It has been said by a very high authority, that "If the master's situation were such, that, but for a voluntary destruction of a part of the vessel or her furniture, the whole would certainly and unavoidably have been lost, he could not claim a restitution; because a thing cannot be said to have been sacrificed, which had already ceased to be of any value." (q)

This cannot be true. Such a principle or rule as this would cut off precisely those cases to which the law of general average is always applied, and has been for more than three thousand years. There are always cases in which, but for the voluntary destruction of a part, the whole must be lost; and it is precisely because this voluntary destruction of a part does save the rest, which could not otherwise be saved, that a claim for contribution exists. If the rest could have been saved without this loss of a part, that loss would have been unnecessary. It cannot be needed to give instances of this, for all cases of general average are such instances.

(m) Scudder v. Bradford, 14 Pick. 13; Bradhurst v. Col. Ins. Co. 9 Johns. 9; Gray v. Waln, 2 8. & R 255; Sims v. Gurney, 4 Binn. 524. In Lee v. Grinnell, 6 Doer, 422, the rigging and masts of a vessel which were on fire, were cut away, with the expectation that they would fall overboard, and thus save the ship and cargo. A spar fell through the deck and set fire to the cargo, whereby both it and the ship were partially consumed.

Assuming that the purpose was accomplished, the court were divided on the question whether the masts were to be contributed for.

(n) Myers v. The Harriet, 2 Whart Dig. p. 48.

(o) Nelson v. Belmont, 6 Duer, 826.

(p) Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co. 8 Sumner, 610.

(q) Benecke in Stevens & Benecke on Average, Phil. ed. 110.

It is still true, that if the very thing lost must itself be inevitably lost, and could not be saved by the loss of anything else, then the loss of it does not come within the meaning of the word "sacrifice," as used in the law of general average.

If, for example, masts are blown over, and still hang to the * vessel by the rigging, they may be said to be voluntarily lost, if the rigging be cut to let them go. But it is obvious that no claim for general average could now be made, unless, possibly, the ship was near a port of safety, and might have dragged the masts and sails in, and so saved them; but this can hardly be supposed. (r) So, too, where a vessel was laden with lime, and the lime was on fire, and the vessel was scuttled to save her, and thereby the lime was destroyed at once, the ship was not required to contribute for the loss of the lime, because that could not have been saved in any way; and the scuttling which saved the ship only hastened the inevitable destruction of the lime, but did not cause it. (s) It is, however, generally true, that if a ship be scuttled, or filled with water, to save herself, and thereby saves so much of the cargo as the fire has not reached, and the cargo which the fire does not reach, is injured by the water, the ship, if saved, contributes for the injury to the cargo. (t) l

Nor is the effect of the sacrifice critically inquired into. Questions of this sort have arisen; but we should say, that if a sacrifice of maritime property be made to save other property, and that other property be saved in point of fact, it must contribute, although it may not be certain that it was saved directly and without the intervention of other causes, by that sacrifice. (u)

(r) Nickerson v. Tyson, 8 Mass. 467; Stevens & Benecke on Average, Phil. ed. 111.

(s) Crockett v. Dodge, 3 Fair! 190. See Col. Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 13 Pet. 340; Marshall v. Garner, 6 Barb. 394. See Lee v. Grinnell, 6 Duer, 400, ante, p. •328, n. (m).

(t) Nelson v. Belmont, 5 Duer, 828;

Lee v. Grinnell, id. 400. In Nimick v. Holmes, 26 Penn. State, 366, the distinction between the goods already on fire and the rest of the cargo was not noticed, and it was held that all which were damaged by water were to be contributed for. (u) But see Scudder v. Bradford, 14 Pick. 13; Stevens and Benecke on Average, Phillips ed. 100, 105-107.

1 The pouring of water on the cargo by the master's orders, to put out a fire in the hold, is a general average act, and if the cargo is thereby injured, the owner is entitled to contribution. Whitecross, etc. Co. v. Savill, 8 Q. B.D. 653. See Stewart v. West India, etc. Co. L. R. 8 Q. B. 88.