the technical meaning of the words "on margin," and a usage among brokers to hold one so buying personally liable in case the security deposited for "margin" proves insufficient. Hatch v. Douglas, 48 Conn. 116.

Questions depending upon the construction or interpretation of a contract sometimes arise between third parties, who had no privity or participation in the original contract, and nothing to do with the language used in it. In such cases much of the reason which prohibits the introduction of extrinsic evidence fails, and with it the prohibition fails. It would be obviously unjust to hold these parties responsible for words which neither of them selected or adopted, or had any power to exclude or to qualify. They may therefore show by extrinsic evidence what the agreement between the original parties, which purports to be expressed by the written contract, * really was, so far as this is necessary to establish their actual rights, and to do full justice between them. (c)1 A simple illustration of this may be found in the rule, that if the two promisors of a note are sued, neither can defend by proving that the one signed only as man, from the obscurity of the handwriting, what the words of a written instrument produced in evidence really were, his lordship decided the question himself, and refused to have it put to the jury.

(b) In Armstrong v. Burrows, 6 Watts, 266, where the only matter in dispute was as to the date of a receipt given by the plaintiff, the date being illegible, the court upon the trial assumed an exclusive right to decipher the instrument, and to determine the date, upon the evidence given. Upon error, Gibson, C. J., in reversing the judgment of the court below, said: "That the court assumed an exclusive right to decipher the contested letters is both true and fatal. It doubtless belongs to it to interpret the meaning of written words; but this extends not to the letters, for to interpret and to decipher are different things. A writing is read before it is expounded, and the ascertainment of the words is finished before the business of exposition begins. If the reading of the judge were not matter of fact, witnesses would not be heard in contradiction of it; and though he is supposed to have peculiar skill in the meaning and construction of language, neither his business nor learning is supposed to give him a superior knowledge of figures or letters. His right to interpret a paper written in Coptic characters would be the same that it is to interpret an English writing; yet the words would be approached only through a translation. The jury were, therefore, not only legally competent to read the disputed word, but bound to ascertain what it was meant to represent." See Cabarga v. Seeger, 17 Penn. St. 514; Jackson v. Ransom, 18 Johns. 107; Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129; Dana v. Fiedler, 2 Kern. 440. (c) Rex v. Scammonden, 8 T. R. 474; Rex v. Laindon, 8 T. R. 879; Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Barb. 582; Krider v. Lafferty, 1 Whart. 303. The parties to an instrument may show the true character of the transaction between them in controversies with strangers. Strader v Lambeth, 7 B. Mon. 589; Reynolds v. Magness, 2 Ired. 26: Venable v. Thompson, 11 Ala. 147.

1 For a case where parol evidence was admitted to vary an insurance policy on the ground that the parties to the suit were not parties to the instrument, see Lowell Manuf. Co. v. Safeguard Ins. Co. 88 N. Y. 591.

surety, and that the other was the principal. But if one of them pays the note and sues the other for contribution, the defendant may show in bar to the action that he signed only as surety for the plaintiff.

The rule in relation to extrinsic evidence prohibits the admission of oral testimony " to contradict or vary "the terms of a valid written contract. (d) Therefore, there is nothing in this rule to prevent the introduction of such testimony for the purpose of explaining the contract. But here a distinction is taken, which, if it did not originate with Lord Bacon, was first clearly stated by him; it is the distinction between a patent ambiguity and a latent ambiguity. (e)