Seaton v. Booth, 4 A. & E. 528, Assumpsit. A, B, & C, being interested in certain lands, but having no common, legal interest in any porton of them, agreed together, according to their respective interests, to put them up for other, which is in some cases carried * very far. Thus, if several plaintiffs sue for a joint demand, and the deplaintiffs had authorized the accord and satisfaction, the plea is nevertheless good. (w) For a release of a debt, or of a claim to damages, by one of many who hold this debt or claim jointly, is a full discharge of it, and this whether they hold this debt or claim in their own right, or as executors or administrators. (x) This has been extended to the case where the release is given by one of joint plaintiffs, who, although a party to the record, is not a party in interest, but whose name the actual parties in interest were obliged to use with their own in bringing the * action. (y) Nevertheless, if in such a case the party taking the release and pleading it in bar is aware that the party giving it had no interest in the claim released, the court would disregard the release; (z) and upon such facts as these the court have ordered the release to be given up and cancelled. (a) fendant pleads in bar an accord and satisfaction with * one of the plaintiffs, but without any allegation that the other sale, and the lands were so put up, under the direction of their agents, in lots. Each lot was described in a separate paper, containing the conditions of sale, in which it was stipulated, among other things, that if the purchaser should be let into the premises before payment of the purchase-money, he should be considered tenant at will to the vendors, and pay interest at the rate of four per cent on the amount of purchase-money, as and for rent. Defendant bought four of the lots, and was let into possession, and held for several years without paying the purchase-money; whereupon the vendors brought their joint action against him, to recover rent. Their declaration contained two counts: one upon the contract between the plaintiffs and defendant for the sale of the property; the other for use and occupation. Held, that the action 'could not be sustained on either count; not on the first, because no joint contract with all the plaintiffs was proved; not on the second, because no joint ownership in the plaintiffs, and occupation under them, was proved. - Wilkinson v. Hall, 1 Bing. N. C. 713. Action of debt against lessee for double value, under stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, for holding over. Held, that tenants in common could not maintain such action jointly where there had been no joint demise. "If there he no joint demise, there must be several actions for rent, for a joint action is not maintainable except upon a joint demise." Tindal, C. J. - Servante v. James, 10 B. & C. 410. Covenant. The defendant who was master of a vessel, covenanted with the plaintiff and others, part-owners, and their several and respective executors, administrators, and assigns, to pay certain moneys to them and to their and every of their several and respective executors, administrators, and assigns, at a certain banker's, and in such parts and proportions as were set against their several and respective names. The action was brought by all the covenantees jointly. Held, that the covenant was several, and so the action not well brought, but each covenantee should have brought a separate action. - Graham v. Robertson, 2 T. R. 282. Plaintiffs, together with A & B, being owners of one ship, and the defendant of another, a prize was taken, condemned, and shared by agreement between them; afterwards the sentence of condemnation was reversed, and restitution awarded, with costs, which was paid solely by the plaintiffs, A and 1? having in the mean time become bankrupts. An action could not be brought by the plaintiffs alone for a moiety of the restitution money and costs, because it was either a partnership transaction, when A and B ought to be joined; or not, when separate actions should be brought by each of the persons paying. See also Smith v. Hunt, 2 Chitt. 142; Brandon v. Hubbard, 2 Br. & B. 11; Tippet v. Hawkey, 3 Mod. 263; Makepeace v. Coutes, 8 Mass. 451, overruled in Capen v. Barrows, 1 Gray, 376; Brand v. Boulcott, 3 B. & P. 235; Kelby v. Steel, 5 Esp. 194.

American Cases. - Boggs v. Curtin, 10 S. & It. 211. Two firms, C. & B. and J. & D., having become sureties for A., gave their joint and several note for the debt of A. Held, that the two firms, on payment by them of the note, could not maintain a joint action against A., it not appearing that the payment was made out of a joint fund of the two firms. "The action of assumpsit must be joint or several, accordingly as the promise on which it is founded is joint or several. Where the promise is express, there can be little difficulty in determining to which class it belongs, as its nature necessarily appears on the face of the contract itself; and if it be joint, all to whom it is made must, or at least may sue on it jointly . . . But an implied promise, being altogether ideal, and raised out of the consideration only by intendment of law, follows the nature of the consideration; and as that is joint or several, so will the promise be." Gibson, J. - Carthrae v. Brown, 3 Leigh, 98. C. covenanted with B. & J. that he would pay B. and J. $300, namely, to each of them one moiety thereof. Held, a several covenant, so that B., as the survivor of the two, could not maintain an action to recover the whole sum. - Ulmer v. Cunningham, 2 Greenl. 117. Assumpsit for money had and received. Goods, belonging to some and not to all of sundry joint debtors, were taken in execution and wasted. Held, that all the debtors could not maintain a joint action against the sheriff, and that those only ought to have sued whose property was actually wasted. See also Adriatic Fire Ins. Co. v. Treadwell, 108 U S. 361.

If two or more are jointly bound or jointly and severally bound, and the obligee releases to one of them, all are discharged. (b) Formerly a very strict and technical rule was applied to these cases; thus where an action was brought against one of three who were bound jointly and severally, a plea in bar that the seal of one of the others was torn off was held good. And where three were bound jointly and severally, and the seals of two were eaten off by rats, the court inclined to think the obligation void against all. (c) But if the seals had remained on until issue were joined, their removal afterwards would not have avoided the bond. (d)