(p) Thus in Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio, 257, A and B having mutual causes of action in tort against each other, had an interview to adjust the demands of B; and for the satisfaction of such demands, A paid him a sum of money and took his receipt; but B insisted, as a condition to such adjustment, that A should execute to him a receipt in "full of all demands" on his part, to which A consented, and such receipt was given, nothing being said respecting the particular demand of A. Held, notwithstanding, that it was a good accord and satisfaction of A's cause of action against B. So, in Foster v. Trull, 12 Johns. 466, it was held, that an agreement by two, having each an action for false imprisonment pending against the other, to discontinue their respective actions, and an actual discontinuance accordingly, are a good accord and satisfaction. So, an agreement to refer mutual causes of action to arbitration, and a performance of the agreement, is a good accord and satisfaction in respect of such causes of action. Williams v. The London Commercial Exchange Co. 10 Exch. 509, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 429.

(q) Ernes v. Widdowson, 4 C. & P. 151.

(r) Maze v. Miller, 1 Wash. C. C. 328; Sinard v. Patterson, 8 Blackf. 354; Hall v. Flockton, 16 Q. B. 439, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 185; State Bank v. Little John, 1 Dev. & Bat. 565. And it is entirely a question for the jury, whether there was an acceptance. Every receipt is not an acceptance. To constitute an acceptance there must be an act of the will. Hardman v. Bellhouse, 9 M. & W. 600; Brenner v. Herr, 8 Penn. St. 106. So whether a note or bond is accepted in satisfaction of an original claim, or only as collateral security, is for the jury. Stone v. Miller, 16 Penn. St. 4%0; Harn v. Kiehi, 38 Penn. St. 147.

(s) Thus, in Jones v. Sawkins, 5 C. B. 142, in an action of debt for use and occupation of certain rooms and apartments of the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded: 1st That the plaintiff during the demise, and before the commencement of the suit, took the defendant's goods as a distress, they being of sufficient value to satisfy the rent and costs of the distress, etc.; that the plaintiff never sold the goods, but retained them until just before the commencement of the suit, when he, with the assent of the defendant received and accepted them, and still retained them in satisfaction, etc. 2. That after the accruing of the causes of action, and before the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff wrongfully seized the defendant's goods, being of value more than sufficient to satisfy the causes of action and retained them for an unreasonable time, namely, etc., and converted them; that it was, before the commencement of the suit, agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant, that, for the termination of disputes between them concerning the causes of action in the declaration, and claims made by the defendant in respect to the seizure and conversion, such demands and rights of action should be mutually relinquished; and that the plaintiff should retain the goods as a final settlement in full satisfaction and discharge of the said causes of action; and that the plaintiff accepted and received, and still retained the said goods in such full satisfaction and discharge. 3. That the plaintiff wrongfully seized the defendant's goods to the value of all the moneys in the declaration mentioned, and detained the goods for an unreasonable time, and converted them, and wrongfully disturbed the defendant in the peaceable possession of the rooms; that the plaintiff was desirous of regaining possession of the rooms; that after the accruing of the causes of action, and before the commencement of the suit, it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant, that, to put an end to disputes in respect of the causes of action in that plea mentioned, and other alleged causes of action on the part of the defendant, they should mutually relinquish their claims; that the plaintiff should retain the goods in full satisfaction and discharge of his claim, and that the defendant should relinquish her right to and give up possession of the rooms, and should be discharged by plaintiff from all claims ; and that the defendant accordingly relinquished her claims to, and gave up possession during the tenancy, and the plaintiff resumed, and still retained possession of, the rooms, and retained the goods so seized, in satisfaction and discharge of the causes of action. Held, that the pleas were good pleas of accord and satisfaction. Held, also, that the replications - which in substance alleged that the plaintiff did not seize or detain any goods of the defendant of sufficient value to satisfy the rents and costs, or of value sufficient for a full satisfaction and discharge of the causes of action - were bad, as raising an immaterial issue. (t) Thus, it is settled that a mere repromise to accept this sum in full. (wx) 1 And so would any other consideration for the payment. We have seen that a promise, without execution, is no satisfaction, unless it has this effect by express agreement. And on the same principle, if the promise be executed literally, or in form, but is rendered inoperative or worthless to the creditor by the debtor's act or omission, this has no effect as an accord and satisfaction. (x) If the accord and satisfaction be made by a third party, and is accepted as satisfaction, it would seem to be sufficient, if the actual debtor consent to look upon it as such. (y)

1 Works v. Hershey, 35 la, 340.

* otherwise he would not have had.(u) Thus, to an action for wrongfully taking cattle, it is no plea that it was agreed that plaintiff might have them again; for this the law would have given him; and the return of the cattle is not a satisfaction for the injury caused by the detention of them. (v) But although it has been held, that the thing given in satisfaction must have a distinct value at law, and therefore the release of equities of redemption could not be a satisfaction for want of such value, (w) it cannot be doubted, that if the satisfaction be actual, and have a real value in fact, either at law or in equity, it would be held sufficient.